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This dissertation studies the labor market effect of different educational policies in Latin
America. The first two chapters are focused on a market level analysis. The first chapter
develops a framework to evaluate the labor market effects of different types of educational
expansions in four labor market outcomes: (1) the occupational structure of employment;
(2) the assignment of workers with different level of education to occupations; (3) the wage
level for each educational group; and (4) the wage gaps between educational groups. I
evaluate three policy experiments consistent on increasing secondary schooling, increasing
higher education, and increasing both. In the second Chapter, I apply the framework to
study the case of Brazil, a country that underwent a major educational expansion during the
period 1995-2014. I provide some new stylized facts for Brazil on the inter-linkages between
changes in education, occupations, and wages over the period of 1995-2014— changes in
outcomes (1)-(4). I found that: (a) the occupational structure of employment improved,
but that improvement was very small when compared to the extension of the educational
expansion; (b) the conditional occupational attainment declined for each educational group—
primary or less, secondary, and university; (c) and average wages increased but not for
all educational groups since wages of primary educated workers increased while wages of
more educated workers declined; (d) there were large reductions in inequality as measured
by educational wage gaps. Then, I show that the model’s predictions for the Brazilian
educational expansion are qualitatively consistent with the patterns observed in the data. I
further demonstrate that, after calibrating the model, the educational expansion in Brazil
was of utmost importance for generating the observed quantitative changes in the labor
market. In the last chapter, I moved from a market level to an individual level analysis
to evaluate the effect of a negative educational shock on workers’ lifetime earnings. In
particular, I examine how school disruptions caused by teacher strikes in Argentina affect
students’ long-run outcomes by exploiting cross-cohort variation in the prevalence of teacher
strikes within and across provinces in Argentina in a difference-in-difference framework. I
find robust evidence that teacher strikes worsen the future labor market outcomes of students
when they are between 30 and 40 years old.
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CHAPTER 1
THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF AN EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION:
A THEORETICAL MODEL
1.1 Introduction
Increases in human capital through formal education are widely cited as a key driver of
economic development (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008, 2012). Most countries have expe-
rienced or are experiencing a rapid increase in the educational attainment of their workforce.
Between 1990 and 2010 the worldwide average enrollment rates in secondary and university
education grew by around 25 percentage points each (Barro and Lee, 2013). These educa-
tional expansions are uneven in the sense that they raise the educational level of some workers
while leaving that of others unchanged. Those workers receiving the additional education
are expected to increase their human capital, earn higher wages, and have access to better
jobs. But an educational expansion likely affects the rest of the workforce as well, positively
or negatively. By generating general equilibrium effects, an influx of more educated workers
can transform the labor market by reshaping the occupational composition of employment
(what jobs are available in the economy and who performs them) together with changing
the entire wage distribution (the wages on these jobs). The direction and magnitude of
these effects are by no means obvious. For example, workers who remain with low levels of
education may be hurt if they are displaced to worse jobs, where wages remain stagnant or
decline, or they may become better off if their wages increase as result of a higher demand
for their jobs (generated by general equilibrium effects) coupled with a lower labor supply.
Given the welfare implications of these different scenarios, it is of utmost importance for
policymakers to better understand how the labor market responds to different educational
1
expansions.
This chapter provides a theoretical framework to study the labor market effects of an
educational expansion using a task-based model. The model assigns workers with three
levels of education—low, medium, and high—to a continuum of occupations that vary in
complexity and are combined to produce a final good. Workers’ types differ in their produc-
tivity when performing each occupation so that there is an optimal assignment of workers’
types to occupations. The key assumption of the model is that the comparative advantage of
more educated workers relative to less educated workers increases with the complexity of the
occupation. This assumption ensures positive assortative matching, where more educated
workers are optimally assigned to more complex occupations.
In equilibrium, the model generates four labor market outcomes: (1) an occupational
structure of employment (the share of workers employed in each occupation); 2) an assign-
ment of workers’ types to occupations; (3) a wage level for each educational group; and (4)
wage gaps between educational groups. I analyze the effects on these equilibrium outcomes
under three alternative policy experiments: (i) a “type–h” educational expansion defined
as an increase in the share of high educated workers through a decline in the share of low
educated workers; (ii) a “type–m educational expansion defined as an increase in the share
of medium educated workers through a reduction in the share of low educated workers; and
(iii) a “type–h&m” educational expansion characterized by an increase in the shares of both
high and medium educated workers.
I find that the predicted effects depend on whether the increase took place in high (type–
h) or medium education (type–m). When there is an increase in both (type–h&m), one of
these effects dominates depending on the extent of the changes in relative supplies—high to
medium and medium to low.
2
There are several differences among each type of educational expansion. With respect to
occupational outcomes (1) and (2), an increase in higher education lowers the conditional
occupational attainment for each educational group, while an increase in secondary education
improves the occupational attainment of high educated workers and expands the range of
occupations where medium educated workers are employed. With respect to outcome (3), an
increase in higher education raises wages of low educated, lowers wages of high educated, and
generates ambiguous changes in wages of medium educated. On the other hand, educational
expansions focused on medium education decline wages of medium educated and generate
ambiguous changes in wages for the remaining groups. Finally, I find an increase in higher
education always declines wage inequality as measured by wage gaps of workers with different
educational level, outcome (4), while an educational expansion focused on medium education
reduces the wage gap between medium and low educated workers but increases the gap
between high and medium educated.
I also find some similarities between the different types of educational expansions. When
any educational expansion takes place, there is always a decline of the occupational attain-
ment for low educated workers, the occupational composition of employment presents small
changes when compared to the extent of the educational expansion, and there is a decline
in wages for at least one educational group.
The task-based approach used here is not new to the economic literature. This type
of model was first proposed by Autor et al. (2003), and it has been broadly used since to
analyze the effects of technological changes.1 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
paper to use this framework to investigate in detail the labor market effects of different types
1Some variations of this approach are present in Acemoglu and Autor (2011); Autor and Dorn (2013);
Goos et al. (2014); Beaudry et al. (2016); Burstein et al. (2016); Deming (2017); Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018). See Autor (2013) for a comprehensive discussion on the task approach.
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of educational expansions.2
The version of the model I used here is closely related to Acemoglu and Autor (2011). I
differ from Acemoglu and Autor (2011) by shifting the focus of the analysis from technological
changes to educational expansions. To that end, I incorporate three dimensions. First,
I modify the model to be more suitable to study educational expansions by adding the
restriction of a measure of workers in the economy equal to one. Thus, if the number of
workers in one group increase there must be a corresponding decline in one of the other
educational groups. This modification is crucial to correctly account for changes in skill
supplies resulting from an educational expansion. Second, I investigate changes in a broader
set of outcomes by studying changes in the overall occupational composition of employment
and in real wages.3 Third, I provide an empirical strategy to calibrate the model and
quantitatively assess the importance of changes in education on the patterns observed in the
data. This empirical strategy is presented in Chapter 2, where I use data from Brazil to
calibrate the model.
The model presented here provides unique predictions that differ from other theoretical
models previously used to analyze the labor market effects of an educational expansion. In my
framework, wages and occupations (overall and for each educational group) are interlinked,
and they are simultaneously determined in equilibrium. On the contrary, most of the existing
literature on the labor market effects of an increase in education is concentrated either on
its effect on the wage distribution or on the effects on occupations, usually considering
one of these dimensions as fixed.4 A descriptive analysis of this literature can be found
2Teulings (2005) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) also use a similar model to study the effects of changes
in the skill distribution of the labor force on the wage distribution and the occupational composition of
employment, but do not refer to increases in education. These models include a continuum of workers skills
which is not explicitly related to education. This makes the effects of changes in the distribution of skills
difficult to interpret in terms of an educational expansion.
3Acemoglu and Autor (2011) analyze the distribution of workers across occupations and relative wages.
4Some models allows some wages and some occupations to change, while others remain fixed Fields (2018).
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in Fields (1995), who presents the labor market consequences of an educational expansion
under different scenarios depending on the functioning of the labor market.
Fields (1995) distinguishes between two set of models. First, there are models with
stratified labor markets by workers’ educational level, where wages fluctuate when supply
changes, but the occupations performed by a given worker type are fixed.5 In this context,
an educational expansion will shift the labor supplies in each market, but it does not change
the occupations performed by each type of worker.6 On the contrary, in the model presented
here, an educational expansion affects the occupational attainment of each type of worker
since it is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
Second, there are other models that consider labor market to be segmented, where wages
in the high earning sector are fixed and only a fixed number of positions or slots are available.7
The first contribution to this literature is Fields (1974), who considers that high educated
workers are hired preferentially for the best jobs available in the economy. Fields (1974)
finds that an educational expansion increases the number of preferential hiring taking place,
leaving fewer high-wage jobs to unskilled workers who are increasingly employed in the low-
wage sector defined as fall-back jobs. Given that low educated workers are bumped into to
low-wage jobs, Fields (1995) refers to these as “bumping models” of the labor market. Fields
(2018) expands the previous model to the study of social and private returns to education
under different scenarios of fallback jobs.8 In these models, wages of low educated workers
5Becker (1964) presents the first version of this model. Fields (1995) refers to it as he “standard textbook
model” for its broad use to studying stratified labor markets.
6Other recent examples of more elaborated versions of the textbook model are papers that use the Katz
and Murphy (1992) relative supply and demand framework to study changes in wage inequality (Goldin and
Katz, 2009; Gasparini et al., 2011a; Messina and Silva, 2017). These model can be interpreted as implicitly
assuming stratified labor markets since workers with a given educational level produce only one input.
7To consider fixed wages in one sector of the economy is a common assumption in the segmented labor
markets literature, such as the novel contributions of Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro (1970).
8There are three cases: a) everyone has access to a fallback job with a fixed wage, b) wages fall on
fallback jobs as labor supply increases, and c) there is a limited number of fallback jobs that will also hire
5
usually do not increase with an educational expansion as these workers are increasingly
employed on fallback jobs for which wages are either fix or decline with increases in supply,
and they are more likely to be unemployed because they are bumped by high educated
workers. Similar results are also present in Lazear et al. (2016) by using a model where
hiring into posted job slots is based on comparative advantage, so that the likelihood of
being hired into a given position not only depends on the worker’s skill but also on the skills
of other applicants. These predictions contrast with the ones of the framework developed in
this chapter. To mention some key differences, the number of jobs in high-paid occupations
is not fixed in my model and wages of low educated always increases when there is an
educational expansion centered on high educated workers.
Another strand of the literature studies the effects of increases in education on wage
premiums and inequality. It is a well-known result that an increase in the relative supply
of skills causes a decline in wage premiums if the technology of the production function is
constant (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Goldin and Katz, 2009; Gasparini et al., 2011a; Acemoglu
and Autor, 2011). This paper adds to the analysis of wage gaps by including the effects on
real wages for each educational group, for different percentiles of the wage distribution, and
the occupational structure of employment.
In my framework, an educational expansion in high education generates lower occupa-
tional attainment for each educational group. This result relates to the literature on overe-
ducation, where there is also an allocation problem of deciding which workers will perform
which jobs, but there are mismatches arising from incomplete markets such as imperfect in-
formation or job-search frictions (Sattinger, 1993; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011; Sattinger,
2012). In this literature, there are Pareto improvements to be made by switching workers
across occupations, and policy interventions that ameliorate these frictions are desirable. In
more educated workers preferentially.
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my model, more educated workers also end up in occupations where their skills have a lower
productivity differential when compared to less educated workers, but they are optimally
assigned to those occupations by labor market forces (supply and demand) and there is no
wage or productivity gain to be made by switching workers across occupations. My finding
indicates that more educated workers may be increasingly employed in occupations where
their acquired human capital through formal education is less relevant in terms of produc-
tivity differentials to perform those occupations. This lower occupational attainment results
from labor market forces (demand and supply) acting in an environment where education
expands and technology is fixed, as opposed to being originated by labor market frictions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section
3 contains the predictions of the model for different policy experiments; and Section 4 con-
cludes.
1.2 The Task-based Model
1.2.1 Environment
I follow Acemoglu and Autor (2011) set up of the Ricardian “task-based” model, henceforth
the AA model. I modify the model slightly by adding a restriction on the measure of workers
which has to be equal to one. This small modification turns out to be key to study the effects
of different types of educational expansions in the next section. However, this modification
has no impact on the initial equilibrium conditions, which are identical to theirs. I follow
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) derivations below, adding a formal expression for the wage levels
which are one of the four outcomes I study in this chapter.
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In this economy, there is a unique final good produced by combining a continuum of
tasks represented in the unit interval [0, 1].9 The final good is produced by combining these
different tasks.10 The production function is Cobb-Douglas, mapping the tasks produced to
the final good. Let Y denote the production of the unique final good and let y(i) be the
production level of the task i, then:
Y = exp
[∫ 1
0
ln y(i) di
]
. (1.1)
The economy is closed in the sense that all tasks have to be produced within the economy
(no trade in tasks). The tasks can be produced by using three type of workers —low,
medium, and high educated—which are perfect substitutes, in terms of efficiency units, in
the production of each task i. Workers’ types differ in their productivity to perform each
task, where productivity is defined as the amount of output of task i produced by a worker
in a given time period. This constitutes the only difference among workers such that all
workers with a given educational level are equally productive in the production of tasks.
Consider AJ to be the factor-augmenting technology of input J and αJ(i) to be the task-
specific productivity of input J in task i, with J = {L,M,H}. The production of each task
i is defined as:
y(i) = ALαL(i)L(i) + AMαM(i)M(i) + AHαH(i)H(i),
where L(i), M(i) and H(i) are the amount of workers employed in producing task i with
low, medium, and high education, respectively. There are two key assumptions in the model.
First, tasks can be ordered by a unidimensional level of complexity represented by the index
9A task relates here to the main activity involved in a occupation. For example, for drivers their task
production in a given period is the “number of miles driven”, for teachers it is the “increases of students’
human capital”, and for researchers it is the “number of publishable papers produced”.
10The same equilibrium conditions will hold if each task is interpreted as a differentiable good purchased
by consumers whose utility function is identical to the production function of the final good considered here.
This has already been noted by Costinot and Vogel (2010).
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i ∈ [0, 1] , where 0 represents the least complex task and 1 stands for the most complex
task. Second, the comparative advantage of more educated workers relative to less educated
workers increases with the complexity of the task and they are continuously differentiable
on i. That is,
∂ αM (i)
αL(i)
∂i
> 0,
∂ αH(i)
αM (i)
∂i
> 0. (1.2)
These are key assumption of the model because they establish the structure of compar-
ative advantage across tasks, ensuring positive assortative matching. In equilibrium, more
educated workers are optimally assigned to more complex tasks. I further assume that
more educated workers have an absolute advantage in the production of all tasks. That is,
ALαL(i) < AMαM(i) < AHαH(i) ∀ i ∈ (0, 1). This assumption does not affect the assign-
ment of workers across tasks and ensures that a more educated labor force always produces
more output.11
Let l, m and h be the share of low, medium, and high educated workers in the economy.
I further assume that there is no unemployment so that labor market clearing requires that:
∫ 1
0
L(i)di = l;
∫ 1
0
M(i)di = m;
∫ 1
0
H(i)di = h. (1.3)
Finally, I assume that there is a measure of workers equal to 1 in the economy,
l +m+ h = 1; (1.4)
Note that because of the assumption of a measure 1 of workers, L(i), M(i) and H(i) are
interpreted as the share of the population with a specific level of education employed in task
i. The labor supply for each of the three types can be defined by two parameters, e.g. h
11The assumption on the absolute advantage is important in Section 1.3 to provide unambiguous predic-
tions of directional changes in real wages for each educational group. It has no impact on the results of this
section.
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and m. When either h or m goes up there must be a corresponding decrease in the share
of workers with another level of education. This is the most significant difference between
the environment of my model and that of Acemoglu and Autor (2011).12 This restriction is
a fundamental feature of an educational expansion where some percentage of the workforce
will move from one educational level to another, increasing the supply of a more educated
group by reducing the supply of a less educated group.
1.2.2 Initial Equilibrium with Given Educational Attainments
Results from the AA model
The wage and employment determination mechanisms in this model are similar to the
traditional demand and supply textbook model with stratified labor markets. There are three
labor markets, one for each educational group. The labor supply in each market is fixed,
exogenously determined, and equal to l,m, and h. Because there is no unemployment, the
employment level for each type equals supply. There is a downward sloping labor demand
for each type of worker that is going to be determined below. All workers of the same
educational level receive the same wage even when they perform different tasks, and wages
can go up or down to clear the market. The final good market and all labor markets are
competitive in the sense that firms take as given the price of the final good and the wage
of each educational group. The market-level labor demand from profit maximizing firms
is the value of the marginal product of labor in producing the final good. The important
difference with the traditional textbook model is that the demands for each worker type
are interrelated, and the market clearing equilibrium in the three markets needs to be solve
12In Acemoglu and Autor (2011) the number of low, medium, and high educated are independent from
one another so that one can increase while the rest remain fixed.
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simultaneously.
The competitive equilibrium in this economy consists of an assignment of workers’ types
to tasks L(i),M(i), H(i) and real wages for each type of worker WL,WM ,WH , such that
producers maximize profits and labor markets clear, given the supply of skills and the pro-
ductivity across tasks of each type of worker.
The price of the final good is considered to be the numeraire, that is:
exp
[∫ 1
0
ln p(i) di
]
= 1. (1.5)
The structure of this economy implies that the same equilibrium conditions are derived
by considering that there is only one firm producing the final good and each of the tasks, or
that some firms specialize in the production of task i and, in turn, sell the task production
for a price p(i) to the a firm or many firms producing the final good.13 If there is one firm
producing both all tasks and the final good, the same process will take place within the firm.
To make exposition clear, I express the firm problem as two separable problems: the final
good producers problem and the task producers problem.
The producers of the final good have to choose how many tasks to buy to produce the
final good in order to maximize profits, taken prices of both the final good and all tasks as
given. The final good producer problem is:
Max
y(i)
Y −
[∫ 1
0
y(i)p(i) di
]
. (1.6)
The task producers observe the price of each task i and the wages of workers with different
13Because the production function is homogeneous of degree one on tasks, it makes no difference to assume
that one firm is producing the final good or that there is N identical firms in the market. To see this, consider
the case of N firms producing total output Y N =
∑N
exp
[∫ 1
0 ln y(i)/N di
]
=
∑N
explnY expln−N = Y .
The result follows from identical firms demanding the same amount of task y(i) so that the total production
of a task is equally distributed among them.
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educational level, and decide how many workers of each type to hire for the production of
task i. Because of the assumption that labor markets are competitive, all workers with a
given educational level have to earn the same wage, independent of the task that they are
performing. The task producer problem for task i is:
Max
L(i),M(i),H(i)
p(i)y(i)− wLL(i)− wMM(i)− wHH(i). (1.7)
The equilibrium conditions in this model are identical to those in Acemoglu and Autor
(2011). The equilibrium is easy to characterize given the positive assortative matching that
arises from the supermodularity in the production function and the assumption that the
comparative advantage of more educated workers with respect to less educated workers is
increasing in i. In particular, there exist two thresholds that determine which tasks are
carried out by low, medium and high educated workers. Restating Lemma 1 from Acemoglu
and Autor (2011):
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium there exist {IL, IH} ∈ (0, 1) with IL < IH such that for any
i < IL, L(i) > 0 and M(i) = H(i) = 0; for any i ∈ (IL, IH), M(i) > 0 and L(i) = H(i) = 0;
and for any i > IH ,H(i) > 0 and L(i) = M(i) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
These thresholds naturally arise from the assumption that comparative advantage is in-
creasing in i, generating positive assortative matching. Intuitively, it is optimal for employers
to use the most productive workers (high educated) for the more complex tasks over the in-
terval (IH , 1) of tasks complexity, where they have a larger comparative advantage. It is
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also in their profit-maximizing interest to employ low educated workers in the tasks of low
complexity which belong to the interval (0, IL). And finally, medium educated workers will
be employed in the remaining tasks with a medium level of complexity located in the inter-
val (IL, IH). I show below that these thresholds IL, IH arise from solving the maximization
problem of the firms, both the final good producers and the tasks producers, and the fact
that competitive labor markets clear.
Workers of the same type may perform different tasks but earn the same wage because
markets are competitive. Letting wL, wM , and wH be the wage of low, mediu, and high
educated respectively, from the first order condition of the tasks producers problem it is
possible to state:
wL = p(i)ALαL(i) ∀i < IL.
wH = p(i)AMαM(i) ∀i ∈ (IL, IH).
wH = p(i)AHαH(i) ∀i > IH .
It implies that for two tasks i and i′ that are produced using the same type of labor it must
be the case that tasks’ price differences exactly offset productivity differences. Therefore,
there is one price for all tasks produced the same type of worker. Let PL, PM , and PH be
the price for tasks produced by low, medium, and high educated workers, respectively, then:
p(i)αL(i) = p(i′)αL(i′) ≡ PL ∀i, i′ ∈ (0, IL). (1.8)
p(i)αM(i) = p(i′)αM(i′) ≡ PM ∀i, i′ ∈ (IL, IH). (1.9)
p(i)αH(i) = p(i′)αH(i′) ≡ PH ∀i, i′ ∈ (IH , 1). (1.10)
Because the technology of the production function is Cobb-Douglas, from the maximiza-
tion problem of the final good producer, the expenditure across all tasks should be equalized
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(p(i)y(i) = p(i′)y(i′) for any i,i′). It implies that for any two task produced by workers of
educational level J = {L,M,H} the following condition must hold:
p(i)αJ(i)J(i) = p(i′)αJ(i′)J(i′).
Additionally, given equation (1.8), J(i) = J(i′) for all i,i′ performed by worker type
J = {L,M,H}. Let E(i) be the employment in each task i. In order to study the changes in
the employment structure of the economy in the next section, it is useful to define bottom-
level, middle-level and top-level tasks according to whether they were originally performed
for low, medium or high educated workers, respectively, before the educational expansion
took place. The employment levels for each of these categories are represented by EB(i),
EM(i), and ET (i). Using the market clearing condition (1.3),
Ei =

EB(i) = L(i) = (1−m−h)IL , if 0 < i < IL
EM(i) = M(i) = m(IH−IL) , if i ∈ (IL, IH)
ET (i) = H(i) = h(1−IH) , if IH < i < 1.
(1.11)
Equation (1.11) implies that there is a constant level employment among tasks performed
by the same type of worker. Comparing now tasks performed by low educated workers and
those of medium educated workers, and using the fact that total expenditure of employers
in each task has to be the same to maximize profits (because of the production is Cobb-
Douglas), it is possible to write
p(i)ALαL(i)L(i) = p(i′)AMαM(i′)M(i′), for any i < IL, IL < i′ > IH .
Similarly, by comparing task of high educated with those of medium educated we get
p(i)AMαM(i)M(i) = p(i′)AMαM(i′)M(i′), for any IL < i > IH , i′ > IH .
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Using equations (1.8), (1.10), (1.9), (1.11), we can express the relative prices of tasks
produced by different workers as:
PM
PL
=
(
IH − IL
IL
)(
ALl
AHh
)
. (1.12)
PH
PM
=
( 1− IH
IH − IL
)(
AMm
AHh
)
. (1.13)
Consider also that the cost of producing task IL with low or medium educated workers
must be the same or employers could increase profits by using the less expensive worker in
this task. Correspondingly, the cost of producing task IH with medium and high educated
workers must be equalized. We can express these conditions as follows:
p(IL)ALαL(IL)L(IL) = p(IL)AMαM(IL)M(IL).
p(IH)AMαL(IH)M(IH) = p(IH)AHαH(IH)H(IH).
By using (1.11),
(IH − IL)
IL
αL(IL)
αM(IL)
= AM
AL
m
(1−m− h) . (1.14)
(1− IH)
IH − IL
αM(IH)
αH(IH)
= AH
AM
h
m
. (1.15)
These equations provide a unique mapping between the thresholds IH and IL, and the
relative supply and relative productivities of high and low educated workers across different
tasks. These thresholds are uniquely determined. To see this, consider the case of equation
(1.14). If IL is equal to zero, the left-hand-side (LHS) goes to infinite; if IL is equal to IH the
LHS is equal to zero. The LHS is decreasing in IL given the assumption that more educated
workers are more productive in more complex tasks; the right-hand-side is positive and does
not depends on IL. Taken together, there is a unique value of IL ∈ (0, IH) that solves
(1.14), given a value of IH . Using similar arguments, there is a unique value of IH ∈ (IL, 1)
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that solves equation (1.15). Finally, there is a unique pair IL, IH ∈ (0, 1) that solves both
equations simultaneously.
Note that (1.14) and (1.15) together with (1.11) imply that EB(i) > EM(i) > ET (i). This
means that the employment share in tasks performed by low educated workers (those of lower
complexity) is higher than the employment share in tasks performed by medium educated
workers, which in turn are higher than those of high educated workers. The intuition is that
because high educated workers are more productive in all tasks, employers find it profitable
to use them in a broader set of tasks, given that each task is equally important to produce
the final good because the elasticity of substitution across tasks in the production function
is equal to 1.
Wages in the equilibrium are equal to the value of the marginal products of different type
of workers because of the assumption that markets are competitive:
WL = PLAL. (1.16)
WM = PMAM . (1.17)
WH = PHAH . (1.18)
By equations 1.12 and 1.13, relative wages can be expressed as follows:
WM
WL
= PMAM
PLAL
= (IH − IL)
IL
(1− h−m)
m
. (1.19)
WH
WM
= PHAH
PMAM
= (1− IH)
IH
m
h
. (1.20)
Wage levels in the AA model
All the results presented in the previous section can be found in Acemoglu and Autor
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(2011). In this section, I derived a functional form for the wage levels to finish characterizing
the equilibrium.
First, it is necessary to compute price levels. Due to the choice of the numeraire,[∫ 1
0 ln p(i) di
]
= 0 from equation (1.6) and equations (1.8), (1.9) and (1.10),
∫ IL
0
(ln PL − ln αL(i)) di+
∫ IH
IL
(ln PM − ln αM(i)) di+
∫ 1
IH
(ln PH − ln αH(i)) di = 0.
(1.21)
This equation together with (1.19) and (1.20) solve for the price levels PL, PM and
PH . Having estimated prices, real wages are computed using (1.16), (1.17) and (1.18). Let
AV P be the average productivity in the production of tasks in the economy, CHM(i) be
the comparative advantage of high with respect to medium educated workers at task i, and
CML(i) be the comparative advantage of medium relative to low educated workers at task
i. Wage levels can be expressed in terms of AV P , CHM(IH), CML(IL) and the thresholds
levels IH and IL, that is:
ln WH = AV P + IHCHM(IH) + ILCML(IL) (1.22)
ln WM = AV P − (1− IH)CHM(IH) + ILCML(IL) (1.23)
ln WL = AV P − (1− IH)CHM(IH)− (1− IL)CML(IL) (1.24)
where,
AV P =
∫ IL
0
ln ALαL(i) di+
∫ IH
IL
ln AMαM(i) di+
∫ 1
IH
ln AHαH(i) di.
and
CHM(j) = ln AHαH(j)− ln AMαM(j)
CML(j) = ln AMαM(j)− ln ALαM(j).
17
The wages for each type of worker have two components, one is common for all workers
and the other contains two terms that are specific to each type of worker. The common
factor is the average productivity of tasks’ production in the economy. The type-specific
component adds (subtracts) to the average labor productivity depending on how much more
(less) productive workers of a type are exactly at the task thresholds, weighted by the number
of tasks each type performs.
From taking the difference of equations (1.22)-(1.24), the wage gaps in the model are
equal to the productivity differential at the task thresholds. That is:
ln WH − ln WM = CHM(IH) (1.25)
ln WM − ln WL = CML(IL) (1.26)
ln WH − ln WL = CHM(IH) + CML(IL). (1.27)
The four labor market outcomes of interest for this paper are defined by equations (1.11),
(1.14), (1.15), and (1.22)-(1.27). They determine, respectively, the employment distribution
across tasks in the entire economy; the distribution of workers’ type to tasks; the wage levels
for each type; and the wage gaps between types.
An intuitive depiction of the equilibrium is shown in Figure 1.1. The figure contains the
level of task complexity (i) on the horizontal axis and the relative productivities and wages
on the vertical axis. The thresholds IL and IH define the assignment of workers’ types to
tasks, such that low educated workers perform tasks below IL, medium educated workers
those between IL and IH , and high educated workers carry out the most complex tasks above
IH . The function that defines the comparative advantage across tasks, CHM(i) and CML(i),
are increasing in the complexity of the task defined by i, and relative wages are defined by
the comparative advantage (relative productivity) among different types at the thresholds
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IL and IH . Employment and wages of equilibrium are shown in Figure 1.2. Panel A presents
the employment share in each task and the average task for workers of a given educational
group. Panel B displays the wage levels for different percentiles of the wage distribution
divided by 100. Considering that wages are the same for all workers of a given educational
type and that WL < WM < WH , the lowest l percentiles are low educated, percentiles l to
m+ l are medium educated, and percentiles l +m to 1 are high educated.
Figure 1.1: Equilibrium in the model: thresholds and relative wages
Notes: The figure shows an infinite number of tasks in the horizontal axis indexed by their
level of complexity from 0 (the less complex tasks) to 1 (the most complex tasks) and
the relative productivity between workers of different educational level across tasks on the
vertical axis. The function CHM (i) represents the comparative advantage of high educated
with respect to medium educated workers at task i and CML(i) states for the comparative
advantage of medium relative to low educated workers at task i. Both are increasing in i
by assumption. The threshold levels IL and IH determine the tasks performed by low (L),
medium (M) and high educated (H). In equilibrium, CHM (IH) (CML(IL)) equals relative
wages of high and medium educated workers (medium and low educated workers), otherwise
employers can profit from switching workers across occupations.
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1.2.3 Decomposition of the Changes in Wages
To better understand the effect on workers’ wages of any change in the parameters of the
model (e.g. skills supplies), it is useful to decompose changes in wages into three different
parts. Consider the optimal production of each task y(i) from the equilibrium condition in
equation (1.11). If the optimal production of a task (i) is replaced in the production function
Y of equation (1.1), we get
Y = exp(AV P )(1−m− h
IL
)IL( m
IH − IL )
IH−IL( h1− IH )
1−IH .
The production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form with three inputs—low, medium,
and high educated— where coefficients sum to one. This functional form ensures that em-
ployers optimally spend a fixed share of the total production on each input, and that share
is equal to the input-specific coefficient in the production function.14 Wages can then be
expressed as:
WL =
ILY
(1−m− h) ; WM =
(IH − IL)Y
m
; WH =
(1− IH)Y
h
;
while log wages consist of three components,
ln WL = ln IL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tasks
+ ln Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output
− ln (1−m− h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply
ln WM = ln (IH − IL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tasks
+ ln Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output
− ln m︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply
ln WH = ln (1− IH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tasks
+ ln Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Output
− ln h︸︷︷︸
Supply
.
Note that average wages W¯ = (1−m− h)WL +mWM + hWH = Y . Any increase in the
production of the final good raises the average wage for the entire economy.
14This property of the task model has also been noted by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018).
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This implies that the change in wages of any educational group arising from a change in
one of the parameters of the model, e.g. the skill supplies, can be decomposed into three
effects:
∆ln WL = ln I ′L − ln IL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Displacement effect
+ ln Y ′ − ln Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity effect
− (ln (1−m′ − h′)− ln (1−m− h))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply effect
(1.28)
∆ln WM = ln (I ′H − I ′L)− ln (IH − IL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Displacement effect
+ ln Y ′ − ln Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity effect
− (ln m′ − ln m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply effect
(1.29)
∆ln WH = ln I ′H − ln IH︸ ︷︷ ︸
Displacement effect
+ ln Y ′ − ln Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Productivity effect
− (ln h′ − ln h)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Supply effect
(1.30)
The Displacement effect refers to the changes in the share of tasks produced by a workers
of a given educational level. The larger the increase in the share of tasks performed by
workers of a given educational level, the higher the increase in wages. The productivity
effects consist on the relationship between wages and changes in the production of the final
good in an economy, and it is the same for all educational levels. Higher output is associated
to an increase in wages. Finally, the supply effect accounts for the direct effect of a change
in the percentage of workers of a given educational level. As usual, an increase in supply
reduces wages. Next, I show that an educational expansion generates all three of these effects
and that they are important to understanding the impact on wages.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium in the model: employment and real wages
(a) Panel A: Employment share across tasks (b) Panel B: Wage levels
Notes: Panel A shows tasks in the horizontal axis indexed by their level of complexity from
0 (the less complex tasks) to 1 (the most complex tasks) and the employment share in each
task on the vertical axis. Panel B displays the wage levels for different percentiles of the
wage distribution divided by 100. Lowest l percentiles are low educated, percentiles l to
m+ l are medium educated, and percentiles l +m to 1 are highly educate.
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1.3 The Labor Market Effects of an Educational Expansion
In order to study the effects of an educational expansion on the four labor market outcomes
of interest, it is useful to start with some definitions. First, an educational expansion is
defined as:
Educational expansion: There exist an educational expansion between time t and t′ if
m′t ≥ mt and h′t ≥ ht, with at least one of those relationship holding with strict inequality.15
Second, in order to study the changes in the employment structure of the economy, it
is useful to define the total employment share in bottom-level, middle-level and top-level
tasks according to whether they were originally performed for low, medium or high educated
workers, respectively, before the educational expansion took place. These employment shares
are represented by EB, EM , and ET and are defined as:
EB =
∫ IL
0
EB(i) di; EM =
∫ IH
IL
EM(i) di; ET =
∫ 1
IH
ET (i) di. (1.31)
Note that in the initial equilibrium before any educational expansion, EB = l, EM = m and
ET = h.
Third, to simplify the analysis on the changes in the occupational attainment for a given
educational group, I define the average complexity of the tasks performed by a low, medium
and high educated workers as i¯L, i¯M and i¯H respectively. Given that employment shares
are constant for the tasks performed by the same educational group, the average tasks only
depends on the task thresholds IL and IH and can be written as:
i¯L =
IL
2 ; i¯M = IL +
IH − IL
2 ; i¯L = IH +
1− IH
2 . (1.32)
15In the rest of the paper the subscript t is dropped to ease notation.
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I study three policy experiments of educational expansions: (i) type–h consisting in an
increase in h by decreasing l; (ii) type–m consisting in an increase in m by decreasing l; and
(iii) type–h&m consisting in an increase in both m and h. Type–h&m is a mixture of the first
two types and can be further divided into two sub-experiments (iii.a) or (iii.b) depending
on whether it is the effects of type–h or type–m that dominates. Which one dominates
depends on the relative importance of the increase in high and medium education, as well as
the curvature of the comparative advantage schedules.16 The summary of the labor market
effects of these different educational expansions is shown in Table 1.1.
The effects of an educational expansion on the equilibrium conditions of the model will be
solved sequentially below: when an educational expansion takes place, equations (1.14) and
(1.15) determine the new allocation of workers to tasks. Then, equation (1.11) solve for the
overall employment composition of the economy. These equations only depend on the relative
supply of skills, which changes differently with each type of educational expansion, and the
comparative advantages across tasks which are assumed to be fixed. Finally, equations (1.22)-
(1.27) determine the new wage levels and relative wages. In other words, I first determine
the effect of each policy experiment on the task thresholds, and the effect on wages follows
from those changes.
16Below I show that for type–m to dominate it is necessary that the percentage increase in m is higher
than that of h.
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Table 1.1: Summary of the labor market effects of different educational expansion
(i) Type–h (∆h > 0) (ii) Type–m (∆m > 0) (iii) Type–h&m (∆m > 0,∆h > 0)
(iii.a) ↓ IH (iii.b) ↑ IH
Panel A: Changes in thresholds
IL ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
IH ↓ ↑ ↓* ↑*
Changes in task composition of employment
Bottom-level (EB) ∆EB > −∆h ∆EB > −∆m ∆EB > −(∆m+ ∆h) ∆EB > −(∆m+ ∆h)
Medium-level (EM ) ↓ ∆EM < ∆m ∆EM < ∆m ∆EM < ∆m
Top-level (ET ) ∆ET < ∆h ↑ ∆ET < ∆h ∆ET > ∆h
Panel C: Changes in mean task index
Low educated (¯iL) ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
Medium educated (¯iM ) ↓ ↑↓ ↓ ↑↓
High educated (¯iH) ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
Panel D: Changes in wages
Low educated (WL) ↑ ∆WL > ∆WM ↑ ∆WL > ∆WM
Medium educated (WM ) ∆WH < ∆WM < ∆WL ↓ ∆WH < ∆WM < ∆WL ↓
High educated (WH) ↓ ∆WH > ∆WM ↓ ∆WH > ∆WM
Panel E: Changes in wage gaps
WH/WM ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑
WM/WL ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
WH/WL ↓ ↑↓ ↓ ↑↓
Notes: The table shows the theoretical predictions of the model under four different policy experiments. Policy experiment (i) consists
of an increase in high education. Policy experiment (ii) refers to increase in medium education. Policy experiment (iii) refers to an
increase in both medium and high, and it is further separated between case (iii.a) when the threshold IH declines, and case (iii.b)
when the threshold IH increases. The share of low educated workers is reduced by the same amount in all policy experiments. ↑
denotes an increase for any value in the parameters of the model; ↓ denotes a decrease; ↑↓ denotes that it can increase or decrease.
Other cells are filled with lower or upper bound to changes in the outcome variable. * Given by assumption.
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I postulate one proposition for each policy experiment (i)-(iii).
Proposition 1 Under a type–h educational expansion, policy experiment (i), the share of
high educated workers increases from h to h′ with a corresponding decline in the share of low
educated such that ∆h = h′ − h = −∆l > 0, holding the share of medium educated constant,
generating:
(i.1) Changes in occupational attainment by educational group: I ′L < IL, I ′H < IH
such that {∆i¯L,∆i¯M ,∆i¯H} < 0;
(i.2) Changes in the occupational structure: ∆EB > ∆l, ∆EM < 0, and ∆ET <
∆h;
(i.3) Changes in real wages: ∆WL > 0, ∆WH < 0, and ∆WM ≷ 0 with ∆WH <
∆WM < ∆WL;
(i.4) Changes in relative wages: {∆WM
WL
,∆WH
WM
,∆WH
WL
} < 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Result (i.1) indicates that, under policy experiment (i), the average worker in each educa-
tional group ends up more concentrated in occupations of lower complexity than before (lower
occupational attainment). Result (i.2) establishes that the employment share of bottom-level
occupations declines less than the reduction in the share of low educated workers because
some medium educated workers start to carry out some of these tasks. Similarly, the em-
ployment share in top-level occupations increases by less than the change in the share of
workers with high education because some of these workers start to perform medium-level
tasks. Results (i.3) and (i.4) arise from the general equilibrium effects of changes in supply
and demand for workers with different skill levels. Result (i.3) indicates that wages of low
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educated workers increase, wages of high educated workers decline, and changes in wages of
medium education workers may increase or decline, but the change is bounded below and
above by the changes in wages of high educated and low educated respectively. Finally,
Result (i.4) indicates that all wage gaps between more educated workers with respect to less
educated workers decline.
These results are intuitively appealing. When the share of high educated workers in-
creases, they become more abundant and their wages fall in the tasks in which they were
originally employed, while low educated workers become less abundant and their wages in-
crease in the tasks they were initially performing. Therefore, it becomes profitable for firms
to start hiring high educated workers on tasks previously performed by medium educated
workers, and to use medium educated workers in tasks previously performed by low edu-
cated workers. Then, all workers’ types end up more concentrated in occupations of lower
complexity than before, generating lower conditional occupational attainment for each edu-
cational group. The changes in the task composition of employment for the entire economy
are small when compared to the educational expansion because more educated workers start
to perform occupations of lower complexity.
To interpret the direction of the changes in wages, it is useful to use the decomposition
from equations (1.28)-(1.30). Wages for high educated workers decline because the negative
effect of the increase in supply dominates the displacement effect and the productivity effect.
The increase in wages of low educated workers is due to the supply effect combined by the
productivity effect dominating the negative effect of the displacement effect. In other words,
the decline in supply coupled with a higher demand for the tasks they perform (generated
by general equilibrium effects) dominates over the fact that they are displaced towards tasks
of lower complexity.17 Changes in wages of medium educated workers can be positive or
17Although the productivity to perform each task does not change with an educational expansion for any
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negative but they are always bounded below and above by those of low and high educated
workers, respectively. In the decomposition, any negative effect on wages of medium educated
workers from the displacement effect would be partially or totally offset by the increase in
productivity in the economy. Wages gaps of more educated workers with respect to lower
educated workers decline. The workers that benefit the most from an increase in the share
of high educated are those who get educated (their wages raise to those of high educated
workers), but also the remaining low educated for who wages increase. The workers that are
hurt the most are those that already were high educated.
Panel (A) in Figure 1.3 displays some of the effects of policy experiment (i). When the
share of higher educated workers increase, their wages decline and it becomes profitable for
employers to hire them for tasks of lower complexity depicted by a decline in IH , moving
medium educated workers downward in the occupational ladder which in turn also displaced
low educated workers towards tasks with lower complexity which translate into a decline in
IL. Wage gaps decline given the fall in the comparative advantages of high to medium and
that of medium to low educated at each threshold, depicted by a downward movement along
the comparative advantages curves.
I discuss next the effect of an increase in secondary education, policy experiment (ii).
Proposition 2 Under a type–m educational expansion, policy experiment (ii), the share of
medium educated workers increases from m to m′ with a corresponding decline in the share
of low educated such that ∆m = m′ − m = −∆l > 0, holding the share of high educated
constant, generating:
(ii.1) Changes in occupational attainment by educational group: I ′L < IL, I ′H > IH ,
group, there is an implicit complementarity in the production of the final good by combining occupations in
a Cobb-Douglas production function with an elasticity of substitution equal to one.
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Figure 1.3: Effects of an educational expansion
(a) Panel A: Policy experiment (i) (∆h) (b) Panel B: Policy experiment (ii) (∆m)
Notes: The figure shows the theoretical effects of an educational expansion on the assignment
of workers’ type to task and relative wages. Panel A shows to the effect of policy experiment
(i) consisting of an increase in the share of high educated workers and a corresponding
decrease in low educated workers. Panel B displays the effects of policy experiment (ii)
increasing the share of medium educated workers by a corresponding decline in low educated
workers.
(I ′H − I ′L) > (IH − IL), and (I ′L + I ′L)/2 ≶ (IL + IH)/2 such that ∆i¯L < 0, ∆i¯M ≷ 0,
and ∆i¯H > 0;
(ii.2) Changes in the occupational structure: ∆ET > 0, ∆EB > ∆l, and ∆EM <
∆m;
(ii.3) Changes in real wages: ∆WM < 0, and {∆WL,∆WH} ≶ 0 > ∆WM ;
(ii.4) Changes in relative wages: ∆WH/WM > 0, ∆WM/WL < 0, and ∆WH/WL ≶
0.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Result (ii.1) establishes that low educated workers are displaced to occupations of lower
complexity, high educated workers are employed in more complex tasks, and medium edu-
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cated workers take over a larger number of tasks in the middle of the task distribution such
that the average task that they perform may increase or decrease. Result (ii.2) follows from
result (ii.1). It shows that the employment share in top-level tasks increases because a share
of medium educated workers is incorporated into these tasks. Similarly, employment share
in bottom-level tasks declines less than the reduction in the share of low educated workers
because some medium educated workers start carrying out some of those tasks. Because a
share of medium educated workers start to perform new tasks, changes in employment in
medium-level tasks are lower than the increase in the share of medium educated workers.
Results (ii.3) and (ii.4) arise from the general equilibrium effects of changes in supply and
demand for workers with different skill levels. Wages of medium educated workers decline,
while wages of the other groups may increase or decrease but the changes are always higher
than the decline in wages of medium educated. The changes in real wages decline the wage
gap between medium and low educated, and increase the wage gap of high to medium.
These results can be intuitively interpreted as follows. When the share of medium ed-
ucated workers increases, they become more abundant and their wages fall. It becomes
profitable for employers to start using them in tasks previously performed by low and by
high educated workers. Therefore, there is an expansion of the number of tasks carried
out by medium educated. As the tasks performed by medium educated expands, there is
a displacement of low educated workers towards tasks of lower complexity and of high ed-
ucated workers to tasks of higher complexity. Note that in this case the employment share
in top-level tasks expands because there is an influx of medium educated workers into these
tasks. In terms of wages, the supply effect dominates for medium educated and their wages
decrease. For low and high educated workers, wages can increase or decrease. For high edu-
cated workers, they are now concentrated into more complex tasks for which they are more
productive, but the price for these tasks diminishes because they are more abundant now.
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Therefore, the value of their marginal product (because we assume markets are competitive,
wages equal the value of their marginal product) may increase or decrease. On the contrary,
low educated workers are now concentrated in tasks of lower complexity, where they are
less productive (although having the comparative advantage on those tasks, productivity is
assumed to increase with the complexity of the task). But the prices for these tasks may
increase because they are relatively more scarce than before. Therefore, the value of their
marginal product (wages) may increase or decrease depending on which effect is stronger.
Relative wages of medium with respect to other workers decline given their large drop in
wages, while that of high educated with respect to low educated may increase or decrease.
The workers that benefit the most from an increase in the share of medium educated are
those who get educated (their wages raise to those of medium educated workers) and the
workers that are hurt the most are those that already have medium education (their wages
will have the largest fall).
In terms of the decomposition approach from equations (1.28)-(1.30), wages of medium
educated workers decline due to the supply effect dominates. For low educated, the displace-
ment effect is larger than before because medium educated workers are more substitute of
low educated workers than high educated, the productivity effect is lower than under policy
experiment (i), and the supply effect dominance is no longer ensured as it was under policy
experiment (i). For high educated workers, the effect is ambiguous because the supply effect
is zero by definition, they are performing a lower share of occupations which diminishes their
wages, while the increase in productivity pushes their wages up.
Panel (B) in Figure 1.3 depicts the effects of policy experiment (ii). As medium education
expands, wages for medium educated workers decline and they start to perform a broader
set of tasks in the economy, pushing low educated workers towards tasks of lower complexity
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(depicted by a decline in IL) and driving high educated workers to tasks of higher complexity
(portrayed by an increase in IH). The wage gaps of medium to low declines and that of high
to medium educated increases due to the downward movement along the curve CML and
upward movement along the curve CHM , respectively.
Turning now to policy experiment (iii), the effects of a simultaneous increase in medium
and high educated are summarized in the following preposition.
Proposition 3 Under a type–h&m educational expansion, policy experiment (iii), the share
of medium and high educated workers increases from m to m′ and from h to h′, with a
corresponding decline in the share of low educated, such that ∆m = m′ − m > 0, ∆h =
h′ − h > 0, and ∆m+ ∆h = −∆l , generating:
(iii.1) ∆IH ≶ 0. If ∆IH > 0 it must be the case that m
′
h′ >
m
h
.
(iii.2) If ∆IH < 0, preposition 1 holds.
(iii.3) If ∆IH > 0, preposition 2 holds.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
The proposition states that if the share of medium and high educated workers increases
at the same time, there is a mixture of the two cases discussed above. Result (iii.1) shows
that the threshold separating tasks of medium and high educated may increase or decrease,
depending on the extent of the changes in relative supply and on the technology reigning the
production function in the economy. It also establishes that for IH to increase it is necessary
(but not sufficient) that the relative supply of medium with respect to high educated workers
increases. Results (iii.2) and (iii.3) determine that the changes in the equilibrium of the model
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are dominated by the increase in h or the increase in m depending on the directional change
in IH . In other words, which one dominates depends on whether in the new equilibrium
high educated workers displace medium educated workers towards tasks of lower complexity
(∆IH < 0, effect of the increase in high education dominates), or if medium educated workers
displace high educated workers in some of the tasks they used to perform (∆IH > 0, effect
of the increase in medium education dominates).
By looking at propositions 1,2 and 3 and across columns of Table 1.1, there are some
common patterns of adjustment across all the policy experiments. First, there is a decline
of the occupational attainment for low educated workers under any educational expansion
(IL always decreases). Second, the changes in the occupational composition of employment
are small when compared to changes in the educational composition of employment due to
the new assignment of workers’ types to tasks when there is any educational expansion in
the economy. Finally, wages always decline for at least one educational group.
Corollary 1: When an educational expansion takes place, there is always a decline of
the occupational attainment for low educated workers, small changes in the occupational
composition of employment when compared to the educational expansion, and a decline in
wages for at least one educational group.
1.3.1 Welfare analysis: changes in the CDF of the wage distribu-
tion, poverty, and inequality
This section studies the effects of the three different policy experiments on the wage distri-
bution by looking into cumulative density functions (CDF), growth incidence curves (that
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reflect wage changes at each percentile of the anonymous wage distribution), poverty, and
inequality.18 In the model, the CDF is estimated using the share of workers with different
educational level and their respective wages, before and after each educational expansion.
Some of the directional changes in wages are ambiguous and depend on the parameters of
the model, according to prepositions 1-3. When this is the case, there are two opposite
forces pushing wages up and down. Wages in those cases may not change much due to the
compensating forces. In this section, I make the simplifying assumption that wages remain
constant when the predictions of the model are ambiguous. Figure 1.4 shows the CDF before
and after the educational expansion for each policy experiment. The changes in the CDF
are better characterized by the growth incidence curves of wages (GIC), which is depicted
in Figure 1.5 for each policy experiment. The GIC shows the dollar change in wages in the
vertical axis and the percentile of the wage distribution (divided by 100) in the horizontal
axis. The label “J ′” indicates the value of any variable J after each policy experiment.
Panel (A) in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 displays the effect on the CDF and the GIC of policy
experiment (i). An educational expansion in high education increases wages across the entire
wage distribution, except for the wages at the top, those that originally were high educated.
The new high educated workers move up in the wage distribution on top of those with
medium education, increasing the educational level of most percentiles in the middle of the
wage distribution. There is an increase in wages for the lower percentiles that remain with
low education (L¯), as predicted by the model. Although the share of medium educated
workers does not change, they move to the left of the wage distribution, increasing the wages
of percentiles that move from being low to medium educated (L → M). Some percentiles
remain medium educated and its wages could increase or decrease (M¯), and are depicted
18Note that I am not considering a full welfare analysis which should take into account that an educa-
tional expansion is costly and that it has to be financed by a tax increase or other changes in government
expenditures.
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by a dashed line. Wages for percentiles the move from medium to high educated increase
(M → H) because more educated workers have higher earnings (albeit falling due to the
educational expansion). Finally, the wage falls for the percentiles that already were high
educated located at the top of the distribution (H¯).
Figure 1.4: Cumulative density function (CDF) before and after each policy experiment
(a) Policy experiment (i) (∆h > 0) (b) Policy experiment (ii) (∆m > 0)
(c) Pol. experiment (iii.a): ∆h dominates (d) Pol. experiment (iii.b): ∆m domintes
Notes: The figure shows the Cumulative Density Function (inverted) of the distribution of
wages before and after the educational expansion under the different policy experiments.
Panel (B) shows the effects of policy experiment (ii). With an expansion in medium
education, the wages of percentiles that were originally low educated and are now medium
educated (L→M) increase to the new level of medium educated wages (W ′M −WL), while
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Figure 1.5: Growth incidence curve of different type of educational expansions
(a) Policy experiment (i) (∆h > 0) (b) Policy experiment (ii) (∆m > 0)
(c) Pol. experiment (iii.a): ∆h dominates (d) Pol. experiment (iii.b): ∆m domintes
Notes: The figure shows the wage change (in absolute value) after different types of educa-
tional expansions at each percentile of the wage distribution. It is the difference in dollars
between the curves Before and After from Figure 1.4.
that of percentiles that were already medium educated (M¯) decline as predicted by the
model. The changes in wages for those percentiles that remain low and high educated (L¯
and H¯, respectively) are ambiguous and I characterized them with a dashed line in the GIC.
It is clear from the figure which anonymous percentiles benefit and which are hurt with
an educational expansion in medium education. Not surprisingly, the percentiles where the
educational level increases benefit by a rise in their wages, while percentiles that already had
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wages of medium educated are hurt when wages fall as supply increases.
Panel (C) presents the effect of policy experiment (iii) when the increase in supply of
high educated dominates (case iii.A in Table 1.1). The effects in the wage distribution are
similar to those in Panel (A), with the only difference of a larger share of percentiles that
were originally low educated are now medium educated (L→M).
Finally, Panel (D) shows the effect of policy experiment (iii) when the increase in medium
education prevails (case iii.b in Table 1.1). In addition to the effects in Panel (B), there is an
increase in the wage of percentiles that become high educated (M → H). Note that the larger
the increase in the share of high educated the smaller the number of percentiles that remain
medium educated (M¯). If the increase in high educated is large enough, these percentiles
for which wage diminishes disappear (∆h > m). This is the only policy experiment in the
context of the model where a wage distribution after an educational expansion can first order
dominate the original wage distribution.19
Looking across panels of Figures 1.4 and 1.5, I find that an educational expansion con-
centrated in medium education mostly changes the middle of the wage distribution, while an
educational expansion concentrated in high education reshapes the entire wage distribution.
I conclude that the labor market effects of policies that increase basic education as opposed
to policies that increases higher education are very different, and that increases in higher
education are more favorable to lower percentiles of the income distribution.
I turn now to the welfare analysis of the different policy experiments presented here
using an abbreviated welfare function. Because an educational expansion always declines
the wages of at least one educational group (see corollary 1), in most educational expansions
19It is also necessary that the parameters of the model are such that the changes in wages of low and high
educated workers, which are ambiguous in the model, are not negative.
37
there is no welfare improvement characterized by a first order dominance.20 But a first order
dominance is a very demanding welfare criterion to evaluate the policy experiments analyzed
here. A more practical welfare analysis can be performed by constructing an abbreviated
welfare function, with welfare depending negatively on poverty and inequality, and positively
on the total production of the economy.21 Next, I analyze the predictions of the model on
these three relevant welfare inputs.
Changes in poverty follow from the changes in the CDF of the wage distribution depicted
in Figure 1.4. The poverty rate is defined as the percentage of workers below a wage poverty
line. If the wage poverty line is anywhere between WL and WM , the poverty rate declines
under policy experiments (i) and (iii.a), but it may increase in policy experiments (ii) and
(iii.b) if the new wage for medium educated workers is below the wage poverty line. Note
also that other poverty indexes that aggregate poor individuals according to how far they are
from the poverty line will further decline under policy experiment (i) and (iii.a) given the
increase in wages of those that remain in poverty (workers with low education, considering
that the wage poverty line is lower than their new wage level). This is not ensured in
experiments (ii) and (iii.b) because wages of low educated workers may fall and the gap
between wages and the poverty line may increase.
In terms of inequality, the most natural measures of inequality in this context are the
wage gaps. Inequality declines under policy experiments (i) and (iii.a), given that all wage
gaps diminish. For policy experiments (ii) and (iii.b), changes in inequality are ambiguous
due to a decline in one wage gap (WM/WL) and an increase in another (WH/WM).
20The only exception being case (iii.b) if no percentiles remain medium educated and technology is such
that wages of low and high educated do not decline.
21In the model, total production is equal to average wages. See section 1.2.3.
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Finally, total production increases with any educational expansion.22 This results from
the assumption that more educated workers also have absolute advantage in the production
of tasks, so that a more educated labor force that is fully employed under the equilibrium
conditions of the model always produces more output.
Corollary 2: Without considering the cost of education, an educational expansion that
increases the share of high educated workers (or when it dominates) always improves welfare
measured by an abbreviated social welfare function which depends on poverty (negatively),
inequality (negatively), and total output (positively). This may not be the case of an expan-
sion in the share of medium educated workers (or when it dominates) since some indexes of
inequality and poverty may increase while output always increases.
1.3.2 The importance of the comparative advantage across tasks
This section discusses the importance of the slope of the comparative advantage across
tasks to determine the extend of the effects of different educational expansions on the four
labor market outcomes of interest: the structure of employment across tasks, the task’s
assignment of workers of different type, wage levels, and wage gaps. To that end, I evaluate
here the effects of an increase in the share of workers with high education under different
parameterization of the comparatives advantages curves. The assumptions in the model
related to the comparative advantages across tasks is that they must be a function that is
continuous, differentiable, and increasing in i, according to equation (1.2). However, the
slopes of these relationships are crucial to determine the magnitude of the effects of an
educational expansion on each labor market outcomes. In particular, if the comparative
22Given that there is a measure of workers equal to 1, total production is equal to production per worker
and to average wages.
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advantages are steep, the changes in the thresholds are small and the changes in wages are
large. On the contrary, if the comparative advantages are flat, an educational expansion
results in large changes in the thresholds and small changes in wages.
To see this, consider four different combinations of comparative advantage schedules. The
comparative advantage of high educated with respect to medium educated workers, CHM(i),
could largely or barely increase with i. Let each of these cases be steep CHM(i) and flat
CHM(i), respectively. Similarly, let steep CML(i) and flat CML(i) be the case of comparative
advantage of medium with respect to low largely and barely increasing with i, respectively.
There are four possible combinations of steep and flat comparative advantages across tasks.
Table 1.2 present a numerical example of the labor market effects of an increase in h for
each of the four cases.23 Figure 1.6 depicts each ones of the comparative advantage curves
considered in this example.
By looking across columns, it is clear that in the case of flat comparative advantages, an
educational expansion produces large changes in occupations and small changes in wages. On
the contrary, in the case of steep comparative advantages, an educational expansion mainly
affects workers’ wages, with a small impact on their assignment to different occupations.
The economic intuition behind these results is the following. If the curves are flat,
employers find it profitable to use the more abundant high educated workers in many new
tasks that were previously performed by medium educated workers, with only a small cost in
terms of lower relative productivity on those tasks. That is, the demand for high educated
workers is more elastic due to the easiness of switching to occupations of lower complexity for
23The table and figure show the effect of an increase in h of 10 percent points, from 0.2 to 0.3. The rest of
the parameters are fixed and they are defined as follows: m = 0.4, AH = 4, AL = 2, AM = 2.5. In the flat
scenario,αL = 1 + 0.0001 ∗ i; αM = 1 + 0.01 ∗ i, αH = 1 + 0.05 ∗ i. In the steep scenario, αL = i; αM = i2,
αH = i3, while AL, AM , and AH are estimated so that the thresholds and the initial wage is the same than
in the flat scenario.
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Table 1.2: A numerical example on the differential effect of ∆h for different scenarios of
comparative advantage across tasks.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Comparative adv. schedule
CH Flat Steep Steep Flat
CL Flat Steep Flat Steep
Panel A: Thresholds
Initial IL 0.304 0.304 0.304 0.304
Initial IH 0.686 0.686 0.686 0.686
Final IL 0.212 0.255 0.224 0.224
Final IH 0.566 0.610 0.598 0.586
Panel B: Changes in occup. composition of employment
Bottom-level (EB) 0.40 -4.48 -1.44 -1.16
Medium-level (EM) -2.10 0.33 -1.99 -1.59
Top-level (ET ) 1.71 4.15 3.43 2.75
Panel C: Changes in mean occup. ranking
Low educated (¯iL) -0.046 -0.025 -0.040 -0.028
Medium educated (¯iM) -0.107 -0.063 -0.084 -0.079
High Educated (¯iH) -0.060 -0.038 -0.044 -0.050
Panel D: % Changes in wages
Low educated 0.2 16.3 5.1 16.2
Medium educated 0.2 -2.8 5.0 -5.4
High Educated -0.3 -13.6 -8.4 -5.7
Panel E: Changes in wage gaps
WH/WM -0.57 -10.90 -12.82 -7.25
WM/WL -0.34 -16.91 -0.35 -3.54
WH/WL -0.90 -25.96 -13.13 -10.53
Notes: The table shows the theoretical predictions of the model under four different
scenarios of comparative advantage across tasks. All scenarios start with the same
thresholds IL and IH , and simulate the effect of an increase in 10 percentage points in
the share of high educated (and a corresponding reduction in the share of low educated).
Column one shows the scenario when both comparative advantage schedules are flat,
that is, they barely increase with the complexity of the task denoted by i. Column
two displays the scenario of steep comparative advantage schedules. Columns 3 and 4
show a combination of steep and flat comparative advantage schedules. Parameters are
calibrated so that initial wages and thresholds are the same in each column.
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Figure 1.6: Four different scenarios of comparative advantage schedules
Notes: The figure shows CHM (i) and CML(i) under a flat or a steep scenario of increase in
comparative advantage across tasks (i). Parameters are chosen such that initial IH and IL are
the same scenario (depicted by a point at the intersection of the flat and steep comparative
advantage).
which they are almost as productive as in the occupations they were originally performing.
When the comparative advantages are steep, wages have to diminish sharply before employers
find it profitable to start employing high educated workers in a small number of tasks of lower
complexity. In this case, the labor demand is more inelastic and wages react more to changes
in supply.
Note that in all cases an educational expansion of high educated workers increases the
employment in Top-level occupations. That is, a type–h educational expansion always im-
proves the occupational structure of employment, at least in the four numerical examples
analyzed here. These improvement will be larger with more steep comparative advantage
curves since employers will have less incentive to use high educated workers in tasks of lower
complexity.
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1.4 Conclusions
To increase the educational level of the workforce is usually one of the priorities of every
developing country and of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations. In some
countries, public policies can and have been put in place to rapidly increase the educational
level of the workforce. In this context, it is important to develop an understanding of the
general equilibrium effects of these policies. Increases in education may not only impact
the labor market outcomes of those who are being educated, but also of those that remain
uneducated or the ones that already have a given educational level, positively or negatively.
This paper developed simple framework to evaluate the labor market effects of different
types of educational expansions in four labor market outcomes: the occupational structure of
employment; the assignment of workers’ with different level of education to occupations; the
wage level of workers with different education; and the wage gaps between educational groups.
In particular, I focused on the effects of three different policy experiments of increasing
secondary schooling, increasing higher education, or both at the same time. I find that
the labor market impacts of increases in secondary schooling largely differ from increases in
higher education, and I also find that one of these effects will dominate with a simultaneous
increase in both.
The main difference between the educational policies with respect to occupational out-
comes is that an increase in higher education declines the conditional occupational attain-
ment for each educational group, while an increase in secondary education improves the
occupational attainment of high educated workers and expands the range of occupations
where medium educated workers are employed. With respect to wages, an increase in higher
education raises wages of low educated, lowers wages of high educated, and produces am-
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biguous changes in wages of medium educated. On the other hand, an educational expansion
focused on medium education declines wages of medium educated and generates ambiguous
changes in the rest. Finally, I find the an increase in higher education always declines wage
inequality as measured by wage gaps of workers with different educational level, while an
increase in medium education reduces the wages gap between medium and low educated
workers but increases the gap between high and medium educated.
I also find some similarities between the different types of educational expansions. When
an educational expansion takes place, there is always a decline on the occupational attain-
ment of low educated workers, small changes in the occupational composition of employment
when compared to the educational expansion, and a decline in wages for at least one group.
Finally, I performed a welfare analysis of the different educational policies. I conclude
that, without considering the cost of education, an educational expansion that increases the
share of high educated workers (or when it dominates) always improves welfare measured
by an abbreviated social welfare function which depends on poverty (negatively), inequality
(negatively), and total output (positively). This may not be the case of an expansion in the
share of medium educated workers (or when it dominates) given that inequality and poverty
do not unambiguously decline.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF AN EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION:
AN APPLICATION TO BRAZIL
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to apply the theoretical framework built in the previous chapter
to study the case of Brazil. During the period 1995-2014, Brazil underwent several major
educational reforms that largely expanded the educational level of its workforce. To evaluate
the labor market impact of this educational expansion, I proceed as follows. First, I provide
some stylized facts for Brazil on the inter-linkages between changes in education, occupations,
and wages over the period of 1995-2014. In particular, I document changes in four labor
market outcomes in which this research is focused on: 1) the occupational structure of
employment (the share of workers employed in each occupation); 2) the assignment of workers
with different level of education to occupations; 3) wages of workers with different education;
and 4) wage gaps between educational groups. I also document changes in wage-poverty and
other measures of wage-inequality resulting from these labor marker outcomes. Then, I use
the model developed in Chapter 1 to evaluate if the model’s predictions for the Brazilian
educational expansion are qualitatively consistent with the patterns observed in the data.
Finally, I calibrate the model and assess if the educational expansion is quantitatively relevant
to explain the labor market changes observed in Brazil during the analyzed period.
An exceptionally large educational expansion took place in Brazil between 1995 and
2014 accompanied by some remarkable changes in the labor market market. The Brazilian
educational expansion is reported to be one of the fastest expansions in history (Bruns et al.,
2011). The share of workers with secondary education doubled from 20.5 to 40.0 percent, the
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share with university level grew from 11.3 to 23.6 percent, and the share of workers with only
primary education or less halved from 68.1 to 36.4 percent. With respect to the four labor
market outcomes of interest, I find that the occupational structure of employment improved,
but that improvement was very small when compared to the educational expansion. For
example, there was an increase in employment of only 1.9 percentage points in the one
third of occupations with the highest wages despite the expansion of 13 percentage points
in the share of high educated workers. I also find that there was a marked decline in the
occupational attainment within each of the educational groups—primary or less, secondary,
and university—defined as an increase in employment in occupations of lower wage-ranking.1
Despite the common decline in occupational attainment across educational groups, average
wages large increased (27.8 percent) but not for all groups: wages of primary educated
workers increased (37.3 percent), wages of secondary educated declined (10.5 percent), and
wages of university educated fell (21.6 percent). These changes in wages imply large reduction
in wages gaps between educational groups as well as marked reductions in wage-poverty and
other measures of wage inequality.2
Taken together, these facts are puzzling for standard theories evaluating the labor mar-
ket effects of an educational expansion but they are consistent with the model developed
in Chapter 1. A large increase of employment in high-rank occupations would have been
expected as result of the educational expansion if labor markets were fragmented as in the
broadly use relative demand and supply framework. In this theory, workers with different
educational levels participate in separate labor markets with specific occupations such that
1I rank ISCO-88 at 3-digit occupations between 0 and 1 according to their median wages over the entire
period, with 0 representing the occupation with the lowest median wage and 1 representing the one with
the highest median wage. The average ranking diminished by 15.2 percent, 28.2 percent and 8.5 percent for
primary, secondary and university educated workers, respectively, between 1995 and 2014.
2The magnitude of the reductions in inequality and poverty depend on the index being considered. For
example, the Gini index declined by 0.085 points and the wage poverty rate (using a 2.4 USD dollar-a-day
at 2011 Purchasing Power Parity wage poverty line) diminished by 16.4 percentage points.
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educational expansion shifts the labor supplies in each market without changing the occupa-
tions performed by each type of worker (Becker, 1964; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Goldin and
Katz, 2009; Gasparini et al., 2011a; Messina and Silva, 2017). Another strand of the theory
ties wages to occupations, predicting that average wages should have fallen for each educa-
tional group given the widespread decline in occupational attainment (Fields, 1995; Lazear
et al., 2016).3 Contrary to these predictions, the occupational structure of employment re-
mained relatively fixed when compared to the educational expansion while changes in wages
were heterogeneous. The failure of these standard models to trace back the changes in the
labor market to the educational expansion may lead to the conclusion that other factors, such
as the increase in the minimum wage (Engbom and Moser, 2017) or the commodity boom
(Adão, 2015), played a more important role in changing labor markets outcomes than the
educational expansion. However, I show in this chapter that all the observed labor market
changes are perfectly consistent with the predictions of the model developed in chapter 1,
which contains elements of these two theories, suggesting that the educational expansion was
the most relevant factor behind the changes in the labor markets of Brazil over the period
1995-2014.
The model qualitatively predicts all the observed labor market changes in the occupa-
tional structure of employment and the wage distribution that took place in Brazil. Consider
the effects of the type-H educational expansion, consisting of an increase in higher education
by reducing workers with primary or less, which produces the same effects than a type-H&M
when H dominates but is easier to understand (the general predictions of a type-H expan-
sion are the same than for type-H&M when H dominates, as shown in Table 1.1). When
the share of workers with high education increases, they become more abundant and their
wages fall in the occupations in which they were originally employed, while the supply of
3See Chapter 1 for more details on these models.
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low educated workers declines and their wages increase in the occupations they were initially
employed. Therefore, it becomes profitable for firms to start hiring high educated workers in
the best occupations that were previously performed by medium educated workers, and to
use medium educated workers in the best occupations previously performed by low educated
workers, generating lower occupational attainment for all educational groups. The occupa-
tional composition of employment for the whole economy only changes slightly given that
the high (medium) educated workers move into occupations they did not use to perform,
such that the employment in initially highly-paid (low-paid) occupations increases (declines)
by less than the increase in the share of high educated workers. Wages of high educated
workers decline due to the increase in supply. Wages of low educated workers rise because of
the decline in supply coupled with a higher demand for the occupations they perform, given
that there is an increase in the production of other occupations.4 The model also predicts
that changes in wages of medium educated workers are always between those of low and
high educated workers and these changes could be positive or negative (the negative effect
of the lower occupational attainment could be partially or totally offset by an increase in
the value of the new occupations that they perform). Inequality declines, as measured by
the wage gaps. Poverty diminishes because of two effects. First, some of the previously poor
workers escape poverty by becoming more educated, which allows them to earn higher wages,
even when the wages of high educated workers are lower then before. Second, wages of the
remaining low educated also increase due to the general equilibrium effects originated by
the educational expansion. All these patterns in occupations, wages, poverty, and inequality
exactly match the stylized facts from Brazil.
In the final part of the paper, I examine how much of the observed changes in the labor
4Although labor productivity at each occupation does not change with an educational expansion for any
educational group, there is an implicit complementarity in the production of the final good by combining
occupations in a Cobb-Douglas production function with an elasticity of substitution equal to one.
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market can be explained by the educational expansion through the lens of the model. To that
end, I calibrate the model using the data from 1995 as the baseline year. Then, I estimate the
effects of the Brazilian educational expansion on the four labor market outcomes of interest,
as well as in wage-poverty and other measures of wage-inequality, by isolating the effects of
an increase in the education level of the workforce on occupations and the wage distribution
when all the other factors, such as technology and educational quality, are held constant.
By comparing the equilibrium outcomes in the model with the ones observed in the data, I
found that the model’s predictions of the effect of the Brazilian educational expansion are
remarkably accurate. I conclude that the increase in education was of utmost importance
to explain the changes in the Brazilian labor market in the last two decades.
In particular, changes in the average ranking of occupations in the model follow closely
that of the data: the model predicts a decline in the occupational attainment of all educa-
tional groups, with a larger decline for medium educated workers (the average occupational
ranking declines by 0.126 in the model compared to 0.128 in the data). With respect to the
overall composition of employment, the general prediction of the model is that the occupa-
tional structure improves, but its changes are small when compared to the large educational
expansion, although the model predicts larger changes than the ones in the data. For ex-
ample, the model predicts an increase of 7.6 percentage points in the share of high-paid
occupations, while in the data it only increases by 1.9 percentage points.5 For real wages,
average wages rise 29.3 percent in the model and 27.8 percent the data; wages of low ed-
ucated workers increase 46.9 percent in the model compared to 37.3 percent in the data;
wages of medium educated workers decline 10.9 percent in the model and 10.5 percent in
the data; and wages of high educated workers decrease 22.2 percent in the model and 21.6
5One of the reasons for this difference is that the model do not account for low and medium educated
workers that initially were performing high-paid occupations and were replaced by high educated workers
after the educational expansion. I discuss this at length in Section 2.6.2.
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percent in the data. A precise prediction of the changes in the wage gaps follows directly
from the accuracy of the model to predict changes in wages for each group. For example,
the model predicts a decline in 47.0 percent in the wage gap between high and low educated
workers compared to a decline of 42.9 percent in the data. I also show that these predictions
are robust to using different years and functional forms to calibrate the parameters of the
model.
Finally, by using the calibrated model to run counterfactuals, I show that the effect of
increases in education on average wages declines rapidly with successive educational expan-
sions when technology is fixed. I find that a further educational expansion over a much
more educated workforce in 2014 will have less than a third of the effect it had in 1995
when the workforce was less educated. The reason for this is that more educated workers
are increasingly employed in tasks of lower complexity, where their relative productivity di-
minishes, reducing the additional impact of the increase in education on the total output of
the economy and, therefore, on average wages. From this exercise, I conclude that further
educational expansions in Brazil will have a much lower impact than previous expansions,
and this is especially true for increases in medium education.
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide evidence that the increase in education
was the main factor behind the changes in the occupational structure of employment and
the wage distribution in Brazil between 1995 and 2014. There is a heated debate in the
literature that studies the contributing factors to the decline in inequality and wage gaps of
workers with different educational levels in the specific case of Brazil. These factors include:
educational upgrading which declined returns to education (Barros et al., 2010; Gasparini
et al., 2011a; López-Calva et al., 2016; Alvarez et al., 2017); increases in the minimum wage
that were spread throughout the wage distribution (Engbom and Moser, 2017); and the fall
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in returns to experience which compressed the wage distribution (Ferreira et al., 2016).6 In
my results, I provide additional support to the first factor by showing that the educational
expansion observed in Brazil not only explains most of the changes in key aspects of the
wage distribution, but it is also consistent with the changes in the occupational structure of
employment in the analyzed years, which has receive much less attention in the literature.
Other papers have empirically studied the effects of an educational expansion on wages
of all educational groups by exploiting regional variation within the United States (Rauch,
1993; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Moretti, 2004a). These papers find that an increase in
the supply of college graduates raises wages of all educational groups, even that of college
graduates, attributing these effects to productivity spillovers. In this paper, I find that
an increase in the share of high educated workers also raises the wages of low educated
workers, but wages of high educated decline. The main reason for this discrepancy could
be that the empirical strategy of these papers only captures small increases in the share of
high educated workers, as opposed to the major increase that took place in Brazil, where
the supply effect is more likely to dominate. Another reason could be that productivity
spillovers require directed technological changes for the educational group that now is more
abundant (Acemoglu, 2002), which may take place over a longer period of time in developing
countries than in developed ones.7
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies the changes in the occupational
structure of employment. My results contribute to better understand the effect of educational
6Other studies are focused on different factors. Ulysseas (2014) and Meghir et al. (2015) study the role of
formal-informal gaps. Alvarez (2017) analyzes agricultural wage gaps. Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) look
at the effect of the trade liberalization during the nineties. Adão (2015) relates the decline in inequality to
shocks in commodity prices.
7Khanna (2015) uses similar techniques exploiting regional and cohort variation to evaluate the general
equilibrium effects of an educational reform in India which largely expanded the access to primary education
in half of the country. He finds that the reform largely increased the share of high educated workers, increasing
the wages of low educated workers and declining the wages of high educated workers. This is consistent with
the supply effects dominating in developing countries at least in the short-run or medium-run.
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expansions on the occupational composition of employment, a factor that has not received
much attention in this literature. In developed countries the changes in occupational struc-
ture are characterized by a hollowing-out of middle-wage occupations, with a corresponding
increase in low and high wage occupations, leading to job polarization (Katz et al., 2006;
Goos et al., 2014). This distinctive pattern on occupational changes has been related to a
rapid change in technology in a context where education is relatively fixed (Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Deming, 2017; Beaudry et al., 2016; Burstein et al.,
2016).8 In the case of Brazil, I find that job polarization has not taken place. Far from that,
the occupational structure has been particularly rigid and the educational expansion was
mostly associated with lower occupational attainment, meaning that more educated workers
are increasingly employed in occupations previously performed by lower educated workers.
I show that the patterns observed in Brazil are expected in countries where education is
increasing rapidly, and it may offset the effects of technological changes that are usually
associated with job polarization.9
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the data; Section 2.3
contains the stylized facts for Brazil; Section 2.4 calibrates the model with Brazilian data;
Section 2.5 presents the results from the calibrated model; Section 2.6 discuss alternative
explanations; and Section 2.7 concludes.
8In developed countries, a large expansion in education took place in the past century, and technological
progress is the main force behind recent changes in the assignment of workers’ types to occupations and their
corresponding wages. In particular, there is an special interest in the effects of labor-saving technologies that
have polarized the labor market in developed countries (Autor, 2014).
9Maloney and Molina (2016) finds that Brazil is not an exception and the labor markets in most developing
countries show no evidence of job polarization.
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2.2 Data
This paper uses data from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), a
nationwide household survey for the years 1995 to 2014. Workers are classified into low,
medium and high educated. Low educated workers are those with completed primary ed-
ucation or less (less than 9 years of schooling). Medium educated workers are those with
some or complete secondary education (between 9 and 11 years of schooling). High educated
workers are those with some or complete university or another tertiary education (more than
11 years of schooling).
Hourly wages are expressed in 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars, and are
estimated by dividing monthly labor earnings by hours worked in the corresponding month.
The analysis is performed on employed workers between 18 and 55 years old, and living
in regions that have been surveyed throughout the entire period.10 Observations are re-
weighted to hold constant the demographic composition within each educational group at
the levels of 1995.11
Codes of different occupations are harmonized using the International Standard Classifi-
cation of Occupations of 1988 (ISCO-88). In the household surveys occupations are classified
according to the Classificação Brasileira de Ocupações (CBO), which changed between PNAD
1996-1999 and PNAD 2001-2014. I follow Salardi (2014) for recoding the occupations from
the CBO for each period into ISCO-88 at 3 digits.
10I exclude regions from rural north as they were incorporated in the sample in 2004.
11I follow DiNardo et al. (1996) by constructing 20 cells within each educational group: two genders,
five age categories and two sub-levels of education. I fix the share of each cell to the value of 1995 (initial
year). This procedure avoids confounding changes in average wages of a particular educational group with
a change in its gender composition, its age structure, or more disaggregated educational attainment within
each educational group. Results are robust to not implementing this re-weighting procedure and are available
upon request.
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To rank occupations in the data, I follow the standard procedure in the literature of using
the wage percentile of each occupation (Katz et al., 2006; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Beaudry
et al., 2016; Deming, 2017). The wage percentile rank is usually estimated using the mean
wage of the occupation in the baseline year. I opt for a different rank procedure that is
better suited for my analysis: the median wage percentile rank of occupations taking into
account the entire period 1995-2014. I prefer to use the median instead of the mean to avoid
the influence of outliers. Moreover, I use all years between 1995 to 2014 for three reasons.
First, it allows me to have more observations in each occupation. Second, the rank is less
susceptible to changes in the characteristics of the occupations that may impact wages of
particular occupations.12 Third, the model presented in Section 1.2 predicts that changes in
occupations’ wages throughout the entire period are informative on its ranking.13
Occupations are usually considered in the literature as the best description a researcher
has on the type of job a worker performs.14 Some occupations are assumed to be more
complex than others. For example, the tasks performed by an electrical engineer are arguably
of higher complexity than that of a housekeeper. Although the tasks’ content of different
occupations may differ in more than one dimension (for example, routine manual, routine
cognitive, and non-routine cognitive tasks), the relative wage of an occupation is assumed
to be an summary indicator of how complex that occupation is when compared to other
12For example, clerks may had a decline in their relative position when compared to other occupations
because of the change in the task content of their job. Clerks were in percentile 51 in 1995 and declined to
percentile 17 in 2014, while using my classification with date of the entire period they are in percentile 27.
Except for some extreme cases like this one, the percentile rank of an occupation is similar using different
classifications such as the median wage in 1995, 2004, 2014, or the median wage during the entire period
1995-2014. The correlation of the ranking produced by these different alternatives and the one used in this
paper is always above .94, as shown in Appendix Table B.2.
13For example, the model predicts that the first occupations to be overtook by high educated workers
from medium educated workers with an educational expansion are those of higher complexity previously
performed by medium educated workers. Wages in those occupations increased to the level of high educated
workers.
14See Autor (2013) for a detailed discussion on the information content of occupations.
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occupations in the economy.15 Therefore, the use of wages to rank occupations provides
useful information regarding their relative position in terms of how complex their tasks
content is.16
2.3 Changes in the Brazilian labor market between 1995-2014
2.3.1 Education
During the 1995-2014 period, there was a major increase in the educational attainment of
the Brazilian workforce. Panel A in Table 2.1 shows the share of workers with low (primary
or less), medium (some secondary), and high education (some university) in 1995 and 2014.
In only 19 years, the share of workers with medium and high education doubled, while the
share of low educated workers halved. The share of low educated workers decreased from
68.1 percent in 1995 to 36.4 percent in 2014, while the share of medium educated increased
from 20.5 to 40.0 percent and the share of high educated workers rose from 11.3 to 23.6
percent.17
To contextualize the extent and pace of the educational expansion that took place in
15This approach has been extensively used in the literature (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn,
2013; Beaudry et al., 2016). However, there is an increasing literature that further discriminates among
different tasks within an occupation by matching occupations with other datasets with detail tasks’ infor-
mation (for example, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles for the United States). This information is not
available for the case of Brazil.
16It could be the case that wages in the public sector or in unionized jobs introduce noise to this ranking
in Brazil since it may not reflect the relative position of an occupations in terms of the complexity of its
tasks. To show that this is not driving the results of this paper, Appendix Table B.2 shows that the ranking
is practically the same (correlation of .98) when dropping workers that belong to a union or that work in
the public sector.
17The extent of the educational expansion is practically the same when using the share of total hours
worked instead of the share of employed workers.
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Table 2.1: Changes in the educational attainment of the workforce and the Brazilian wage
distribution between 1995 and 2014
Brazil
1995 2014 Change
Panel A:Educational attainment (share of the workforce)
Low educated (less than secondary) 0.68 0.36 -0.32
Medium educated (some secondary) 0.21 0.40 0.19
High educated (some university) 0.11 0.24 0.13
Panel B: Average Wages
Total workers 2.36 3.02 27.8%
Low educated 1.47 2.02 37.3%
Medium educated 2.76 2.47 -10.5%
High educated 7.00 5.49 -21.6%
Panel C: Wage gaps
WM/WL 1.88 1.22 -34.8%
WH/WM 2.54 2.22 -12.4%
WH/WL 4.76 2.72 -42.9%
Panel D: Inequality
Gini 0.445 0.360 -0.085
Theil
Total 0.327 0.219 -0.109
Between educ. groups 0.071 0.051 -0.020
Atkinson (Inequality aversion = 2)
Total 0.572 0.440 -0.132
Between educ. groups 0.140 0.062 -0.078
Panel E: Wage poverty (wage line: 2.4)
FGT(0) 0.626 0.462 -0.164
FGT(1) 0.305 0.144 -0.162
FGT(2) 0.183 0.065 -0.118
Notes: The table shows the levels and changes in the educational attainment of the
workforce and in different outcomes of the wage distribution estimated from PNAD
1995 and 2014. The column changes displays the absolute changes in each variable
between 2014 and 1995 unless is preceded by % indicating percentage change.
Brazil, it is useful to compare it with changes in enrollment rates in the rest of the world
over a similar period of time. Panel (A) of Figure 2.1 shows the changes in enrollment rates
in secondary and university education across countries, according to the data from Barro and
Lee (2013). Brazil is the country with the largest increase in secondary school enrollment,
going from 16.0 percent in 1990 to 86.2 percent in 2010, closely followed by other Latin
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American countries and Portugal.18 In university education, the enrollment rate in Brazil
increased 20 percentage points, around the average of the countries considered in the data.
The educational expansion in Brazil between 1990 and 2010 was also large from a historical
point of view for the country. Panel (B) in Figure 2.1 plots the evolution of enrollment
rates since 1975. Except for a moderate increase in primary education, enrollment rates
were practically constant in Brazil between 1975 and 1990. From 1990 to 2010 enrollment in
secondary schooling soared, while university enrollment increased steadily after 1995. The
substantial increase in enrollment had an impact on the educational level of the labor force
as younger and more educated cohorts replaced older less educated cohorts. According to
Bruns et al. (2011), the rise in the educational attainment of Brazil’s labor force since 1995
has been one of the fastest on record in history.
Brazil implemented several important educational reforms to increase the educational
level of the population. These reforms included, among others: Financial reforms such as
an increase in public expenditure in education from 2.0 percent of GDP in 1995 to over 5.0
percent in 2010 and a redistribution of resources towards poor municipalities in primary
education in 1996 (a reform called Fundef) and secondary education in 2007 (Fundeb);
increases in accountability by implementing nation wise standardized tests to track the
learning progress over time in primary and secondary schooling; and reducing the direct
and indirect cost of schooling by creating more schools and universities (less travel time)
together with conditional cash transfers (Bolsa familia) and other scholarships (for example,
ProUni) that particularly benefited poor households.19 Bruns et al. (2011) estimate that, as
a consequence of the complementarity between these reforms, a six-year-old Brazilian child
starting school in 2010 from the bottom quintile of the income distribution will, on average,
18The enrollment rate is defined as the ratio of students at a given level of schooling in the designated age
group to the total population of that age group.
19Bruns et al. (2011) and OECD (2011) provide a detailed description of these reforms.
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Figure 2.1: Changes in enrollment rates in Brazil
(a) Across countries comparison (1990-2010) (b) Historical comparison
Notes: Panel (a) shows the changes in enrollment rates across countries between
1990 and 2010 in secondary and university/tertiary education. Panel (b) shows
the historical evolution of enrollment rates for primary, secondary and university
education in Brazil. Enrollment ratios are defined as the ratio of students at a
given level of schooling in the designated age group to the total population of
that age group.
Source: Barro and Lee (2013).
complete more than twice as many years of schooling than her parents have.20
Data from PNAD shows the large increase in secondary schooling between 1995 and
2014: the share of the population between 20 and 24 years old that finished secondary
schooling increased from 24.0 to 63.3 percent during this period. The demand for higher
education skyrocketed. According to the data from Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas
20It is possible that the large increase in educational expenditure after 1995 affected labor markets in-
directly by introducing changes in tax policy. For example, tax revenues as percentage of GDP increased
from 11 percent in 1995 to 14.6 percent in 2001 (World Development Indicators, 2018) in part because of
an increase in tax on incomes, profits and capital gains that represented 13.5 percent of total revenues in
1995 and 25.3 percent in 2001. These taxes may have distorted capital and labor supply decisions (Lledo,
2005). However, most of the increase in taxes was introduced by the national government, while the increase
in educational expenditure took place at a municipality and regional level because of the implementation of
Fundef (Bruns et al., 2011), making it difficult to disentangle how the educational expansion was actually
financed. Due to this limitation, instead of building a general equilibrium framework including the public
sector, I consider the educational expansion as exogenous of the labor market. I acknowledge that this is a
limitation of this study, which is restricted to estimating the direct labor market effects of the educational
expansion instead of a full welfare analysis considering the cost and other indirect effects originated by it.
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Educacionais Anísio Teixeira (INEP), the number of students in tertiary education increased
from 1.7 million in 1995 to 6.6 million in 2015. But the selection process became tougher:
19 percent of the candidates were accepted in 1995, as opposed to only 14 percent in 2015.
Between 1995 and 2015, the number of candidates increased from 2.6 to 14.3 million. The
supply and diversity of higher level institutions also increased. The number of institutions
offering university/tertiary education went from 894 in 1995 to 2,364 in 2014, driven by the
deregulation of higher education which foster the creation of a large number of for-profit
private institutions (Ferreyra et al., 2017).
Despite the large educational expansion that took place in secondary and university level,
the available evidence points out that the quality of education in Brazil remain relatively
unchanged. In secondary education, the students’ scores in the Program for International
Student Assessment (PISA) increased slightly between 2000 and 2015 in each of the evalu-
ated subjects (science, mathematics, and reading), and the scores in 2009 first-order dominate
those of the year 2000, with the highest increase taking place at the bottom quintile (Bruns
et al., 2011).21 The scores are low by OECD standards, but they have not deteriorated in a
time of a large educational expansion, which has been recognized as a remarkable achieve-
ment (Bruns et al., 2011). Regarding tertiary education, selection to top universities remains
highly competitive, as was discussed previously. For example, there are 16 applicants for each
accepted candidate in UNICAMP and USP (two of the largest universities in Brazil). Ac-
cording to INEP, approximatively 90 percent of the students in university/tertiary education
attend an institution that applied some kind of selection in 2014.22
21PISA is regarded as one of the best measures of student outcomes. It is constructed to assure the
comparison of results across countries and within a country in different periods.
22Changes in education quality can also be inferred by comparing data on wages of workers with the
same educational level but that were educated at different periods. In Section 2.7.1, I follow Bowlus and
Robinson (2012) decomposition to disentangle what part of the changes in wages for each educational group
can be explained by a change in education quality (the quantity of human capital inherent to each education
level) and which part corresponds to a change in market prices. I find that practically all the changes in
wages come from a change in the market price of human capital for each educational level, consistent with
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2.3.2 Wage distribution
Along with the educational expansion, the wage distribution in Brazil changed in several
important ways between 1995 and 2014. Panels B-E in Table 2.1 presents changes in differ-
ent dimensions of the wage distribution. The average wage for the total workforce largely
increased by a 27.8 percent during this period, but wages did not increase for all educational
groups. While the average wage of low educated workers increased by 37.3 percent, the aver-
age wage of medium and high educated workers fell by 10.5 and 21.6 percent respectively.23
Wage inequality declined sharply in Brazil, contrary to what happened in the United
States and other developed countries since the 1980s (Cingano, 2014). The wage gaps be-
tween workers with different educational levels diminished, and all the indexes of relative
income inequality declined.24 In 1995, the average wage of high educated workers was 2.5
times that of medium educated, and 4.8 times the average wage of low educated workers.
These gaps declined to 2.2 and 2.7 in 2014, respectively. The Gini index went down 0.085
points, from 0.445 in 1995 to 0.360 in 2014. To better understand the importance of changes
in wages for workers with different educational levels in the reduction of inequality, I compute
other indexes that can be decomposed in between-group and within-group inequality. The
Theil index diminished 0.109, with 20 percent of that fall explained by changes in inequality
between the three educational groups—low, medium, and high educated—considered in this
paper. The importance of the between-group inequality is larger in the case of the Atkin-
son index with an inequality aversion parameter equal to 2, which puts more weight on
changes at the bottom of the wage distribution. The index declined 0.132, with 59.2 percent
the assumption that the human capital content, which relates to educational quality, remained relatively
unchanged.
23The increase in the overall average wage was driven by the wage increment of low educated workers,
and the raise in the share of workers receiving wages of medium and high levels of education (the wage bill
increased for these two groups despite the fall in average wages).
24See Barros et al. (2010) for a detail characterization of the decline in inequality in Brazil.
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of that decline due to falling inequality between workers with different educational level.
Wage-poverty, defined as the share of workers with wages below USD 2.4 at 2011 Purchasing
Power Parity, diminished by 16.4 percentage points from 62.6 percent to 46.2 percent.25
2.3.3 Occupational structure of employment
The large educational expansion in Brazil was not matched by a corresponding occupational
upgrading between 1995 and 2014. On the contrary, the occupational structure of employ-
ment was practically fixed. Table 2.2 displays the employment shares and its changes for
different occupation categories and educational groups for 1995 and 2014. Three occupational
groups are considered based on the 82 occupations from the ISCO-88-3 digit classification
according to the median wage over the period 1995-2016: Bottom-third refers to the 27 oc-
cupations with lower wage, medium-third consists of the next 27 occupations, and top-third
represents the remaining 28 occupations with the highest wages in the economy. Panel A
and B show the employment shares of the total workforce in each occupation-education cell
for the years 1995 and 2014 respectively, while Panel C contains the changes in each cell.
For example, 48.8 percent of all workers were low educated and employed in bottom-third
occupations in 1995 but only 28.4 percent of the workforce fell into that category in 2014,
which represents a decline of 20.5 percentage points. Note that the total row share contains
the share of employment in each occupational group and the total column share equals the
share of workers in each educational group.
By looking at the changes in the total row share in Panel C, it is clear that the occu-
25I consider a wage poverty line of USD 2.4 given that it is the income needed for a family of four to not
be consider poor by the USD 3.1 dollar-a-day moderate poverty line used by the world Bank if one of the
member of the household works at least 40 hours a week.
61
Table 2.2: Employment shares by education and occupation of total employment
Low Medium High Total row
educated educated educated share
Panel A: 1995
Bottom-third 48.8 6.4 1.0 56.2
Middle-third 14.7 9.7 3.7 28.0
Top-third 4.5 4.9 6.4 15.8
Total column share 68.0 21.0 11.0 100.0
Panel B: 2014
Bottom-third 28.4 22.1 4.2 54.7
Middle-third 6.6 14.0 6.9 27.5
Top-third 1.0 3.9 12.8 17.7
Total column share 36.0 40.0 24.0 100.0
Panel C: Change 1995-2014 (p.p.)
Bottom-third -20.5 15.7 3.3 -1.5
Middle-third -8.1 4.3 3.3 -0.5
Top-third -3.4 -1.1 6.5 1.9
Total column share -32.00 19.00 13.00 0.00
Notes: The 82 occupations from the ISCO-88-3 digit classification are divided into 3 groups
of equal number of occupations according to their median wage over the period 1995-2016.
Bottom-third refers to the 27 occupations with lower average wage, medium-third are the
next 27, and the remaining 28 are classified as top-third occupations. Workers are clas-
sified into low (less than secondary), medium (some secondary), and high educated (some
university). Panel A and B show the employment share in each education-occupation cell
of the total workforce for 1995 and 2014 respectively. Panel C contains the changes in the
employment share in each cell between 2014 and 1995.
pational structure of employment improved between 1995 and 2016 in the sense there was
an increase in employment in high-wage occupations. But it also becomes evident that im-
provement was very small when compared to the large educational expansion. The share of
top-third occupations only increased by 1.9 percentage points while the share of low-third
and middle-third occupations slightly diminished by 1.5 and 0.5 percent respectively. These
small changes contrast with the large educational expansion that took place in Brazil, as
shown in the large changes in the total column share. It is striking that the share of top-third
occupations only increased 1.9 percentage points while the share of high educated workers
increased by 13 percentage points.26
26The relatively small change in the occupational composition of employment is also evident when looking
into the 1 digit ISCO-88 classification. The Appendix Table B.3 displays the changes in the occupational
composition of employment overall and for each educational level between 1995 and 2014 and occupational
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The small improvement in the occupational composition are consistent with more flexible
ways of classifying occupations. To be as flexible as possible, I follow Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013), among others, in estimating smoothed regressions of
the changes in employment share over a ranking of occupations based on the median wage
between 1995 and 2014.27 Figure 2.2 shows the locally weighted regression of changes in
employment share along the occupational ranking. The blue-circle line in the figure shows
the observed change in employment shares across occupations for the total workforce. With
this more flexible approach, I find that there is an increase in high-ranking occupations
and a corresponding decline in low-ranking occupations, but the changes in employment are
small when compared to the increase in education. To see this, consider the red-triangle
line in Figure 2.2. This line displays the result of a thought experiment which simulates the
changes in occupations between 1995 and 2014 if workers with a given educational level in
2014 were distributed across occupations as in 1995. This exercise creates a counterfactual
on how the occupational structure of employment would have looked like in 2014 if the
increases in education had not changed the assignment of workers’ type to occupations.
The employment share in low ranking occupations would have largely declined, and the
employment share would have increased for occupations in the middle and at the top of the
ranking. The difference between the blue-circle and the red-triangle lines is due to the lower
occupational attainment within each educational level, to which I now turn.28
categories are ordered from higher pay to lower pay according to their median wage during the period 1995-
2014. The changes for the overall workforce are characterized by a small increase in the share of employment
in top ranking occupations and a small decline in low ranking occupations. For example, the share of
professionals and managers only increased by 2.5 percentage points, from 13 to 15.5 percent, between 1995
and 2014.
27The ranking is robust to using other measures to construct the occupational ranking, such as the average
wage of the initial or final period in each occupation. For more details see Section 2.2.
28It is also noteworthy that the slightly positive slope in Brazil differs from to the U-shaped pattern
that has been estimated for the United States and other developed countries (Acemoglu and Autor, 2011;
Goos et al., 2014), where occupations in the middle declined and those at both ends of the occupational
distribution increased in the last three decades.
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Figure 2.2: Changes in the occupational composition of the workforce 1995-2004
Notes: Occupations at 3 digit level from ISCO-88 are ranked according to their
median wage from lower to higher in the horizontal axis. The blue line (circle) in
the figure is a locally weighted smoothing regression of the changes in employment
shares (percent points) across the occupational ranking based on the median wage
of each occupation over the period 1995-2014. The red line (triangle) displays a
counterfactual change in the occupational composition of employment between
1995 and 2014 if the occupational composition within each educational group is
fixed to the levels of 1995.
Along with the large educational expansion and the small improvement in the occupa-
tional structure of employment I find that there was a clear deterioration of the conditional
occupational attainment for each educational group, especially for medium educated work-
ers. Table 2.3 displays the share of employment across different occupational categories for
each educational group. As expected, in 1995 most of the low educated workers (71.8 per-
cent) were employed in bottom-third occupations, while most of medium and high educated
were in middle-third and top-third occupations respectively (46.0 and 57.9 percent). When
looking at changes between 1995 and 2014, all educational groups experienced a sizable
increase in employment in the bottom-third occupations. For low educated workers, the
share of employment in the bottom-third occupations increased by 7.0 percentage points.
For medium, the share in bottom-third occupations practically doubled increasing 24.9 per-
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centage points. In the case of high educated workers, the share in bottom-third occupations
more than doubled from 8.7 percent in 1995 to 17.6 percent in 2014. This lower occupational
attainment is also depicted in Figure 2.3 which shows locally weighted regression of changes
in employment for each educational group. Each educational groups lost employment shares
in higher rank occupations and increased their employment share in lower rank occupations
so that the average occupational rank declined, and this pattern was much stronger among
medium educated workers.29
In summary, there are four stylized facts that characterize the changes in the Brazilian
labor market between 1995 and 2014 along with the large educational expansion. First,
average wages increased but not for all groups since wages of low educated workers increased
and wages of medium and high educated workers fell. Second, wage gaps among work-
ers with different educational levels largely declined. Third, the occupational structure of
employment improved but that improvement was surprisingly small when compared to the
large educational expansion that took place during this period. Finally, there was a large
deterioration in the conditional occupational attainment for each educational group. I argue
in the rest of the paper that the educational expansion was the main factor generating these
distinct patterns in wages and occupations.
29In the Appendix B.1 I explore in detail the relationship between changes in average wages of each educa-
tional group and their occupational composition of employment. Using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, I
disentangle what part of the changes in averages wages is due to an occupational composition effect (changes
in the occupations workers perform) and what part is due to a pay structure effect (changes in wages within
occupations). I find that for all workers the composition effect is small and positive, consistent with small
improvements in the occupational composition of the economy; while the increase in wages is driven by higher
wages at each occupation, especially those that started with a lower wage. I also find that all educational
levels experienced a negative occupational composition effect, consistent with lower occupational attainment
for each educational level. For low educated workers wages within each occupation largely increased, com-
pensating for the negative composition effect, and average wages increased. For medium educated workers,
wages increased only in a small number of occupations but not enough to compensate for the negative
composition effect. In the case of high educated workers, wages declined within occupations, reinforcing
the negative composition effect, and average wages largely fell. The analysis indicates that changes in both
between and within occupations played a relevant role to explain the observed pattern of wages in Brazil.
65
Table 2.3: Employment shares by occupations and mean occupational ranking for each
educational group
Low Medium High Total
educated educated educated workers
Panel A: 1995
Bottom-third 71.8 30.5 8.7 56.2
Middle-third 21.6 46.0 33.5 28.0
Top-third 6.6 23.5 57.9 15.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean occupational ranking 0.240 0.449 0.670 0.335
Panel B: 2014
Bottom-third 78.8 55.3 17.6 54.7
Middle-third 18.3 35.0 29.0 27.5
Top-third 2.9 9.6 53.5 17.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean occupational ranking 0.203 0.320 0.612 0.268
Panel C: Change 1995-2014 (p.p.)
Bottom-third 7.0 24.9 8.9 -1.5
Middle-third -3.3 -11.0 -4.5 -0.5
Top-third -3.7 -13.9 -4.4 1.9
Total 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mean occupational ranking -0.037 -0.129 -0.058 0.007
Notes: The 82 occupations from the ISCO-88-3 digit classification are divided into 3
groups of equal number of occupations according to their average wage over the period
1995-2016. Bottom-third refers to the 27 occupations with lower average wage, medium-
third are the next 27, and the remaining 28 are classified as top-third occupations.
Workers are classified into low (less than secondary), medium (some secondary), and
high educated (some university). Panel A and B show the employment share for each
educational group in different occupations and the mean ranking for 1995 and 2014
respectively. Panel C contains the changes in employment shares and mean ranking for
each educational group between 2014 and 1995. The mean occupational ranking refers
to the mean for each educational group of their occupation percentile according to the
median wage over the period 1995-2014 divided by 100.
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Figure 2.3: Occupational downgrading for each educational group between 1995-2014
Notes: The figure plots a locally weighted smoothing regression of the changes
in employment shares (percent points) across the occupational ranking based on
the median wage of each occupation over the period 1995-2014. Workers are
classified into low (less than secondary), medium (some secondary), and high
educated (some university). Occupations are ranked as in Figure 2.2.
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2.4 Comparison of the qualitative predictions of the model and
the changes in the data
This section compares observed changes in labor market outcomes in Brazil with the pre-
dictions of the model developed in Chapter 1 when only the Brazilian educational expan-
sion takes place, holding constant the rest of the parameters of the model. That is, I
explore the effects of changes in m and h in the magnitudes observed in Brazil, hold-
ing constant the technology of the production function entirely characterized by the set
{AL, AM , AH , αL, αM , αH}. I first discuss the qualitative results, followed by a quantitative
assessment of the model’s predictions arising from the calibrated model in the next sections.
Table 2.4 displays the directional changes in the data for Brazil between 1995 and 2014,
and the qualitative results of the model when there is an increase in the shares of medium
and high educated workers.30 The qualitative predictions of the model exactly match the
changes observed in the data: the occupational composition of the workforce presents small
changes when comparted to the educational expansion, so that the share of employment in
tasks originally performed by high (low) educated workers increases (decreases) by less than
the increase in the share of high educated workers (decline in the share of low educated
workers); the average complexity of the task performed by each type of worker declines
(lower educational attainment for each educational group); wages of low educated increase,
wages of high educated workers decline, and changes in wages of medium educated workers
are between those of low and high educated; and wage gaps of more educated workers with
respect to less educated workers fall.
30Section 1.2 described two possible scenarios when both m and h increases, depending on whether IH
increases or decreases. The necessary condition for IH to increase is that the ratio of the share of high edu-
cation workers to the share of medium educated workers declines, which is not the case in Brazil. Therefore,
the only relevant case here is a decline in IH .
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Table 2.4: Qualitative observed changes vs model predictions
Brazil Model (iii.a)
1995-2014 ∆m > 0 and ∆h > 0
Panel A: Changes in thresholds
IL ↓
IH ↓
Panel B: Changes in occup. composition of employment
Bottom-third (OB) (↓)∆OB > −(∆m+ ∆h) ∆EB > −(∆m+ ∆h)
Middle-third (OM) (↓) ∆OM < ∆m ∆EM < ∆m
Top-third (OH) (↑)∆OH < ∆h ∆ET < ∆h
Panel C: Changes in mean occup. ranking
Low educated ↓ ↓
Medium educated ↓ ↓
High educated ↓ ↓
Panel D: Changes in wages
Low educated ↑ ↑
Medium educated (↓) ∆WH < ∆WM < ∆WL ∆WH < ∆WM < ∆WL
High educated ↓ ↓
Panel E: Changes in wage gaps
WH/WM ↓ ↓
WM/WL ↓ ↓
WH/WL ↓ ↓
Notes: The table shows the qualitative changes in the labor market in Brazil during the years 1995-
2014 and the changes predicted by the model under policy experiment (iii.a). The table contents
should be interpreted as follows: ↑ denotes an increase for any value in the parameters of the model; ↓
denotes a decrease; ↑↓ denotes that it can increase or decrease; {EH , EM , EB} refer to the categories
in Table 1.1 that classify occupations in the model. Other cells are filled with lower or upper bound
to changes in the outcome variable.
In the context of the model, only a supply shock as the one that took place in Brazil can
generate the patterns on occupations and wages observed in the data. Changes in the labor
market can arise from supply shocks or from technological shocks in the model. I already
showed that a supply shock as the one that took place in Brazil matches all the patterns
observed in the data. It remains to be shown that technological changes in the model cannot
generate these patterns. First, if the productivity parameters of all workers increase by the
same ratio (factor-neutral technical change where AL, AM , and AH experience the same
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proportional increase), there is no effect on the assignment of workers to tasks, and wages of
all types increase in the same proportion, leaving wage gaps unaffected. Second, a skill-biased
technological change, portrayed in the model by an increase in AH , generates a pattern of
lower occupational attainment for each group consistent with the data, but it also predicts
an increase in wages of high educated workers, which is at odds with the data.31 The only
technological change that can reduce the wage gaps is an increase in the productivity of low
educated workers, that is, depicted by an increase in AL in the model, but it would also imply
occupational upgrading instead of lower occupational attainment: less educated workers will
start to perform tasks of higher complexity. A type-H&M educational expansion where H
dominates is the only plausible change in the model consistent with all the patterns observed
in the data.
2.5 Calibration
The procedure to calibrate the parameters of the model with data from Brazil is fairly simple.
The set of parameters that need to be estimated are the skill supplies and the productivity
across tasks for each worker type. I use the baseline year, the data from 1995, to calibrate
all these parameters.
The parameters corresponding to the educational level of the workforce come directly
from the data. The values of l, m, and h are the share of the employed workers with low
(less than secondary), medium (some secondary), and high education (some university) in
the survey of 1995.
31This type of technological change has been identified as the main factor influencing the labor markets
during the 1990s in the United States and other developed countries (Acemoglu, 1998; Bekman et al., 1998).
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What remains to be estimated are the factor-specific augmenting technologies common
to all tasks AL, AM , and AH , and the specific productivities across tasks αL(i), αM(i), and
αH(i). To that end, I use the average wage for low, medium and high educated workers
in 1995. My identifying assumption is to assume a functional form for the functions αL(i),
αM(i), and αH(i) that simplifies the equilibrium conditions in the model.32
With wage gaps and relative supplies in 1995 it is possible to estimate the thresholds
levels IL and IH from the equilibrium conditions of the model. Restating equations (1.12),
(1.13), it is possible to express:
(1− I∗H)
I∗H − I∗L
= WH
WM
h
m
, (2.1)
(I∗H − I∗L)
I∗L
= WM
WL
m
(1−m− h) . (2.2)
where I∗L and I∗H are the task thresholds in 1995. In terms of Figure 1.1, these equations
solve for the thresholds levels and the wage gaps corresponding to each threshold. Note that
CHM(i) is a function that goes through the point where IH meets with the relative wage
WH/WM , and it defines the relative productivity across all tasks of high educated workers
with respect to medium educated workers for all i ∈ (1, 0). Similarly, CML(i) defines the
relative productivity of medium to low educated workers across all tasks and it pass through
the point where IL intersects the relative wage WM/WL. I assume a functional form for
these functions. In particular, let
αL(i) = i; αM(i) = i2; αH(i) = i3.
32In Appendix Table B.4 I show that the general results of the model are robust to assuming other
functional forms.
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Then, the functions that determine the relative productivity across tasks are:
CHM(i) = ln
AHαH(i)
AMαM(i)
= ln AH
AM
i,
CML(i) = ln
AMαM(i)
ALαL(i)
= ln AM
AL
i.
The above expressions combined with condition WH/WM = CHM(IH) (equation (1.25))
and WM/WL = CML(IL) (equation (1.26)) solve for AHAM and
AM
AL
WH
WM
= AH
AM
I∗H ,⇒ AH =
WH
WM
AM
I∗H
WM
WL
= AM
AL
I∗L,⇒ AM =
WM
WL
AL
I∗L
.
Finally, I use a simulated method of moments to target AL so that equation (1.24)
solves for the observed average wage for low educated workers in 1995. As result of this
calibration, AL = 2.81; AM = 12.39 and AH = 47.36, which implies that CHM(i) = ln 3.82i
and CML(i) = ln 4.42i.
The calibrated model using these parameters matches the initial moments in the data
relatively well. Table 2.5 contains the results of the calibration for the targeted and non-
targeted moments. Panel A and B show that the supply of skills and average wages in 1995
are used to calibrate the model, so that its values perfectly match that of the model. The
the overall distribution of occupations and the average task performed by each educational
level are not targeted in the model and are shown in Panel C and Panel D, respectively.
According to the model the average task of low educated workers is 0.21 in 1995, while
in the data it is 0.24, while the average tasks in 1995 for medium and high educated are
slightly overestimated in the model.33 The model matches that most of the employment is
concentrated on occupations of lower ranking (52.9% of total employment is located into
33I consider that the ranking of an occupation is informative of its complexity, such that a higher ranked
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bottom-third occupations), while there is a much lower share of employment in high-rank
occupations where high educated workers are employed (11.2% of total employment is into
top-third occupations). The reason for the low share of employment into the top occupations
in the model results from the optimal decisions of profit maximizers employers to use the
most productive workers in a larger range of tasks, diminishing the employment share on
those tasks.
Panel E displays the wage-inequality predicted by the model. Wage gaps are not pre-
sented since they are directly estimated from the average wages that are targeted, and
perfectly matched by the model. The inequality of the wage distribution in the model is, as
expected, lower than that of the data, given that in the model there is no inequality within
each educational group. The Gini index in the model is 30 percent lower than that of the
data, but the level of inequality in the model is higher than the between component of the
Theil and the Atkinson(2) indexes. The model does a better job on fitting different indexes
of wage poverty with a poverty line of $2.4. I argue in the next section that although the
model cannot capture the total level of inequality at a given point in time because it only
produces three different wages for the total workforce (one for each educational group), it is
useful to understand changes in inequality that arise from variations in these wages and in
the share of workers who earns them.
occupation is more complex than a lower ranked occupation. In a strict sense, there is a correspondence
between the ranking of the occupation and the index of task complexity in the model, but one index can be
a monotonic transformation of the other, preserving the order but not necessarily the distance among each
other.
73
Table 2.5: Initial moments in the data (1995) and the model
Brazil 1995 Model
Panel A: Initial thresholds
Initial IL 0.424
Initial IH 0.664
Panel B: Wages (targeted)
Low educated 1.47 1.47
Medium educated 2.76 2.76
High educated 7.00 7.00
Panel C: Occup. composition of employ. (not-targeted)
Bottom-third 0.562 0.529
Middle-third 0.279 0.359
Top-third 0.159 0.112
Panel D: Av. occ. ranking (not-targeted)
Low educated 0.243 0.212
Medium educated 0.454 0.544
High Educated 0.669 0.832
Panel E: Inequality (not-targeted)
Gini 0.445 0.271
Theil
Total 0.327 0.179
Between educ. groups 0.071
Atkinson (Inequality aversion = 2)
Total 0.572 0.205
Between educ. groups 0.140
Panel F: Wage poverty- wage line $2.4 (not-targeted)
FGT(0) 0.626 0.709
FGT(1) 0.305 0.275
FGT(2) 0.183 0.106
Notes: Estimations for Brazil comes from PNAD 1995. The model is calibrated for
the year 1995 according to Section 2.5. 82 occupations at ISCO-88 3 digit level are
ranked from 0 to 1 according to its median wage for the period 1995-2014. The
average ranking is computed for each educational group. Bottom-third refers to the
27 occupations with lower average wage, medium-third are next 27, and the remaining
28 are classified as top-third occupations. Workers are classified into low (less than
secondary), medium (some secondary), and high educated (some university).
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2.6 Quantifying the Effects of the Educational Expansion in Brazil
2.6.1 Changes in the Occupational Structure and the Wage Dis-
tribution
This section compares observed changes in labor market outcomes in Brazil between 1995
and 2014 with the predictions of the model when the Brazilian educational expansion takes
place, holding constant the rest of the parameters of the model. That is, I explore the effects
of changes in m and h in the magnitudes observed in Brazil, holding constant the technology
of the production function entirely characterized by the set {AL, AM , AH , αL, αM , αH}.
I already established that a supply shock as the one that took place in Brazil matches all
the qualitative patterns observed in the data. I turn now to the quantitative assessment of the
effects of an educational expansion through the lens of the model. To this end, I estimate the
changes in several outcomes of interest in the calibrated model generated by the educational
expansion that took place in Brazil. The educational expansion consists of: a decrease in
l from 0.68 to 0.36, an increase in m from 0.21 to 0.40, and an increase in h from 0.11 to
0.24. Table 2.6 presents the actual and simulated changes in the occupational structure of
employment and the wage distribution. The table compares the changes observed in the
data between 1995 and 2014 with those predicted by the model as results of the educational
expansion. The objective of this exercise is to estimate how much of the changes in the data
can be predicted by the model when only the educational level of the workforce increases as
it did in Brazil while all other parameters (technology) are held constant. The last column
of the table shows the difference between the model fit and the observed changes in the data.
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Table 2.6: The labor market effects of an educational expansion: data vs model
Data (1995-2014) Model Difference
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
Panel A: Changes in thresholds
IL -0.167
IH -0.084
Panel B: Changes in occup. composition of employment
Bottom-third -0.015 -0.072 -0.057
Middle-third -0.005 -0.004 0.001
Top-third 0.019 0.076 0.057
Panel C: Changes in mean occup. ranking
Low educated -0.037 -0.083 -0.046
Medium educated -0.129 -0.126 0.003
High Educated -0.058 -0.042 0.016
Panel D: % Changes in wages
Total workforce 27.8 29.3 1.5
Low educated 37.3 46.9 9.6
Medium educated -10.5 -10.9 -0.4
High Educated -21.6 -22.2 -0.6
Panel E: % Changes in wage gaps
WH/WM -12.4 -12.7 -0.3
WM/WL -34.8 -39.3 -4.5
WH/WL -42.9 -47.1 -4.2
Panel F: Changes in welfare and inequality
First order dominance Yes No
Gini -0.085 -0.082 0.003
Theil -0.109 -0.099 0.010
Between component -0.020 -0.099 -0.011
Atkinson(2) -0.132 -0.088 0.044
Between component -0.078 -0.088 0.010
Panel G: Changes in wage Poverty (wage line 2.4)
FGT(0) -0.164 -0.331 -0.167
FGT(1) -0.162 -0.237 -0.075
FGT(2) -0.118 -0.103 0.015
Notes: Estimations for Brazil comes from PNAD 1995-2014. The estimations for the model comes
from simulating the Brazilian educational expansion between 1995-2014 on the calibrated model,
holding constant the rest of the parameters. The Brazilian educational expansion consists of:
an increase in the share of medium educated from 20.5 to 40.0 percent, an increase in the share
of high educated workers from 11.3 to 23.6 percent, and a decline in the share of low educated
workers from 68.1 to 36.4 percent. The third column estimates the difference between the changes
in the data and in the model.
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I found that the model’s predictions of the effect of an educational expansion are re-
markably accurate. The model is not only able to predict the qualitative changes but it also
makes a close quantitative prediction of the observed changes in most of the outcomes of
interest.
Panel B displays the results regarding the overall composition of employment. The
general prediction of the model is that the educational expansion generated an improvement
in the occupational composition of the workforce, but that improvement was small when
compared to the extent of the educational expansion, which match the patterns observed
in the data. The model predicts larger changes than the ones observed in the data, but
the same qualitative results (a decline in the bottom-third and an increase in the top-third
occupations). When the educational expansion takes place, high and medium educated
workers moved down to tasks of lower complexity, implying that not all the high and medium
educated workers find a job in the same tasks workers with that educational level used to
carry out, and the overall occupational composition of employment improves slightly, but its
changes are small when compared to the educational expansion. The see this clearly, consider
that the model predicts a decline of only 7.2 percentage points in bottom-third occupations,
despite the fact that the share of low educated workers declined by 32 percentage points. At
the same time, the model predicts an increase of 7.6 percentage points in the share of top-
third occupations despite the increase in 13 percentage points in the share of high educated
workers.34
Panel C shows that the changes in the average ranking of occupations in the model follow
closely that of the data: there was a decline in the conditional occupational attainment
for each educational group, and it was larger for medium educated workers. For medium
educated workers, the average occupational ranking declines by 0.126 in the model compared
34I discuss the predictions of the model for high educated workers at length in Section 2.6.2.
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to 0.128 in the data. For high educated workers, the average ranking declines by 0.042 in the
model and by 0.057 in the data. The model predicts a larger decrease in the average task of
low educated workers (0.083) than the one observed in the data (0.037). Part of the reason
is that the model cannot explain the decline in the share of employment in agriculture that
is due to some structural change taking place during these years, which decreased the share
of low educated workers in agricultural-related occupations that are at the bottom of the
ranking.35
Whit respect to real wages, Panel D shows that the model’s predictions are very close to
actual changes overall and for each educational group. Average wages rise 29.3 percent in
the model and 27.8 percent the data; wages of low educated workers increase 46.9 percent in
the model compared to 37.3 percent in the data; wages of medium educated workers decline
10.9 percent in the model and 10.5 percent in the data; and wages of high educated workers
decrease 22.2 percent in the model and 21.6 percent in the data. The model predicts that
wages of medium educated workers decrease less than wages of high educated workers, as
observed in the data, despite the fact that medium educated workers experienced the largest
decline in occupational attainment (both in the data and the model). A precise prediction of
the changes in the wage gaps follows directly from the power of the model to predict changes
in wages, as depicted in Panel E. The wage gap of medium to low falls 39.4 percent in the
model and 34.8 percent in the data. The wage gap of high to medium declines 12.7 and 12.4
in the model and the data respectively. Finally, the wage gap of high to low declines 47.0
percent in the model and 42.9 percent in the data.
35Structural change may also be driven, in part, by an educational expansion. Consider a model with
two sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture. In the agriculture sector, labor productivity declines with the
number of workers in that sector. The non-agriculture sector produces a final good combining an infinite
number of tasks, as in the model presented here. Low educated workers can be employed in the agriculture
sector or in tasks of low complexity in the non-agriculture sector. An educational expansion such as the one
that took place in Brazil may increase the wages of low educated workers in tasks of lower complexity in the
non-agriculture sector, pulling workers out of agriculture.
78
Changes in inequality and poverty in the model are also close to those of the data. With
respect to inequality, Figure 2.4 displays the Lorenz curves for Brazil in the data (Panel A)
and in the model (Panel B). The Lorenz curve in 2014 is always above the one in 1995, which
implies that any index of relative inequality decreased during this period. The same pattern
is observed in the model. In terms of specific indexes of inequality portrayed in Panel F of
Table 2.6, the Gini coefficient declined 0.085 points in the data and 0.082 in the model. The
reduction in the Theil index is also similar, but the changes in the between education groups
component of inequality (directly related to the changes in the model) is overestimated.
This is not the case in the Atkinson index with an inequality aversion parameter equal to
2, which puts more weight to changes at the bottom of the wages distribution. In this case,
the between groups inequality declined 0.078 in the data while in the model it decreased
0.088.36 The fact that the fit of the model is better for the changes in the Atkinson (2)
than in the Theil index is consistent with the model not being able to capture some of the
movement at the top of the income distribution related to the dispersion of wages among
high educated workers. Taking the average fit across the indexes of inequality, the model
predicts 85 percent of the observed changes.37
The generalized increase in wages at the bottom of the wage distribution reduced poverty
in the data and in the model, as depicted by Panel G. Wages for the percentiles that re-
mained low educated increased and wages rose even more for those percentiles that switched
from low to medium and high education. This represents the bottom 70 percent of the
wage distribution in the model (the percentage that originally was low educated). However,
changes in the poverty rate are overestimated in the model given its sensitivity to different
poverty lines. The model better predicts changes in the poverty gap—FGT(1)—and the
36In the model there is no within group inequality, therefore total inequality is equal to between-group
inequality.
37If only the between components and the Gini index are taking into account, the fit of the model diminishes
slightly to 68.4.
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Figure 2.4: Changes in relative inequality: Lorenz Curves
(a) Brazil: 1995 and 2015
(b) Model: Before and after the educational ex-
pansion
Notes: Panel (a) shows Lorenz curves for Brazil in 1995 and 2014. Panel (b)
shows the Lorenz curves in the calibrated model before and after the educational
expansion.
depth of poverty—FGT(2). On average, the model fits 68.4 percent of the changes in wage
poverty in Brazil measure by FGT(0)-FGT(2).
Although the model accurately predicts most of the patterns in the occupational structure
of employment and the wage distribution observed in Brazil between 1995 and 2014, it has
some limitations to predict the year by year changes in a satisfactory way. Figure 2.5 shows
the evolution of key variables and the predictions from the model. Brazil had a financial
crisis in 1999 that lasted until 2003. The average wages during this period dropped overall
and for the three educational groups. The model does not contain any structure to analyze
business cycles, so it is expected to perform poorly during this period. The crisis mainly
affected the levels of real wages, but it may be argued that the wage ratios were less affected
if the crisis equally hurt workers with any educational level. This seems to be the case
because even during this period of crisis the model closely predicts the evolution of wage
gaps.
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Figure 2.5: Data vs model predictions: wages year by year
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of wages and wages gaps labor market
outcomes in the data and in the model year by year. The model simulates
expansions in education as the one that took place year by year in Brazil, holding
all the other parameters in the model constant at the levels of 1995.
In summary, the model developed in the previous chapter and calibrated in this chapter
allows isolating the effects of an increase in the education level of the workforce on occupa-
tions and the wage distribution when all the other factors, such as technology and educational
quality, are held constant. This exercise resulted in estimations that follow very closely the
observed changes in the data, providing tentative evidence that the educational expansion
in Brazil was the main factor behind the observed changes in the labor market between 1995
and 2014.
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2.6.2 Where did all the increase in high education go?
It is striking that the share of high educated workers in Brazil increased by 13.0 percentage
points during the period 1995-2014 while the occupational structure of employment remained
relatively fixed, presenting only a small improvement. This section discusses in which occu-
pations end up the high educated workers after the educational expansion and the strengths
and limitations of the model to adequately characterize the observed patterns.
When the educational expansion took place in Brazil, there were three labor market
effects in place to absorb the large increase in the share of high educated workers, according
to Table 2.2. First, there was a small but still sizable increase in employment in the top-
third occupations, which accounts for 1.9 percentage point of the increase in the share of
high educated workers. Second, there was a decline in the occupational attainment of some
high educated workers who started to be employed in occupations previously performed by
workers with lower levels of education. This effect accounts for 6.6 percentage points.38
Finally, some high educated workers replaced workers with lower educational level in jobs at
the top-third occupations that already existed before the educational expansion. This effect
accounts for the remaining 4.5 percentage points.39
The framework developed in the first two chapters of this dissertation is able to account
for new jobs being created in the top-third occupations and for the lower occupational at-
tainment of high educated workers. But the framework is silent about high educated workers
replacing middle and low educated workers that were initially employed in top-third occu-
pations before the educational expansion. The reason is that the model predicts thresholds
38This number comes from Table 2.2, which shows the increase in the total employment share of high
educated workers in bottom-third and middle-third occupations.
39Table 2.2 shows that there was a decline if 3.4 and 1.1. percentage points of employment in top-third
occupations for low and medium educated respectively.
82
that perfectly separates the occupations performed by workers with different educational
level, while in the data that is not necessarily true and workers with different education
overlap across occupations (see Table 2.2). The model abstracts from the fact that labor
markets have frictions and that workers with a given educational level are heterogeneous.
These factors are necessary to rationalize the overlap of workers with different education into
the same occupation, and future research should be encouraged to incorporate these factors
into this type of models. Because of this limitation, the model predicts a larger job creation
in the top-third occupations than what is observed in the data. Nonetheless, the version of
the model presented here accurately predicts two of the three effects that change the em-
ployment of high educated workers, and it rationalizes one important mechanism generated
by the educational expansion: high educated workers take over the best jobs that workers
with lower education used to perform, which is validated by the data.
2.6.3 Output changes and the declining effects of an educational
expansion
An expansion in education has distributional effects by changing the wages and shares of
workers with different educational levels. It also affects the amount of output produced
because more educated workers are more productive in the tasks that they start to perform
after the educational expansion. In this section, I evaluate whether the model is informative
with respect to the changes in output per worker observed in Brazil. Then, I evaluate
different counterfactuals to study the differences between an increase in education in 1995
and in 2014.
The trend in output per worker is correctly captured by the model. Figure 2.6 shows the
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evolution of output per worker in Brazil and in the calibrated model.40 Output per worker in
Brazil increased 18 percent between 1995 and 2014 and 15 percent in the model, accounting
for 82 percent of the observed change.41 This result suggests that the large investment in
education in Brazil resulted in a considerably higher output.42
Figure 2.6: Evolution of output per worker in the data and in the model
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of output per worker in the data for
Brazil. Output per worker is defined as GDP over employ workers. obtained
from the World Development Indicators (2017). Output per worker in the model
is defined as the total amount of the final good that is produced according to
equation (1.1) in the calibrated model and taking into account the yearly changes
in skill supplies from the data.
Despite the large effect of education on output during the period 1995-2014, I find that
further increases in education are predicted to have a much lower impact. I estimate the
effects of an increase in 1 percentage point in the share of medium or high educated workers
in 1995 and 2014. The results are presented in Table 2.7. An increase of 1 percentage point
40Output per workers is measured as the coefficient of gross domestic product and the number of employed
workers. The statistics are taken from World Development Indicators (WDI).
41Changes in average productivity in the model can be estimated from (1.1).
42My estimation may underestimate the real impact in economy-wide productivity if a more abundant
supply of high educated workers might lead to skill-based technological change (Acemoglu, 2002), or increases
in human capital might generate positive externalities in terms of productivity that are not taken into account
here, such as reduction of crime and better democratic institutions in the long term (Moretti, 2004a).
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in the share of medium educated in 1995 raises output by 0.5 percent. However, the same
increase in 2014 increases output by only 0.1 percent, an impact five times lower than in
1995. In the case of an increase of 1 percentage point in the share of high educated workers,
output increases by 2.3 percent in 1995 and only 1.1 percent in 2014. These are still sizable
effects, but they account for less than half of the impacts in 1995.43 In short, the return to
a dollar invested in education declines as the labor force becomes more educated.
Table 2.7: Declining effect on output per worker of successive educational expansions
1995 2014 Difference
Effect of 1 p.p increase in
Share of medium educated (m) 0.54% 0.09% -0.45
Share of high educated (h) 2.30% 1.06% -1.25
Share of both (m&h) 2.83% 1.13% -1.69
Notes: The table presents the effects on output per worker of an increase
of 1 percentage point in m or h in the model under the different equi-
librium conditions in 1995 (with a less educated labor force) and 2014
(with a more educated labor force). The results have to be interpreted
as the predictions of the model of increasing the supply of skills by 1
percentage point while decreasing the share of low educated workers in
the same magnitude.
The previous result implies that further increases in secondary schooling might not con-
tinue to foster increases in output and average wages at the same rate as before. This result
must be interpreted with caution for several reasons. First, in order to increase h without
reducing m, as implied in the last two columns of Table 2.7, the share of workers with at
least secondary education has to increase as fast as h (otherwise there would be a decline
in m). Second, it does not necessarily mean that the government should stop investing in
43The changes in real wages for each group and in relative wages are similar in 1995 than in 2014. But the
share of people affected by these changes is very different. For example, an increase inm in 2014 will decrease
wages of 2/3 of the workforce while it only decreased wages on 1/3 in 1995. The educational composition of
the workforce in the baseline year matters when estimating the effect of an educational expansion on output,
even when the effects in the wage gaps are very similar in different years (there is a movement along the
curves of comparative advantage in Figure 1.3).
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secondary schooling. Instead, it shows that investing only in secondary schooling will have a
small impact on output, given the restrictions on the demand side by holding the technology
constant. That the positive effect on output declines rapidly with successive educational
expansions when the demand side remains fixed implies that policymakers have to focus on
both supply and demand. Finally, the effects on wages or output estimated here do not
have to be interpreted as social returns to education. It is well-documented that education
generates several positive externalities that might be difficult to quantify, including (but not
limited to): decrease in crime, positive effects in health, and better family planning.44
2.6.4 Decomposition of changes in wages
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation I showed that the changes in log wages can be decomposed
into three effect: the displacement effect, the productivity effects, and the supply effect. I
further mention that an educational expansion as the one that took place in Brazil generates
all three. Next, I present the quantitative results of the decomposition for Brazil, using the
calibrated model.
The result of this decomposition are shown in Table 2.8. The table displays the change
in log wage that is predicted by the model and its decomposition in log points into the three
different effects identified in (1.29). I find that the supply effects dominates, but the displace-
ment and productivity effects are also quantitatively important. For low educated workers,
most of the increase in wages that is generated by the supply effect is counterbalanced by
the displacement of those workers towards a lower share of tasks (those of less complexity
in the economy). Only one third of the increase in log wages is actually coming from the
44See Moretti (2004b) for a detailed discussion on human capital externalities.
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difference between the supply effect and the displacement effect, while the remaining two
thirds are generated by the increase in the productivity in the economy. In the case of
medium and high educated workers, the supply effect of the educational expansion was very
large and negative. However, most of it, although not all, was counterbalanced by positive
displacement and productivity effects.
Table 2.8: Decomposition of changes in wages with the calibrated model
Low Medium High
Predicted change in log wages 0.38 -0.12 -0.25
Decomposition:
Displacement effect -0.51 0.30 0.22
Productivity effect 0.26 0.26 0.26
Supply effect 0.63 -0.67 -0.73
Notes: The table shows decomposition of changes in wages according to
equation (1.29) after simulating the Brazilian educational expansion between
1995-2014 on the calibrated model, holding constant the rests of the param-
eters.
2.6.5 Robustness Checks
The comparative advantages across tasks are crucial for estimating the labor market effects
of an educational expansion, as discussed in Section 1.3.2. Therefore, the results presented
above are sensitive to the calibration procedure. In this section, I evaluate different alterna-
tives to calibrate the parameters of interest. I show that the results are robust to using these
alternatives. First, I show the results are robust to using other years to calibrate the model
instead of 1995 data. Second, I discuss whether the linear assumption for αL(i), αM(i) and
αH(i) is reasonable according to the patterns observed in the data.
In principle, any year could be used to calibrate the parameters AL, AM and AH as
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in Section 2.5. Figure 2.7 shows the value of the productivity parameters with respect to
1995, when parameters are estimated for each year separately, using data on wages and skill
supplies from each specific year. All productivity parameters decreased by around 25 percent
between 1995 and 2004, and increased thereafter reaching similar levels in 2014 with respect
to 1995. These patterns are consistent with the precise predictions of the model for wage
levels in 2014—assuming that productivity parameters were the same in 1995 and 2014—and
the lower fit for the years between 1995 and 2014. The model is more suitable to explain
changes over an extensive period of time because it lacks the flexibility to accommodate for
short-term effects related to the business cycle, e.g. financial crises. This is an important
limitation of the model given that business cycles in Latin America (including Brazil) tend
to be more pronounced than in other regions of the world (Mejia-Reyes, 1999). However,
it is worth noticing that because all the productivity parameters tend to move in the same
direction and extent, the ratios AM/AL and AH/AM do not change much during the analyzed
period. These ratios determine the assignment of workers to tasks in the model, as well as
the relative wages. This is the reason why the model does a better job at predicting the
trends in relative wages than in real wages throughout the analyzed period.
To evaluate the sensibility of the results to different values of the parameters AL, AM
and AH , I compare the results of four different alternatives: 1) the base calibration using
1995 data; 2) the mean value of AL, AM and AH from the series 1995-2014; 3) the minimum
value of the series 1995-2014; and 4) the maximum value of the series 1995-2014. The results
are shown in Table 2.9. From looking across the columns of the table, I find that the initial
and final tasks thresholds IL and IH estimated in the model do not change much under these
different calibrations. Note that the wages of 1995 are no longer targeted under estimations
2-4. More importantly, the predictions of proportional changes in real wages, relative wages,
occupations within each educational group and overall distribution of occupations are robust
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Figure 2.7: Calibration of productivity parameters year by year
Notes: The figure shows the values of the productivity parameters if the cali-
bration exercise is performed separately using year by year data on the share of
workers with different educational level and their average wages.
to the different calibration exercises. What matters for estimating these effects are the ratios
AM/AL and AH/AM , which are similar across all alternatives.
The second assumption that I discuss here is whether the linearity for αL(i), αM(i)
and αH(i) is consistent with the data when the assumption of no change in productivity
holds. Yearly data on wage gaps and skill supplies allows estimating year-by-year changes
on thresholds levels according to Section 2.5. Let cJ be equal to exp(CJ) for J = HM,ML.
Then, it is possible to estimate cHM(IH) and cML(IL) for the different thresholds and to
check whether these points lie on a linear curve. We can then define:
cHM(IHt) =
AH
AM
αH(IHt)
αM(IHt)
, cML(ILt) =
AM
AL
αM(ILt)
αL(ILt)
, for t = {1995, ..., 2014}.
The identifying assumption in Section 2.5 was that αH(IHt)
αM (IHt) =
αM (ILt)
αL(ILt) = i. If this assump-
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tion is consistent with the data, the year-by-year points estimated by the model should lie
close to the curve with no constant and with the slopes estimated in Section 2.5. Figure 2.8
shows the results of this exercise. In the case of the curve cML(i), the points lie very close
to the estimated curve. However, in the case of cHM(i) it seems that the slope is larger than
the one predicted by the model, and it goes mostly below the points estimated year-by-year.
There are two reasons why the curve cHM(i) may not fit very well the points in the data.
First, the assumption of the function αH(IH)/αM(IH) = i may be accurate, but AH might
have changed, which seems to be the case according to the previous exercise for the years
in between 1995 and 2014 but not for the end points (in fact, the first and the last point of
the series lie in the curve cHM(i) calibrated in 1995). Second, the function αH(IH)/αM(IH)
is misspecified and should be approximated by a linear function with a constant (c + bi). I
checked how sensible the results are to the linear function being misspecified. To that end, I
considered each of the yearly estimated points as an observation in an OLS regression. The
result is a linear function that minimizes the sum of the quadratic distance of the points to
the linear function. This exercise provides an alternative estimation for cHM(i) and cML(i)
based on the data of the entire period. Figure 2.9 shows the predictions of the model in
some key variables when this calibration is used. The results do not significantly differ from
those in Figure 2.5.45
The main takeaway from this exercise is that the results are robust to using different
functional forms for the productivity schedules across tasks that are also consistent with the
data. A reason for this is that in Brazil the threshold IH did not diminish much since both
m and h increased during this period.46 Therefore, moderate changes in the functional form
45The model also matches, overall, the changes observed in Brazil when using different functional forms
to define the comparative advantages across occupations instead to the linear assumption in Section 2.5.
The Appendix Table B.4 shows the main results from the model when other fucntional forms are used. The
specific prediction varies following Table 1.3.2, that is, for more steep slopes in CHM and CMH the model
predicts larger changes in wages and lower changes in the occupational structure of employment.
46IH went from 0.66 to 0.58, compared to a decline twice as big in IL from 0.42 to 0.26.
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of the curve CHM(i) have a small impact on the results.
Although the specific value of the model’s predictions changes when using alternative
years to calibrate the model as well as different functional forms to fit the comparative ad-
vantages across tasks, the same general conclusion holds: the model matches very closely the
changes in the occupational structure of employment and in the wage distribution observed
in Brazil.
Figure 2.8: Comparison of 1995 calibration vs year by year calibration
Notes: The figure shows the values of the productivity parameters if I calibrate
the model using the average wages and educational levels of each year.
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Table 2.9: Model results with different calibrations
Brazil Model calibration
1995 mean min max
1995-2014 1995-2014 1995-2014
Panel A: Thresholds
Initial IL 0.424 0.420 0.419 0.421
Initial IH 0.664 0.661 0.652 0.669
Final IL 0.257 0.254 0.254 0.255
Final IH 0.580 0.578 0.567 0.586
Panel B: Average occup. ranking 1995
Low educated 0.243 0.212 0.210 0.209 0.210
Medium educated 0.454 0.544 0.541 0.535 0.545
High Educated 0.669 0.832 0.831 0.826 0.834
Panel C: Changes in occup. composition of employment
Bottom-third -0.015 -0.072 -0.074 -0.072 -0.076
Middle-third -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 0.001
Top-third 0.019 0.076 0.077 0.081 0.075
Panel D: Changes in mean occup. ranking
Low educated -0.037 -0.083 -0.083 -0.082 -0.083
Medium educated -0.129 -0.126 -0.125 -0.125 -0.125
High Educated -0.058 -0.042 -0.042 -0.043 -0.041
Panel E: Average wage 1995
Low educated 1.47 1.47 1.31 1.11 1.53
Medium educated 2.76 2.76 2.51 2.05 2.99
High Educated 7.00 7.00 6.37 5.54 7.25
Panel F: % Changes in wages
Low educated 37.3 46.9 47.3 47.8 47.0
Medium educated -10.5 -10.9 -10.8 -10.4 -11.0
High Educated -21.6 -22.2 -22.1 -22.1 -22.0
Panel G: Changes in wage gaps
WH/WM -12.4 -12.7 -12.7 -13.1 -12.4
WM/WL -34.8 -39.3 -39.5 -39.4 -39.5
WH/WL -42.9 -47.1 -47.1 -47.3 -47.0
Notes: Estimations for Brazil comes from PNAD 1995-2014. The productivity parameters
of the model are calibrated in different ways, according to the values in Figure 2.7. The
model simulates an educational expansion between 1995-2014 following Table 2.1. Workers
are classified into low (less than secondary), medium (some secondary), and high educated
(some university).
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Figure 2.9: Data vs model predictions with alternative calibration : wages year by year
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of wages and wages gaps labor market
outcomes in the data and in the model year by year as in Figure 2.5. In this
case, the calibration of the comparative advantage parameters is obtained by the
OLS regressions over the points depicted in Figure 2.7 instead of using the data
on 1995.
2.7 Discussion: of alternative explanations
In this section, I discuss other plausible explanations that have been mentioned in the liter-
ature that could generate some of the labor market changes in the four outcomes studied in
this chapter.
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2.7.1 Decline in the Quality of Education
When the access to education increases rapidly in a country, it is plausible that the quantity
of human capital generated through schooling declines. Two factors may contribute to this
decline. First, when the access to education expands the quality of each lesson may go down
due to different factors, such as classroom congestions or lower teacher quality.47 Second, the
level of unobserved ability of the marginal student might diminished as education expands.48.
If these factors are at play, the quantity of human capital after the educational expansion
may be lower for a given educational attainment, and the decline in educational quality could
potentially explain the decrease in wages and the lower occupational attainment for workers
with secondary and university education.
In this section, I test this hypothesis by evaluating whether the observed changes in wages
of medium and high educated workers are driven by market forces (supply and demand) or
by a change in the human capital that each of these educational levels represent. I follow
Bowlus and Robinson (2012) and Heckman et al. (1998) who compute changes in the prices
of human capital by looking into yearly changes in median wages of cohorts for which the
quantity of human capital should have remained constant. By comparing the changes in
prices with the observe changes in wages, I conclude that most of the changes in wages were
generated by changes in the price of human capital. This results support the hypothesis
that the decline in wages of medium and high educated workers were mostly driven by the
market forces described in the previous sections instead of a decline in educational quality.
47For example, Chaudhury et al. (2006) report that school enrollment rates have largely increased in
developing counties since 1960, especially in primary schooling, but many children either leave school at a
very young age or learn little while in school. This is unlikely to be the case in Brazil, since the educational
expansion was accompanied by a large increase in school expenditures and teacher’s educational requirements.
48For this argument to be valid it is necessary to assume that the distributions of abilities remains un-
changed across cohorts. It may not be the case if health outcomes of young children are improving, or if
households conditions are changing such that parents are more educated, poverty is less prevalent, etc.
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In the theory and the model presented above, an educational level is equivalent to a
quantity of human capital that the workers possess. In another strand of the literature
related to human capital models, wages are defined as the product of efficiency units of
human capital that each worker possesses and its price. Let wit be the wage of worker i in
time i, λt be the market level price for a unit of human capital, and Eit be the quantity of
human capital. It is possible to define
wt,i = λtEt,i.
Changes in the log of median wages between t and t′ for an educational level s from
cohort c can be defined as:
lnMedianwt′,s,c− lnMedianwt,s = ln λt′,s,c− ln λt,s,c + lnMedianEt′,s,c− lnMedianEt,s,c.
This equation shows that change in the log of median wages can be decomposed into a
market price effect given by the first term and a human capital or quantity effect reflected
in the second term. To estimate the incidence of each of these two terms in changes in
wages, Heckman et al. (1998) looks into changes in wages for cohorts whose level of human
capital does not change over a short period of time. In other words, they look into the age
groups for which the quantity of human capital is assumed to remain constant so that the
second term in the previous equation is equal to zero. These age groups are said to be in
a “flat point” with respect to their life-cycle earnings. Let define the cohorts of educational
level s for which human capital remain constant from t to t′. The changes in prices for an
educational group s can be defined as an average of the changes in prices for each cohort in
the flat point like follows
ln λs,t′ − ln λs,t = 1
n
∑
c
ln λt′,s,c− ln λt,s,c = 1
n
∑
c
lnMedian wt′,s,c− lnMedian wt,s,c, (2.3)
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where n is the number of cohorts consider to be in the flat spot.
To find the ages groups, I follow Bowlus and Robinson (2012) defining the flat point
according to potential years of experience for each educational group by looking into the
cross-sectional life earning cycle of wages. I find that the life earnings cycle is flat in most
years when looking into low educated between 43-52 years old, between 48-57 years for
medium educated workers, and 50-61 for high educated workers.49. Table 2.10 replicates
Table 1 in Bowlus and Robinson (2012). A flat point is found if earnings do not change
with age. I found that to be the case for most of the years, except for the first four years
for low educated workers. As indicated by Bowlus and Robinson (2012), this could generate
a downward bias in the price series of low educated workers, since the decline in prices for
those years might be partly due to decline in the quantity of human capital. In this case,
the price series I estimate here can be interpreted as a lower bound. Once the price series
is obtained, the quantity effect is estimated as the residual of wage effects minus the price
effect.
Table 2.11 summarizes the results of this decomposition exercise for the period 1995-2014.
I found that the price effects explain most of the changes in wages between 1995 and 2014.
Most of the increase in wages for low educated workers and the decrease for high educated
workers (97% and 84% respectively) is explained by the price effect as opposed to a quantity
effect. For medium educated workers, price effects are larger than the changes in wages,
suggesting that the quantity of education embedded in medium educated workers is actually
higher in 2014 than in 1995. This evidence is also consistent with results from international
standardized tests in secondary education which find an increase in test scores during the
49I perform this analysis only for men, working more than 35 hours a week. The reason to restrict the
sample to men is that at this age range participation in the labor force decline rapidly for women, and price
effect may be biased due to selection effects into the labor force
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Table 2.10: Flat-point on earnings: Cross sectional evidence
Low educated Mediun Educated High educated
43-52 years old 48-57 years old 51-60 years old
1995 -0.00965** 0.00746 0.0300*
1996 -0.0115*** -0.0133 0.00505
1997 -0.0125*** -0.00230 -0.0178
1998 -0.00683* -0.00235 0.000176
1999 0.00116 -0.00728 -0.0307*
2002 -0.00200 0.00943 0.00564
2003 0.00261 0.00323 -0.00511
2004 0.00508 0.00702 -0.00456
2005 0.00389 0.0118 -0.00290
2006 0.00303 0.00248 -0.00344
2007 0.00242 0.0113* 0.0104
2008 0.00211 0.00570 0.00191
2009 0.00389 0.00354 0.00122
2011 -0.00125 -0.0000646 0.00331
2012 0.000809 0.00264 0.0131
2013 0.00269 0.00763 -0.00329
2014 -0.00121 0.00523 0.0166*
Note: Each cell in the table shows the returns to an extra year of experi-
ence in a mincer equation of low wages. The sample is restricted only to
employed males. Workers are classified into low (less than secondary),
medium (some secondary), and high educated (some university). * Sig-
nificant at 10 percent. ** Significant at 5 percent. *** Significant at 1
percent.
2000s.50.
The evidence presented in this section is consistent with the theoretical model presented
above where the changes are originated by market level effects as a response to changes
in the supply of skills instead of changes in educational quality. It has been a remarkable
achievement for Brazil to have one of the largest educational expansions in history without
decreasing the quality of is education. However, this quality is still relatively low to inter-
50Bruns et al. (2011) contain a detailed analysis of the evolution of test scores in Brazil when compared to
other countries as a measure of the evolution of quality of education. The authors conclude that, although
the scores are still far below OCDE levels, Brazil has made a fast and sustained progress during the 2000s.
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national standards and one of the main challenges that the educational system faces today
is to increase educational quality.
Table 2.11: Decomposition of the changes in wages on price and quantity effects
Low Medium High
Median log wages 1995 0.504 1.197 2.209
Median log wages 2014 0.776 1.038 1.820
Change in wages 1995-2014 0.272 -0.160 -0.389
Prices effect 0.264 -0.396 -0.326
Quantity effect 0.008 0.237 -0.063
Notes: Median wages are estimated for males working more than
30 hours per week. Price effect is estimated from adding the year-
by-year price effects from equation (2.3). Quantity effect is the
residual of the total change in median wages minus the price effect.
Workers are classified into low (less than secondary), medium (some
secondary), and high educated (some university).
2.7.2 Other factors
Of the four labor market outcomes analyzed in this paper, the one that has received more
attention in the literature, by far, is the reduction in wage inequality. Among other reasons,
it has been documented that wage inequality declined because of increases in the minimum
wage that spread throughout the wage distribution (Engbom and Moser, 2017), a fall in
returns to experience which compressed the wage distribution (Ferreira et al., 2016), a decline
in the agricultural-non agricultural wage gap (Alvarez, 2017), and to shocks in commodity
prices that benefited low skill workers in Brazil (Adão, 2015).51
Although each of this factors might have contributed to the decline in the wage gaps
51There are others non-competitive labor market factors that have been consider to study the recent
increase in inequality in the developed world, such as the rise of superstar firms (Dorn et al., 2017) and the
interaction between employer power and labor saving technical changes (Chau and Kanbur, 2018). These
factors seem to be less important for the case of Brazil where inequality largely fell.
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among workers with different educational levels, my results suggest that the educational
expansion was the single most important factor. However, my results can be related to the
other channels that have been identified in the literature. For example, it could be possible
that the increase in the minimum wage was effective in raising wages and did not decrease
formal employment because the labor market for low educated workers became much tighter
as a result of the supply and demand mechanisms generated by the educational expansion.
Moreover, if returns to experience are larger in more complex occupations (occupations
of high rank according to my model), returns to experience may have declined for each
educational group because of the lower occupational attainment arising from the educational
expansion. Additional research that examines the relationship between these various sources
of changes in the wage distribution should be encouraged.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, I first documented the major educational expansion of the Brazilian workforce
between 1995 and 2014 and the remarkable changes in labor market outcomes that took place
in the same period. I found that the occupational structure of employment presents a small
improvement, but remained surprisingly fixed when compared to the educational expansion;
workers of all educational groups—primary or less, secondary, and university—experienced a
decline in occupational attainment; and wages largely increase overall but not for all groups
since wages of primary educated workers increased while wages of more educated workers
declined, bringing forth large reductions in wage gaps and other inequality measures as well
as a stark reduction in wage-poverty.
Then, I showed that the model from Chapter 1 reproduces, qualitatively, all the patterns
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in occupations and wages observed in the data with an educational expansion as the one that
took place in Brazil (type-h&m), suggesting that the educational expansion may have been
an important contributing factor to the observed labor market changes. Finally, I calibrated
the model to quantitatively assess how much of the observed changes in the data can be
explained by the educational expansion. I find that the changes predicted by the model are
remarkably accurate. I also show that these predictions are robust to different calibration
strategies and that are not driven by a decline in educational quality.
I conclude that the increase in educational attainment of the workforce was of utmost
importance to the notable changes in the Brazilian labor market in the last two decades.
My results reassert educational expansions as a key driver of economic development. In the
case of Brazil, it largely improved the income distribution by reducing wage poverty and
wage inequality, and it increased mean labor earnings. But I also find that the return to a
dollar invested in education declines as the labor force becomes more educated. For example,
I estimated that the effect of an increase in one percentage point in medium education in
2014 generates around one-fifth of the effect in average wages with respect to its effects in
1995. This indicates the necessity of educational expansions to be accompanied by policies
directed to increase the job opportunities in occupations where more educated workers can
exploit the productivity differentials that they have obtained through education. Otherwise,
more educated workers will end up in occupations where schooling adds little value to work-
ers’ productivity, undermining the positive effect of an educational expansion on economic
development.
Given the extent and speed of educational expansions around the world, it is relevant
to improve our understanding of its effect on the entire labor market, not just for those
workers receiving additional education. The theoretical model introduced in Chapter 1
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together with the empirical application presented in this chapter provide a new framework to
study the labor markets effects of different educational expansions. This framework contains
novel theoretical predictions, with a special focus on the relationship between changes in
the occupational structure of employment and the wage distribution. All these predictions
can be tested empirically using data on wages and occupations already available in most
countries. This Chapter showed an application of the framework to Brazil and it can also
be used to study the labor market effects of educational expansions in many other countries
as well.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF TEACHER STRIKES. EVIDENCE FROM
ARGENTINA
(This chapter was written in collaboration with Alexander Willén, Cornell University)
3.1 Introduction
Teacher industrial action is a prevalent feature of public education systems across the globe;
during the past few years teacher strikes have been observed in countries such as Argentina,
Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, India, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Russia and the
United States (e.g. Charleston, Seattle, East St. Louis, Pasco, Prospect Heights and
Chicago). A shared belief among policymakers across several of these countries is that
teacher strikes disrupt learning and negatively affect student educational attainment. In
some countries this sentiment has led to the enactment of legislation that severely restricts
teachers’ right to strike.1 However, despite the prevalence and debates surrounding teacher
strikes, there is very little empirical research that credibly examines how they impact student
long-term outcomes.
In this paper, we construct a new data set on teacher strikes in Argentina and use this
to
present the first evidence in the literature on the effects of teacher strikes on students’
long-run outcomes. Between 1983 and 2014 Argentina experienced a total of 1,500 teacher
such strikes, with substantial variation across time and provinces with substantial variation
1For example, even though 33 states in the US have passed duty-to-bargain laws that require districts to
negotiate with a union, only 13 states allow teachers to go on strike in the event of a bargaining impasse
(Colasanti, 2008).
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across time and provinces, making this an interesting case for the study of teacher strikes.
We analyze the relationship between exposure to strikes during primary school and relevant
education, labor market and other socioeconomic outcomes when the affected cohorts are
between 30 and 40 years old. We also investigate if the effects that we estimate carry over
to these individuals’ children.
To identify the effect of teacher strikes, we rely on a dose-response difference-in-difference
method that examines how education and labor market outcomes changed among 30 to 40
year olds who were exposed to more days of teacher strikes during primary school compared
to 30 to 40 year olds who were exposed to fewer days of teacher strikes during primary school.2
The sources of variation we exploit come from within-province differences in strike exposure
across birth cohorts and within-cohort differences in strike exposure across provinces. On
average, provinces lost 372 instructional days due to strikes during this period (6.7 percent
of total instructional days), ranging from 188 days in La Pampa to 531 days in Rio Negro.3
The main assumptions underlying our estimation strategy are that there are no shocks
(or other policies) contemporaneous with teacher strikes that differentially affect the various
cohorts and that the timing of teacher strikes is uncorrelated with prior trends in outcomes
across birth cohorts within each province. We show extensive evidence that our data are
consistent with these assumptions.
We find robust evidence that school disruptions caused by teacher strikes worsen future
labor market outcomes: being exposed to the average incidence of teacher strikes during
primary school (88 days) reduces labor market wages for males by 2.82 percent and monthly
labor market earnings for females by 4.22 percent. The prevalence of teacher strikes in
2We focus on this age range because existing literature suggests that labor market outcomes at this age
are informative about lifetime outcomes (e.g. Haider and Solon (2006))
3There are 180 instructional days per year in Argentina.
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Argentina means that the effect on the economy as a whole is substantial: A back-of-the-
envelope calculation suggests an aggregate annual earnings loss of $3265 million. This is
equivalent to the cost of raising the average employment income of all primary school teachers
in Argentina by 87.1 percent.
In addition to adverse wage and earnings effects, our results reveal negative effects on
several other education and labor market outcomes. Specifically, we find that the average
incidence of teacher strikes leads to a 14.7 percent and 10.4 percent increase in unemployment
for males and females respectively. In the case of females, we also find a 7.48 percent increase
in the probability of not working or studying relative to the respective mean. For males, we
find evidence that teacher strikes causes individuals to sort into lower-skilled occupations.
Examining short- and long-run educational outcomes show that the labor market effects are
driven, at least in part, by a reduction in educational attainment. Using data on students
who have just finished primary school we demonstrate that many of these adverse effects
are visible immediately after individuals have finished primary school. Finally, we document
significant intergenerational treatment effects: children of individuals exposed to teacher
strikes during primary school suffer negative education effects as well.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several important ways. First, no other
paper has examined the effects of school disruptions on student long-run outcomes. Given
the large literature demonstrating that short-run program effects on student outcomes can
be very different from any long-run effects (e.g. Chetty et al. (2011); Deming et al. (2016);
Lovenheim and Willén (2016)), this is of great value to policy makers. Second, the frequency
and prevalence of teacher strikes that we exploit is much greater than that which has been
used in earlier studies. This allows us to obtain more precise estimates, and examine a richer
set of outcomes. Third, this paper makes use of a novel data set which we have created
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based on information from annual business reports on the Argentine economy. This data
is a great tool for other researchers interested in questions centering on teacher strikes and
industrial action.
It is important to highlight that the pervasive level of teacher strikes during our analysis
period is not a deviation from the norm in Argentina, and current student cohorts are
exposed to similar levels of strikes. This cements the relevance of our paper and highlights
the urgency of implementing reforms that can reduce the prevalence of teacher strikes in the
country. One policy could be to introduce labor contracts that extend over several years, and
only allow teachers to strike if a bargaining impasse is reached when renewing these multi-
year contracts. This would eliminate sporadic teacher strikes while still allowing teachers to
use industrial action as a tool to ensure fair contracts.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the education
system in Argentina and offers theoretical predictions of how teacher strikes may affect
student outcomes; Section 3 discusses pre-existing research; Section 4 introduces the data;
Section 5 presents our empirical strategy; Section 6 discusses our results; and Section 7
concludes.
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3.2 Background & Theoretical Predictions of Teacher Strikes
3.2.1 The Argentinian Education System
Education in Argentina is the responsibility of the provinces and is divided into four levels:
kindergarten, primary education, secondary education and tertiary education.4 Primary
education begins the calendar year in which the number of days the child is 6 years old is
maximized, and comprises the first seven years of schooling. During our analysis period,
only primary education was mandatory in Argentina (Alzúa et al., 2015).5 Since then,
compulsory schooling has grown to include secondary education as well, increasing the length
of mandatory education from 7 to 12 years. Public education is financed through a revenue-
sharing system between the provinces and the federal government, and is free at all levels.
The fraction of students that attended private school at the primary level during our
analysis period was approximately 0.2, and this fraction was held relatively constant across
the years that we examine. Since 2003, however, private enrollment at the primary level has
increased substantially. Existing research suggests that this increase is driven by high- and
middle-income families migrating from public to private schools, leading to an increase in
socioeconomic school segregation (Gasparini et al., 2011b; Jaume, 2013).6
4Primary education was decentralized in 1978 and secondary education was decentralized in 1992. How-
ever, the national government remains highly involved in terms of setting curriculum, regulations and fi-
nancing.
5The youngest cohort in our main analysis sample finished primary school in the year prior to the imple-
mentation of the “Federal Education Law” (1998; approved in 1993) which extended mandatory education
to encompass secondary schooling as well.
6A commonly held belief is that individuals perceive private education as superior due to the fact that
teacher strikes are much less pronounced at private institutions, but existing literature finds no effect of
teacher strikes on the likelihood of being enrolled at a public institution (Narodowski and Moschetti, 2015).
We examine this in detail in Section 6.4.
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3.2.2 Teacher Strikes in Argentina
The presence of unions, collective bargaining and labor strikes in Argentina can be traced
back to the early years of the 20th century, except for the years during which the country
was subject to military dictatorships (Confederacion de Educadores Argentinos, 2009).7 Fol-
lowing the most recent reinstatement of democracy in 1983, industrial action has quickly
regained its status as a pervasive feature of the Argentine labor market. Since then, public
sector teachers have been the most active protesters in the country, making up 35 percent of
all strikes in Argentina (Etchemendy, 2013). In comparison, private school teachers account
for less than 4 percent of total strikes in the country. The occupation with the second largest
incidence of strikes in modern times is public administration, accounting for 25 percent of
all strikes (Chiappe, 2011; Etchemendy, 2013).
Teacher unions are typically organized at the provincial level, and variation in teacher
strikes across time and provinces is substantial. On average, provinces have lost 372 instruc-
tional days due to teacher strikes between 1983 and 2014 (6.7 percent of total instructional
days), ranging from 188 days in La Pampa to 531 days in Rio Negro, with a standard devia-
tion of 109 days.8 The pervasive level of strikes during our analysis period is not a deviation
from the norm in Argentina, and current students are exposed to similar levels of strikes.
To illustrate this point, Panel A of Figure 3.1 shows the variation in the number of days of
school disruptions caused by teacher strikes by province from 1977 to 2014, and Panel B of
Figure 3.1 displays the number of strikes by province during the same period (a strike can
last for a couple of hours or for several weeks).
Although no study has examined the effect of teacher strikes on student outcomes in
7During the dictatorships, labor strikes were prohibited and collective bargaining limited.
8There are 180 instructional days per year in Argentina.
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Figure 3.1: Variation in Teacher Strikes 1977-2014
(a) Days of teacher strikes
(b) Number of teacher strikes
Notes: Authors’ tabulations from annual reports on the Argentine economy published by Consejo Tecnico
de Inversiones (1977-2014). Panel A shows the evolution of days teacher strikes for each province and at a
national level. Panel B displays the number of teacher strikes. The vertical line indicates the two sub-samples
used for the estimation of long-run (left) and short-run (right) outcomes.
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Argentina, several studies have tried to disentangle the factors underlying the prevalence of
teacher strikes in the country. The results are mixed:Murillo and Ronconi (2004) finds that
teacher strikes are more common in provinces where union density is high and political rela-
tions with the local government is tense, while Narodowski and Moschetti (2015) concludes
that strikes display an erratic behavior without any discernible trends or explanations. What
these studies have in common is that they both emphasize the lack of a relationship between
local labor market conditions and teacher strikes. This is important for our analysis since
our main identifying assumption is that there are no shocks contemporaneous with teacher
strikes that differentially affect the different cohorts (see Section 6.3).
3.2.3 Theoretical Predictions
This paper exploits variation in teacher strikes within and across provinces in Argentina
to identify the reduced form effect of teacher strikes on students. As such, it is not a
full analysis of the benefits and costs associated with teacher strikes, but rather a partial
equilibrium analysis that uses teacher strikes to measure the effect of school disruptions on
students’ long-term outcomes.9 Nevertheless, the success of education policies ultimately
depends on how they impact the long-run outcomes of students, and identifying the net
effect of teacher strikes on student outcomes is therefore of great independent importance.
In this section, we list and discuss a large subset of relevant factors that may be influenced
by teacher strikes, specifying which ones our empirical strategy is able to pick up.10
9Specifically, we are not measuring the benefits or costs in a dynamic general equilibrium setting. For
example, the ability of teachers to strike may give them leverage in negotiations, leading to changes in
working conditions that attract a different quality of teachers or affecting investments in schooling.
10Many of the predictions of the effects of teacher strikes are related to the underlying reasons for teachers
to strike. It is therefore difficult to determine the generalizability of our results to other countries and
settings, as teachers in, for example, the US may strike for other reasons than those that lead teachers in
Argentina to strike. In a companion paper, we build a political economy model that aspires to identify
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The main way in which strikes can affect student outcomes is by reducing the time
students spend in school. Theoretical as well as empirical research provide clear predictions
that reduced instructional time lowers academic achievement (Cahan and Davis, 1987; Cahan
and Cohen, 1989; Neal and Johnson, 1996; Lee and Barro, 2001; Gormley and Gayer, 2005;
Cascio and Lewis, 2006; Luyten, 2006; Pischke, 2007; Marcotte, 2007; Sims, 2008; Marcotte
and Hemelt, 2008; Leuven et al., 2010; Fitzpatrick et al., 2011; Hansen, 2011; Rivkin and
Schiman, 2015; Goodman, 2014).
In addition to reducing effective instructional time, teacher strikes can (1) affect teacher
effort, (2) alter resource levels and allocation, (3) affect academic expectations and gradua-
tion requirements, (4) alter the value of a diploma, (5) change the value differential between
a public and a private degree, and (6) change the composition of teachers. The direction
and magnitude of the effects flowing through these channels will depend on the nature and
outcome of the strike. For example, if the unions go on a short strike to raise wages and
are successful, the strike will likely lead to an increase in teacher effort and productivity.
This could also lead to an improvement in the composition of the teacher workforce in the
long-run. However, if the strike is in effect for several months before the two sides reach an
agreement, academic expectations and graduation requirements may be adjusted downwards
with the potential implications of a reduction in the value of a diploma and an increase in
the value differential between a public and a private degree. Further, the increase in teacher
pay may be financed through a reallocation of resources from other inputs that enter the
education production function, and this can lead to a reduction in educational quality.
The discussion above makes clear that the effect of teacher strikes on education production
can be both positive and negative, and the resulting predictions of the effects of teacher
the most common drivers of teacher strikes in Argentina. The outcome of that paper should be used to
determine the generalizability of the results in the current paper to other countries and settings.
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strikes on student outcomes are therefore ambiguous. With respect to the current study, it
is important to note that we use teacher strikes to measure the effect of school disruptions on
student long-term outcomes through a partial equilibrium analysis. To the extent that the
above factors impact current students, they will contribute to the effects that we estimate.
However, our estimation strategy does not permit us to pick up any general equilibrium
effects that strikes may have on the future education system of Argentina.
Two factors augment the theoretical ambiguity associated with the effect of teacher strikes
on student outcomes. First, there may be treatment heterogeneity across students. The most
likely source of heterogeneity relates to the socioeconomic characteristics of the students’
families: wealthy parents will be able to move their children to private institutions if they
believe the strikes to hurt their children. If this behavior is sufficiently pervasive it may
lead to a segregated school system with additional adverse effects on the students from poor
families that are left behind.11 Another source of treatment heterogeneity relates to when
during primary school children are exposed to strikes. Ample research suggests that younger
children are more susceptible to policy interventions in general, and children who lose several
weeks of instructional time in first grade may therefore suffer more than children who lose the
same amount of days in the final grade of primary school (Meisels and Shonkoff, 2000; Cunha
and Heckman, 2007; Chetty et al., 2016). We explore both of these potential heterogeneity
effects in Section 6.4.
Second, teacher strikes may have important effects on non-educational outcomes. The
reason is that teacher strikes reduce effective instructional time. Unless parents can make
alternative educational arrangements (which will depend on whether it was an expected
or unexpected strike, and on the resources that the parents possess), this will lead to an
11This effect may be further augmented if teachers from poorer districts are more likely to join teacher
unions and participate in strikes.
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increase in leisure time and to an increase in the risk of engaging in bad behavior and
criminal activity (Anderson, 2014; Henry et al., 1999). This can directly impact the future
education and labor market outcomes of children. Though we are unable to look directly
at the relationship between teacher strikes and engagement in bad behavior and criminal
activity, to the extent that this occurs and affects the long-run labor market and education
outcomes of students, it will be a part of the effects captured by our estimation strategy.
3.3 Prior Literature on Teacher Strikes
The majority of the existing research on teacher strikes is cross sectional with identification
strategies that are vulnerable to omitted variable bias (Caldwell and Jeffreys, 1983; Zirkel,
1992; Thornicroft, 1994; Zwerling, 2008; Card et al., 2010; Johnson, 2011). Specifically, stu-
dents, teachers and schools subject to strikes may be systematically different from those that
are not on dimensions that we cannot observe. If these differences have independent effects
on the outcomes that are being examined, this will bias the results. Further, these studies
have focused on contemporaneous effects (test scores) of teacher strikes that are of very
short duration. These two factors significantly limit our understanding of the consequences
associated with school disruptions caused by teacher strikes.
Abstracting away from potential identification issues, the results from the above studies
are mixed. While some studies find no association between strikes and student outcomes
(e.g. Thornicroft (1994); Zirkel (1992); Zwerling (2008), others find marginally statistically
significant and negative effects (e.g. Caldwell and Jeffreys (1983); Johnson (2011)). Taken
together, these studies suggest that school disruptions caused by teacher strikes have a
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minimal impact on student outcomes.12
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies that look at the effect of teacher strikes
on student outcomes have relied on research designs that are not cross sectional: Michele
and Dinand (2010) and Baker (2013). Michele and Dinand (2010) exploit an institutional
reform in Belgium in 1990 that led to substantial and frequent strikes in the French-speaking
community but not in the Flemish-speaking community of the country. By comparing the
difference in education outcomes between individuals in school to those not in school in the
French-speaking community to that same difference in the Flemish-speaking community, the
authors find some evidence in favor of strikes causing a reduction in education attainment
and an increase in class repetition. Though interesting, this study is not able to examine if
the identified education effects carry over to the labor market, if there are non-educational
effects of teacher strikes or if there are intergenerational treatment effects. Further, the
point estimates in Michele and Dinand (2010) provide the intent-to-treat effect of exposure
to all strikes in 1990 among students in all grade school years. This makes it difficult to
extrapolate the marginal effect of teacher strikes on students in specific school grade years.
Baker (2013) evaluates the effect of teacher strikes on student achievement in Ontario
by comparing the change in test score between grade 3 and 6 for cohorts exposed to a
strike to the corresponding change for cohorts that were not subject to a strike. The results
suggest that strikes that lasted for more than 10 days and took place in grade 5 or 6 have
statistically and economically significant negative effects on test score growth, while strikes
that occurred in grades 2 or 3 do not. However, data limitations prevent the author from
examining long-run education and labor market effects – one of the main contributions of
the current analysis.
12It should be noted that these studies – just as the current paper – are unable to look at any general
equilibrium effects associated with teacher strikes, and therefore do not provide a complete analysis of the
benefits and costs associated with teacher strikes.
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There is no existing research that has explored the long-run educational attainment and
labor market effects of teacher strikes. Further, no study has been able to examine if there
are intergenerational treatment effects associated with teacher strike exposure. These gaps in
the literature prevent us from fully understanding the dynamics of teacher industrial action,
and whether the net effect of such policies is beneficial or harmful to students. This cements
the importance of our empirical investigation on the topic.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Teacher Strikes
Data on teacher strikes are obtained from annual reports on the Argentine economy published
by Consejo Técnico de Inversiones (CTI). These reports provide province- and sector-specific
information on strikes per month, and we use information from 1977 to 1998 to construct our
data set. We assume that children begin school the calendar year they turn 6, and graduate
from primary school at the age of 12. This means that we have information on exposure to
teacher strikes while in primary school for children born between 1971 and 1985.13
In our main analysis, we restrict attention to teacher strikes in primary school. This
decision is based on the fact that there are multiple levels of selection that would complicate
the analysis on teacher strikes in secondary school. In particular, four factors stand out.
First, during our analysis period only primary education was mandatory (less than 60 percent
13The assumption that children attend primary school between the ages of 6 and 12 leads to some mea-
surement error in treatment assignment because children start primary school the calendar year in which the
number of days they are 6 years old is maximized. This assumption will thus cause a slight attenuation bias
in our results. Using household survey data on the educational attainment of 6 year olds between 2003-2015,
we estimate that 70 percent of individuals in our sample are assigned to the right cohort.
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attended secondary school). Second, the strike data used here concerns public primary school
teachers. While secondary school teachers may participate in these strikes, the institutional
features of the Argentinian education system make it unlikely that they will. Third, private
enrollment was 53 percent higher in secondary schooling (28.7 percent) for the cohorts in
our sample and strikes are less prevalent in the private sector, reducing the percentage of
students whose school day is disrupted by the strikes. Fourth, if school disruptions in primary
school affects educational attainment, it may impact who enters secondary education causing
selection bias (something we show in Section 6.3). The first three of these four factors would
introduce noise and cause attenuation bias while the fourth factor would bias the results
upward. All of these factors would make it difficult to identity the causal effects of teacher
strikes on student outcomes during secondary school based on our empirical strategy. To
demonstrate this point, we show results from specifications that use strike exposure during
both primary and secondary school as the treatment variable in Appendix Table C.10. As
will be discussed in Section 6, these results are much noisier and less negative than our
preferred results that examine the effect of teacher strikes only in primary school.14
Table 3.1 depicts our identifying variation. Looking across the table, there is substantial
variation both within provinces over time and across provinces in any given year. Table 3.1
also shows that the average number of days of teacher strikes that these cohorts were exposed
to during primary school is 40 (3.2 percent of primary school).15 If one takes national teacher
strikes into account this number increases to 88 (6.98 percent ).16 As discussed in Section 2,
strikes were prohibited during the military junta of 1977-1983. This explains why the oldest
14Only using variation in teacher strike exposure in primary school means that cohorts who were in
secondary school during high strike years are part of the “control” groups. If there is some correlation
between strikes in primary and secondary schools, then this would bias our results toward finding no effects.
However, given the factors listed in the text and the fact that our main results for primary school remain
significant after controlling for strikes during secondary school we believe that such correlation is unlikely.
15Primary school in Argentina is comprised of 1260 instructional days, 180 days per year.
16We do not consider national teacher strikes when constructing our treatment measure as they are com-
pletely subsumed by the cohort fixed effects that we use. See Section 5.
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cohorts in our sample are exposed to relatively fewer days of teacher strikes.
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Table 3.1: Days of teacher strikes during primary school by birth cohort and birth province
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Mean
Buenos Aires 2 2 3 5 6 14 35 36 71 76 74 77 69 52 50 38
Catamarca 9 11 21 29 29 30 45 38 36 29 35 42 51 56 55 34
Chaco 0 5 5 23 40 45 76 88 88 91 108 97 103 74 62 60
Chubut 0 0 2 31 45 62 65 82 82 80 53 39 23 20 3 39
Ciudad Bs.As. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 13 22 22 22 22 22 9
Cordoba 1 1 2 13 19 19 27 30 32 34 34 35 76 70 66 31
Corrientes 0 0 0 5 12 12 12 12 16 16 11 4 4 4 4 7
Entre Rios 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 2 2 10 10 11 15 13 13 8
Formosa 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 1
Jujuy 12 12 12 27 27 54 85 91 95 98 83 87 75 49 31 56
La Pampa 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
La Rioja 0 1 9 24 44 107 107 110 112 110 147 134 99 98 95 80
Mendoza 0 0 0 35 68 68 72 72 72 74 39 6 6 2 3 34
Misiones 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 0 3 5 5 5 15 15 15 7
Neuquen 4 4 4 9 19 19 19 15 17 22 17 7 9 17 53 16
Rio Negro 45 45 45 49 68 73 73 30 31 31 45 31 114 121 125 62
Salta 4 8 8 13 27 56 118 163 168 170 165 193 178 117 69 97
San Juan 5 7 19 23 27 27 41 41 40 30 25 21 40 26 27 27
San Luis 7 7 19 22 25 28 31 24 29 17 19 16 13 10 10 18
Santa Cruz 4 6 12 17 19 19 49 46 47 42 37 35 35 5 4 25
Santa Fe 19 29 31 56 67 106 180 207 203 205 180 169 130 56 10 110
Sgo del Estero 2 3 3 16 27 29 38 48 47 62 132 126 132 123 111 60
T. Del Fuego 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 6 6 6 6 6 8 4 3
Tucuman 4 13 76 105 159 179 232 269 264 201 172 118 109 65 26 133
Mean 6 7 12 22 31 40 55 59 61 59 59 53 55 43 36 40
Notes: Authors’ tabulations from annual reports on the Argentine economy published by Consejo Tecnico de Inversiones (1977-2014).
The table shows the total days of exposure to teacher strikes at ages 6-12 for each birth year- birth province cell. Cohorts 71-85 correspond
to the 30-40 year old respondents in the 2003-2015 EPH for which outcomes variables are available.
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Figure 3.2: Data structure for a subsample of birth cohorts
Notes: Example of three cohorts that are part of our main analysis.
3.4.2 Long-run Outcomes
Our main outcome data come from the 2003-2015 waves of the Encuesta Permanente de
Hogares (EPH), a household survey representative of the urban population of Argentina (91
percent of the population). We restrict out analysis to individuals between the ages of 30
and 40 because these individuals are typically on a part of their life-cycle where current
earnings are reflective of lifetime earnings (e.g. Haider and Solon (2006); Böhlmark and
Lindquist (2006). Figure 3.2 shows a visual depiction of the data structure for a sample of
birth cohorts.17
Critical to our identification strategy is our ability to link respondents to their province
17The birth cohorts range from 1971 to 1985. These are the only cohorts that are between 30 and 40 years
old when the outcomes of interest are measured (2003-2015) for which we can perfectly calculate exposure to
teacher strikes during primary school. This means that we do not have a balanced panel of age observations
across the EPH waves. In Section 6.3 we show that limiting our analysis to EPH waves 2011-2015 for which
we have a balanced panel has no impact on our results.
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of birth, because teacher strikes may lead to selective sorting across provinces, especially if
exposure to strikes affects school quality. Teacher strikes could also impact post-primary
school mobility patterns if strike-induced education effects affect one’s access to national
labor markets. Relying on birth province rather than current province of residence elimi-
nates these endogenous migration issues. It is still the case that a fraction of respondents
will be assigned the wrong treatment dose as families can move across provinces such that
birth province is different from the province in which the child attended primary education.
However, Appendix Table C.1 shows that the province of residence is the same as the birth
province for 93 percent of 13 year olds in Argentina.18
To construct our analysis sample, we collapse the data on the birth province – birth year
– EPH year level. Aggregation to this level is sensible because treatment varies on the birth
province – birth year level. Appendix Table C.2 provides summary statistics of the outcome
variables we use in our analysis. For educational attainment, we generate dummy variables
for completion of secondary education and for having obtained at least a bachelor’s degree.
These indicators are constructed from a years of education variable that we also use to
examine the educational attainment effect of strike exposure. With respect to labor market
outcomes, we look at the proportion of people that are unemployed, out of the labor force
and dedicated to home production (neither studying nor working). To construct a measure
of occupational skill we follow Lovenheim and Willén (2016) and calculate the fraction of
workers in each 3-digit occupation code that has more than a high school degree. We use this
to rank occupations by skill level to examine if strike exposure leads individuals to sort into
lower-skilled occupations.19 We also use the EPH measures of hours worked and earnings.
With respect to earnings, we consider both the log of hourly wage and log of total labor
18In Section 6.3 we further show that our results are robust to excluding the five provinces with the highest
migration rates.
19We also construct two alternative measures of occupational skill based on average years of education
and average wage in the occupation. The results are robust to these alternative measures.
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earnings. Since teacher strikes may affect labor force participation and unemployment, we
also study the effect on the level of total labor earnings, which includes individuals with zero
earnings.
Preliminary evidence on the relationship between teacher strikes and student outcomes
is displayed in Figure 3.3, which plots the predicted years of schooling (Panel A) and labor
earnings (Panel B) as a function of the number of days of teacher strikes during primary
school.20 There is clear suggestive evidence of a strong linear negative correlation between
teacher strikes and later-in-life outcomes: For each 180 days of teacher strikes (one year of
primary school) labor earnings are reduced by 6.7 percent, and years of education decline
by 3.1 percent, relative to the sample means.21 Though instructive, it is important to note
that causal inference cannot be made from these graphs.
We also examine the effect of strikes on several sociodemographic outcomes: the likelihood
of being the household head; the likelihood of being married; the number of children in the
household; the age of the oldest child; the education level of the partner; and the per capita
income of the household. In addition, we analyze intergenerational effects by examining
the effect of teacher strikes on two education outcomes of children to individuals who were
exposed to strikes in primary school. We first construct a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the child is not delayed at school (age of the child minus years of education plus 6 is greater
than zero). We then construct a variable of the educational gap of the child, defined by years
of schooling plus 6 minus age. We collapse these variables at the household level.
20The figures are obtained through a model that includes birth year, birth province and EPH fixed effects.
See figure notes for information.
21180 days is also the difference between the 10th and the 90th percentile of strike exposure among the
individuals included in our sample.
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Figure 3.3: Correlation between teacher strikes and student outcomes
(a) Years of Education (b) Earnings
Notes: The figure is a binned scatter plot. The horizontal axis shows the days of teacher strikes during
primary education, which varies at birth year- birth province level. The vertical axis of Panel A contains the
average years of education and Panel B the average labor income for each birth year- birth province-survey
year cell, after controlling for province, cohort and survey year fixed effects. Data is grouped on 20 intervals
of equal number of observations according to days of exposure to teacher strikes. Each point correspond to
the group average of the variable in the vertical axes. 180 days of teacher strikes is equivalent to a full year
of primary school and the difference between the 10th and the 90th percentile of teacher strike exposure
among the individuals included in our sample.
3.4.3 Local Labor Market Controls
One of the main threats to our research design is the possibility that teacher strikes are
driven by local labor market conditions. If that were the case, the effects we identify do
not represent the effect of exposure to teacher strikes during primary school holding all else
constant, but rather the effect of teacher strikes and local labor market conditions during
primary school.
To minimize this identification threat we include two variables in our estimating equation
that control for variation in local labor market conditions during primary school across
provinces and time. First, we collect data on public administration strikes by province and
year from CTI (the occupation with the largest number of strikes during our analysis period
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after teachers).22 By controlling for public administration strikes during primary school, we
exploit variation in teacher strikes net of any general province-specific events and conditions
that fuel labor conflict. Second, we collect data on province-specific GDP.23 We average the
province-specific GDP during the seven years of primary school for each birth year -birth
province cell.
These controls significantly reduces the risk that our results are driven by local labor
market conditions; such factors have to be uncorrelated with province-specific GDP and
public administration strikes but correlated with teacher strikes and independently affect
the outcomes that we examine. One way in which this could happen is if there are province-
specific public school conditions that trigger teacher strikes that are unrelated to our local
labor market controls and fixed effects. If, for example, poor material conditions or low
salaries trigger strikes that effectively changed these variables at the province level, these
changes will not be captured by our fixed effects and labor market controls. If this was the
case, it is hard to assume that changes in these conditions are not biasing the results, as they
could have caused lower outcomes for exposed cohorts even if strikes had not happened.
To ensure that province-specific public school factors are not driving our results, we have
obtained data on teacher wages from 1996 through 2009 from the Ministry of Education.
Provided that the relationship between teacher strikes and teacher wages during this time
period is informative of that same relationship during the period 1977-1998, these data help
lower this concern.
22Public administration strikes make up more than 25 percent of all labor strikes in Argentina (Chiappe,
2011; Etchemendy, 2013).
23This data comes from Mirabella de Sant (2002), who estimates province GDP using residential electricity
consumption.
122
3.4.4 Short-run Outcomes
To examine if the adverse long-run effects of strike exposure that we identify are present
immediately after the children have been exposed to strikes, or if the effects develop over
time, we complement our main analysis with an analysis on the effect of exposure to teacher
strikes on outcomes of students who have just finished primary school.24 The data that we
use for this analysis come from the 2003-2015 EPH waves for children between 12 and 17
years old. We concentrate on educational outcomes since most of these individuals have
not yet entered the labor market. These outcomes are: the likelihood of having attended
primary school, the probability of attending public school, years of education, the likelihood
that the main activity is home production, and the likelihood of being enrolled in secondary
school. Unfortunately, we do not have access to any test score data that could provide
further evidence on the direct effect of teacher strikes on human capital accumulation.
Though this analysis is informative for better understanding the channels through which
our identified long-run effects operate, it is important to note that this sample is different
from our main analysis sample, and that these individuals were exposed to teacher strikes
in a time period much different from our main analysis sample. Some caution is therefore
necessary when comparing the results from the two analyses.25
24Due to educational reforms during the past two decades, grade 7 became a part of secondary education
in 2002, and mandatory education was extended from 7 to 12 years in 1998. In this section the treatment
variable is still defined as the days of strike while students were in primary school, which is now when the
children were between 6 and 11 years old.
25Two major differences are the increase in enrollment in private primary schooling and the large uptake
in secondary enrollment rate (compulsory after 1998). Both factors attenuate the effects of public teacher
strikes during primary schooling.
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3.5 Empirical Methodology
We exploit cross-cohort variation in exposure to teacher strikes during primary school within
and across provinces in a dose-response difference-in-difference framework. Specifically, we
estimate models of the following form:
Ypct = β0 + β1TS_Exposurepc + γXpc + ∅t + ϑc + ϕp + δT c + θT p + εpct, (3.1)
where Ypct is an outcome for respondents born in province p, in birth cohort c and observed in
EPH year t. Regressions are weighted by the number of observations in each birth province
- birth year - calendar year cell. The variable of interest is TS_Exposure and measures
the number of days (in tens) that the cohort was exposed to strikes during primary school.
Standard errors are clustered on the birth province level.26
Equation (3.1) also includes province (ϕp), birth cohort (ϑc) and calendar year (∅t) fixed
effects as well as a province-specific linear time trend (θT p) and a cohort-specific linear time
trend (δT c). θT p absorbs any trend in Y over time within a province, and δT c absorbs
any trend in Y over time within a birth cohort. Equation (3.1) further contains a vector of
province-specific covariates (Xpc) that control for average socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics of the province while the cohort was in primary school.27
In addition to using equation (3.1) as defined above, we estimate models that substitute
26As we only have 25 effective clusters, we also estimate our results using cluster bootstrap with asymptotic
refinement (wild cluster bootstrap) as discussed in Cameron and Miller (2015). Appendix Table C.4 shows
that our results are robust to this adjustment.
27In results not shown, we have also estimated this equation using number of strikes, rather than number of
days of strikes, as our measure of treatment intensity. The results obtained from this alternative specification
are consistent with the results presented in this paper: the number of strikes exposed to during primary school
is associated with negative educational attainment and labor market effects. We further find substantial
heterogeneity when using this alternative measure: the negative effects are driven exclusively by strikes that
lasted for more than two days. That the effects are dependent on the length of the strikes is consistent with
Baker (2013).
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the time trends for birth province-by-calendar year and birth year-by-calendar year fixed
effects. The province-by-calendar year fixed effects control for variation in Y that is common
across birth cohorts within a province in a given year (e.g. province-specific macroeconomic
shocks) and the birth year-by-calendar year fixed effects control for any systematic difference
across birth years that may be correlated with exposure to teacher strikes and the outcomes of
interest. Though more flexible than equation (3.1), this is a very demanding specification, in
particular bearing in mind our relatively low number of observations. Because our results are
robust to both of these models, we consider equation (3.1) to be our preferred specification.
Results using the alternative model are shown in the online appendix.28
The unit of observation is a birth province — birth year — calendar year, and the
identifying variation stems from cross-cohort variation in exposure to teacher strikes during
primary school within and across provinces. There are two main assumptions underlying
our estimation strategy. First, that there are no shocks (or other policies) contemporaneous
with teacher strikes that differentially affect the different cohorts. The most serious threat to
this identification assumption is that strikes may be caused by political events or economic
conditions that also vary at the birth province – birth year level and independently affect
the outcomes of interest. This would bias our results and lead to invalid inference. To
28We also perform our analysis using an instrumental variable approach in which we instrument teacher
strikes with public administration strikes. This estimation strategy relies on a set of assumptions that are
distinct from our preferred cross-cohort difference-in-difference method: that exposure to public administra-
tion strikes must be a good predictor of exposure to teacher strikes and that, conditional on the covariates
and fixed effects included in the model, exposure to public administration strikes cannot have an indepen-
dent effect on the outcomes of interest. The most serious threat to the exclusion restriction is that public
administration strikes may have an effect on student outcomes that does not operate through exposure to
teacher strikes (which is why we have included exposure to public administration strikes as a control variable
in equation (3.1)). However, given the rich set of fixed effects as well as the control for province-specific
GDP that we include in our model, this is unlikely. Our main results are robust to this alternative approach.
The main take-away from this exercise is that – even if we cannot ascertain the validity of the assumptions
underlying either one of our two estimation methods – the fact that our results are insensitive to which of
these methods we use significantly limit the sources of bias that can invalidate our results. The reason is that
the two methods rely on completely different sets of assumptions. Results from the instrumental variable
approach are available upon request.
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limit this identification threat we control for public administration strikes as well as average
province-specific GDP during primary. These controls significantly reduce the risk that our
point estimates are driven by local conditions or secular shocks; such shocks would have to
be uncorrelated with provincial GDP and public administration strikes but correlated with
teacher strikes and have an independent effect on the outcomes that we examine (and survive
the fixed effects and linear time trends). Further, to the best of our knowledge, there are no
other relevant policies that occurred concurrently with these strikes that are correlated both
with variation in teacher strikes across provinces and the outcomes that we examine.
The second assumption underlying our analysis is that the timing of teacher strikes must
be uncorrelated with prior trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each province.
The conventional method for examining the validity of this assumption is to estimate event-
study models that non-parametrically trace out pre-treatment relative trends as well as time
varying treatment effects. Our research design does not lend itself well to this approach,
and we rely on two alternative methods for illustrating that the timing of teacher strikes is
uncorrelated with prior trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each province.
First, we incorporate province-specific linear time trends to show that our results are
not driven by trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each province. Second, we
reassign the treatment variable for birth cohort c to birth cohort c-7, such that the measure
of exposure to teacher strikes is the number of days (in tens of days) of primary school
strikes that took place while the individuals were 13 – 19 years old. As these individuals
have already completed primary school they should be unaffected by these strikes, and the
coefficient on TS_Exposure should not be statistically or economically significant.29
29It should be noted that 13-19 year olds were exposed to teacher strikes as well. To the extent that teacher
strikes are correlated across years within provinces, this model may produce economically and statistically
significant results. This makes any null results obtained through this falsification test even more powerful in
terms of supporting our identifying assumptions.
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3.6 Results
3.6.1 Long-term Effects of Teacher Strikes
i. Educational attainment
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents baseline estimates of the effect of teacher strikes on educational
attainment stratified by gender. Each cell in the table comes from a separate estimation of
equation (3.1).30 The results in Panel A provide strong evidence of adverse education effects
associated with teacher strikes. Specifically, ten days of strikes (0.79 percent of primary
school) increases the number of both males and females that do not graduate from high school
by 30 out of every 1,000, and reduces the number of years of education by approximately
0.025. These effects represent a decline of 0.5 and 0.2 percent relative to the respective
means, which are shown directly below the estimates in the table. With respect to tertiary
education, the results suggest that ten days of strikes leads to an increase in the number of
males that do not complete college by 30 for every 1,000, but that it does not have an impact
on females. Though indicative of heterogeneous gender effects, it is important to note that
these point estimates are not statistically significantly different from each other.
The average individual in our sample experienced 88 days of strikes during primary
school. This suggests that for males (females) the average cohort in our sample suffered
adverse education effects with respect to the proportion of people obtaining a high school
diploma, a college degree and years of education equivalent to 4.75, 12.76, and 2.02 (3.69,
2.82, a 2.02) percent respectively, relative to the means.31 Taken together, these results
30Replacing the cohort-specific and province-specific linear time trends with birth province-by-EPH survey
year and birth year-by-EPH survey year fixed effects does not affect the results (Appendix Table C.3).
31This rescaling assumes linear treatment effects. Given the suggestive evidence in Figure 3.3 this is not
127
suggest that teacher strikes not only have adverse short-term education effects (reduction in
the proportion that obtain a high school diploma), but that these effects persist as individuals
move through the various stages of the education system (proportion that obtain a college
degree and the average number of years of education).32 This is an important finding that
has not been documented before.
an unreasonable assumption.
32In section 6.4 we study the effect of teacher strikes on contemporaneous educational outcomes for children
aged 12-17, something that we cannot do for our main analysis sample due to data limitations. This auxiliary
analysis reveals negative educational effects consistent with the results for older cohorts discussed in this
section.
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Table 3.2: Effect of Strike Exposure on Individual Outcomes
Panel A. Educational Attainment
High School Diploma College Degree Years of Schooling
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure -0.003** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.026*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
% Effect -0.54% -0.42% -1.45% -0.32% -0.23% -0.18%
Panel B. Employment
Unemployed Not in Labor Force Home Production
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure 0.001** 0.001* -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Effect 1.91% 1.37% -0.97% 0.22% 1.30% 0.82%
Panel C. Wages and Earnings
Log Earnings Log Wages Total Earnings
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure -0.002* -0.002 -0.003** -0.002 -1.704 -1.906***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0013) (1.351) (0.624)
% Effect - - - - -0.23% -0.51%
Panel D. Occupational Quality and Work Hours
Occupational Sorting Total Hours Informal
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure -0.002*** -0.000 -0.011 -0.026 -0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.050) (0.001) (0.001)
% Effect -0.85% -0.11% -0.03% -0.12% -0.06% 0.48%
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respondents. The unit of observation
is a birth priovince - birth year - EPH year, and the sample consists of 2460 observations. Regressions include birth province,
birth year and EPH survey year fixed effects as well as local GDP and exposure to public administration strikes. Regressions
further include cohort-specific and a province-specific linear time trends. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual
observations used to calculate the averages for each birth year-birth province- EPH year cell. The coefficient measures the effect of
being exposed to ten additional days of teacher strikes in primary school on the respective outcomes. Standard errors are clustered
at the birth province level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates
significance at the 10% level.
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ii. Employment, labor force participation & home production
Pre-existing research has documented a strong positive relationship between educational
attainment and later-in-life labor market opportunities (Ashenfelter et al., 1999; Card, 2011;
Harmon et al., 2003; Heckman et al., 2006).33 This suggests that teacher strikes may also
affect students’ labor market outcomes. Panel B of Table 3.2 examines this question in detail,
showing gender-specific estimates for the proportion of individuals who are unemployed, not
in the labor force and whose main activity is home production. Looking across the panel,
there is clear evidence that teacher strikes lead to an increase in the proportion that is
unemployed: ten days of teacher strikes lead to an increase in the proportion of unemployed
individuals by one percentage point. This effect is present among both males and females,
and represents an effect of approximately 1.4 percent relative to the mean.
Teacher strikes also increase the proportion of people whose main activity is home pro-
duction, though this effect is only present among females.34 In terms of effect size, the point
estimate suggest that ten days of teacher strikes induce 30 out of every 1,000 females to
move from either working or studying to home production. The male estimate is smaller but
not statistically significantly different from the female estimate.
With respect to labor force participation, our results show that there is no statistically
significant effect of teacher strikes on the extensive margin of employment. However, once
we control for province-specific linear birth year trends in Section 6.3 (Panel F of Table 3.6),
we do find significant adverse effects of teacher strike on labor force participation among
women. Our inability to detect this effect in our baseline table may be due to secular shifts
33However, it is not necessarily the case that adverse educational effects carry over to the labor market
(Böhlmark et al., 2017).
34In our sample, 6 percent are still enrolled in an educational institution and 83 percent of those are
enrolled at a university.
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in labor market opportunities that occurred for women over the cohorts we consider (Blau
and Kahn, 2013; Gasparini and Marchioni, 2015). The effect that we identify in Section 6.3
suggests that exposure to 10 days of strikes reduces female labor force participation by 0.14
percent relative to the mean shown in Appendix Table C.2.
iii. Earnings & wages
The adverse employment and education effects identified in Panels A and B of Table 3.2
suggest that teacher strikes may negatively impact earnings and wages as well. This is
examined in Panel C of Table 3.2 with respect to log earnings, log wages and the level
of earnings.35 Looking across the columns in Panel C, the results show interesting effect
heterogeneity across genders: while strikes cause a statistically significant reduction in wages
and earnings among men conditional on employment, it causes a statistically significant
decline in the likelihood of receiving positive earnings among women and therefore shifts
the female wage distribution to the left. However, in terms of effects sizes the gender-
specific estimates are not statistically significantly different from each other. In terms of
interpretation, the estimates indicate that 10 days of strikes lead to a reduction in earnings
by 0.2 percent (log-specification), in wages by 0.3 percent, and in earnings by USD 1.8 (level-
specification).36 Scaling the point estimates to account for the average level of exposure to
teacher strikes during our analysis period suggests that the average cohort in our sample
suffered adverse effects of 1.76, 2.64 and 3.26 percent, respectively.37
Another way to interpret our income estimates is to aggregate them up to the country
level and consider the total effect on the Argentinian economy. While such back-of-the-
35We include the level of earnings (expressed in 2005 PPP dollars) in addition to the log of earnings as
individuals with zero earnings automatically are eliminated from the log specification.
36The identified effect on the level of employment income is equivalent to 0.34 percent relative to the mean.
37These numbers are based on the averages of the gender-specific effects.
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envelope calculations must be cautiously interpreted due to the many factors that cannot
be taken into account when performing this exercise, it is informative for understanding the
potential magnitude of the effect. Using the estimated impact on labor earnings and the
average treatment exposure to strikes, the aggregate earnings loss induced by teacher strikes
amounts to USD 3265 million.38 This is equivalent to the cost of raising the average annual
employment income of all primary school teachers in Argentina by 87.1 percent.39 In terms
of policy implications, this suggests that it may be worth raising teacher wages if this will
prevent them from going on strike.
The point estimates in Panel C of Table 3.2 suggest that the rate of return to education
in Argentina is between 5.4 and 9.2 percent.40 This range is consistent with pre-existing
estimates in Argentina of 7-12.5 percent (Kugler and Psacharopoulos, 1989; Galiani and
Sanguinetti, 2003; Gasparini et al., 2011a; Montenegro and Patrinos, 2014). However, it is
important to note that school missed due to sporadic school closures is fundamentally differ-
ent than less schooling because one leaves school at an earlier age. In one case, curriculum
and learning is repeatedly interrupted and in the other it is not. As such, human capital
accumulation might be very different and hence the estimated "return" to years of schooling
may not be fully comparable.41 It is not clear how much one would want to extrapolate
38This estimation comes from the sum of the effects on males and females. For males, we multiply the total
labor income for the country from EPH 2015 by the percent of employed workers that is male, multiplied
by the percent effect for males identified in column 3 of Panel C in Table 3.2, which is scaled by the average
treatment exposure. For females, we multiply the total labor income by the percent of employed workers
that is female, multiplied by the percent effect for females from column 6 of Panel C in Table 3.2, scaled by
the average treatment exposure. This result should be interpreted as the annual labor earnings loss for the
entire economy if all adults were exposed to the level of teacher strikes that we find in our sample.
39Teachers labor earnings are approximately USD13.000 a year, and there were 289,812 primary school
teachers in 2014.
40This number is obtained by multiplying the average of the estimated effect on wages for males and on
total earnings for females by 18, as the school year consists of 180 instructional days.
41For example, conventional education economics suggests that the return to education consists of two
components – a human capital component and a signaling component (Lange and Topel, 2006). While both
a reduction in formal schooling and teacher strikes may negatively affect human capital accumulation, only
a reduction in formal schooling – and not teacher strikes – will likely affect the signaling value of education.
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from our estimates about returns to schooling that is more general than the impact of dis-
rupted education. Nevertheless, this type of comparison helps anchor our estimates and put
the effects in relation to more known education interventions.
The wage and earnings results in Table 3.2 may conceal important heterogeneous effects
across the earnings and wage distributions. We explore this possibility in Table 3.3 with
respect to total earnings (Panel A) and log wages (Panel B). The results in Panel B demon-
strate that strikes affect all but the tails of both the male and the female distributions. The
magnitude of the effect is relatively constant across the different deciles for males and it is
smaller for the lower deciles in the case of females. Taken together, these results indicates
that the people in the left tail of the wage distribution would have done equally poorly with-
out teacher strikes, and that the people in the right tail of the wage distribution would have
done equally well without teacher strikes, while the rest of the individuals would have done
better. With respect to total earnings (Panel A), our results are again very similar across
men and women, though the magnitudes of the effects are slightly larger for the 40th-90th
decile of the female subsample.
To better understand the pattern of these wage and earnings results, Panel C shows
results from a similar heterogeneity analysis with respect to educational attainment. These
results largely mirror the wage and earning results in the sense that there are statistically
significant and adverse effects across all but the bottom and top deciles of the distribution,
and that the magnitude of the effects across the different deciles is relatively constant.
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Table 3.3: Heterogeneous effects of strike exposure on wages, earnings and educational attainment
Panel A. Total Earnings
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Panel A: Males
Strike Exposure 0.434 -0.203 -1.368 -1.106 -1.352 -2.128* -3.120** -2.393 -5.173
(1.802) (1.060) (0.907) (0.923) (0.958) (1.042) (1.413) (1.888) (3.820)
% Effect 0.25% -0.06% -0.31% -0.20% -0.21% -0.28% -0.35% -0.22% -0.38%
Panel B: Females
Strike Exposure 0.094 0.293 -0.072 -2.041 -2.456 -2.328 -3.770** -3.126** -2.353
(0.070) (0.316) (0.954) (1.688) (1.763) (1.714) (1.342) (1.480) (2.285)
% Effect 0.83% 0.98% -0.10% -1.39% -0.98% -0.63% -0.75% -0.47% -0.26%
Panel B. Log Wages
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Panel A: Males
Strike Exposure 0.002 -0.003* -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008)
Panel B: Females
Strike Exposure 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003* -0.004** -0.003* -0.003** -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Panel C. Years of Education
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
Panel A: Males
Strike Exposure -0.012 -0.025** -0.041* -0.030* -0.025* -0.029** -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.023*
(0.008) (0.010) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
% Effect -0.17% -0.31% -0.44% -0.29% -0.22% -0.24% -0.28% -0.30% -0.15%
Panel B: Females
Strike Exposure -0.021*** -0.017 -0.012 -0.041** -0.038*** -0.054*** -0.034** -0.029** -0.007
(0.007) (0.018) (0.026) (0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007)
% Effect -0.29% -0.20% -0.12% -0.38% -0.32% -0.42% -0.25% -0.20% 0.04%
Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respondents. The unit of observation is a birth priovince
- birth year - EPH year, and the sample consists of 2460 observations. Regressions include birth province, birth year and EPH survey year fixed
effects as well as local GDP and exposure to public administration strikes. Regressions further include cohort-specific and a province-specific
linear time trends. All outcomes are expressed in 2005 PPP dollars. The % effect is dropped for log wage given that the point estimate is
already interpreted as a percentage change. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations used to calculate the averages
for each birth year-birth province- EPH year cell. The coefficient measures the effect of being exposed to ten additional days of teacher strikes
in primary school on the respective outcomes. Standard errors are clustered at the birth province level. *** indicates significance at the 1%
level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
134
iv. Occupational quality, informal employment & hours worked
In addition to the extensive margin employment effects that we identify above, the adverse
effect of strikes on earnings could be driven by a reduction in work hours or worse employment
conditions. This is examined in Panel D of Table 3.2, where we look at occupational sorting,
hours worked and the proportion that work in the informal sector.
The results suggest that being exposed to 10 days of strikes during primary school has no
effect on hours worked, but does have a large negative effect on occupational sorting among
men.42 This effect is not present among women, and we can reject the null hypothesis that
there is no difference in effect size across genders. With respect to the average male who was
exposed to 88 days of teacher strikes during primary school, the occupational sorting effect
represents an effect of 1.32 percent relative to the sample mean in Appendix Table C.2.
With respect to the likelihood of working in the informal sector, we find a precise null
effect among males but a sizable effect among females. Although the female coefficient falls
just outside of being statistically significant at conventional levels, in alternative specifica-
tions where we include province-specific linear cohort trends (Panel F of Table 3.6) or where
we replace the province- and cohort-specific time trends with province-by-survey year and
birth cohort-by-survey year fixed effects, we find statistically significant effects. We cau-
tiously interpret this as indicative of an effect of strike exposure on the likelihood of working
in the informal sector among females. For the average female in our sample who was ex-
posed to the 88 days of teacher strikes during primary school, the increase in the likelihood
of working in the informal sector represents an effect of 4.2 percent relative to the mean.
vi. Socioeconomic & intergenerational effects of teacher strikes
42The results are robust to alternative measures of occupational quality, such as average wage or years of
education in one’s occupation.
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There is a large literature documenting a strong positive relationship between an individual’s
education- and labor market outcomes and his/her socioeconomic position (Finer and Zolna,
2014). Teacher strikes may therefore also impact outcomes such as the likelihood of being
married, the probability of being the head of the household, the number of children, the
educational attainment of the partner, and household per capita income.43 Table 3.4 explores
this question, showing results from estimation of equation (3.1) for each of these outcomes.
Table 3.4 shows evidence of a negative effect on the probability of being household head
among females but not males. Relative to the mean, ten days of strikes leads to a 0.19 percent
reduction in the likelihood of being household head. That we find effects among females but
not males could be due to the heterogeneous effects identified in Section 6.1: while teacher
strikes cause males to sort into lower skill occupations, it cause females to move toward
home production, potentially lowering their bargaining position in the household. However,
evidence of such gender heterogeneity is relatively weak as the male point estimate is not
statistically significantly different from the female estimate.
Table 3.4 further shows that strikes affect the characteristics of the partners of the indi-
viduals that are exposed to teacher strikes. Specifically, the results show that the partners
of females that were exposed to strikes are less educated, such that females experience a
marriage downgrading with respect to partner skill: being exposed to the average level of
strikes during primary school leads to a decline in the years of education of females’ partners
by 4.7 percent relative to the sample mean. We do not find a significant effect among males.
Finally, the point estimates in Table 3.4 also show that strikes affect per capita family
income: the average individual in our sample is exposed to 88 days of teacher strikes, and this
43Given the structure of the EPH, we can only identify children of the head, or the spouse of the head, of
the household.
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Table 3.4: Effect of Strike Exposure on Socioeconomic Outcomes
Head of Household Married Number of Kids
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure -0.002 -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
% Effect -0.20% -0.12% -0.07% -0.06% -0.23% -0.51%
Age of older kid Per Capita Family Income Years of Schooling of Partner
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure 0.008 0.020 -0.005** -0.005** -0.007 -0.037***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010)
% Effect 0.07% 0.16% - - -0.10% -0.53%
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respon-
dents. The unit of observation is a birth priovince - birth year - EPH year, and the sample consists of
2460 observations. Regressions include birth province, birth year and EPH survey year fixed effects as
well as local GDP and exposure to public administration strikes. Regressions further include cohort-
specific and a province-specific linear time trends. The educational attainment of the partner is defined
for heads of households or spouses to heads of households. Regressions are weighted by the number
of individual observations used to calculate the averages for each birth year-birth province- EPH year
cell. The coefficient measures the effect of being exposed to ten additional days of teacher strikes in
primary school on the respective outcomes. Standard errors are clustered at the birth province level.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates
significance at the 10% level.
is associated with a decline in per capita household income by around 4.4 percent relative
to the sample mean. The effect is not statistically significantly different across genders.44
Given that teacher strikes not only have adverse effects on student education and labor
market outcomes, but also influences the marriage market and family planning decisions,
there may be intergenerational effects associated with strikes. This question is explored in
Table 3.5, using the intergenerational outcome variables discussed in Section 4 as dependent
variables (the probability of not being delayed at school and the educational gap). Across
the table, there is evidence of adverse intergenerational education effects among females but
not males. This is consistent with the heterogeneous treatment effects identified in Section
44The point estimate on per capita family income encompass the effect on labor earnings of exposed
individuals, on labor earnings of exposed individual’s partner, and on household’s composition.
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Table 3.5: Intergenerational Treatment Effects
Not Delayed at School Gap in Years of Education
Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure 0.001 -0.003*** 0.002 -0.007***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
% Effect 0.16% -0.43% -0.48% 1.45%
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to
40 year old respondents. The unit of observation is a birth priovince - birth year -
EPH year, and the sample consists of 2460 observations. Regressions include birth
province, birth year and EPH survey year fixed effects as well as local GDP and
exposure to public administration strikes. Regressions further include cohort-specific
and a province-specific linear time trends. Not being delayed at school is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the age of the child minus years of education
plus 6 is greater than zero. The educational gap is defined by years of schooling
plus 6 minus age. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations
used to calculate the averages for each birth year-birth province- EPH year cell. The
coefficient measures the effect of being exposed to ten additional days of teacher
strikes in primary school on the respective outcomes. Standard errors are clustered
at the birth province level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
6.1. In terms of magnitude, being exposed to ten days of teacher strikes during primary
school leads to a 0.43 percent increase in the probability that the child is delayed at school
relative to the mean (and to an increase in the education gap of 1.45 percent relative to the
mean).
The above discussion shows that teacher strikes not only impact educational attainment
and labor market outcomes, but also family planning decisions and the educational outcomes
of the affected individuals’ children. These results have not been documented before, and
additional research that examines these questions should be encouraged.
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3.6.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
A large literature has documented that human capital accumulates over time, such that
human capital obtained at one point in time facilitates further skill attainment later in life
(e.g. Heckman et al. (2006)). Therefore, early childhood investments are often argued to
yield higher returns than education investments that target older children.45 With respect
to the current analysis, this suggests that exposure to teacher strikes in early grades may
have larger adverse effects on long-run educational and labor market outcomes.
Appendix Table C.5 shows the effect of exposure to teacher strikes on the long-term
education and labor market outcomes of students based on whether they were exposed to
strikes in grades 1 through 4 or in grades 5 through 7. Across the columns in Appendix
Table C.5, there is suggestive evidence that teacher strikes in early grades have noticeably
larger adverse effects than strikes in later grades. However, these differences are generally
not statistically significant. Only for two outcomes we find that the effect of teacher strikes
in early school grades is statistically significantly different from the effect of teacher strikes
in later school grades: years of education and total earnings for females.
3.6.3 Robustness & Sensitivity Analysis
The results obtained from our preferred specification support the idea that teacher strikes
have adverse effects on long-term educational attainment and labor market outcomes. In
this section, we explore evidence on whether these results are driven by other policies, trends
or events that are not accounted for by the controls in equation (3.1).
45This argument is also based on research that finds young children to be more receptive to learning. See
Phillips et al. (2000).
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In Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.6 we exclude the city of Buenos Aires and the province
and city of Buenos Aires, respectively. These geographic areas differ slightly from the rest of
Argentina with respect to their institutions and legislation, and the purpose of this exercise
is to ensure that our results are not exclusively driven by these geographic areas. The results
are robust to the exclusion of these regions.
In Panel C we estimate equation (3.1) without the five provinces that have the highest
cross-province mobility rates.46 The point estimates produced for this subsample of provinces
are not statistically significantly different from our baseline results. This demonstrates that
our results are robust to accounting for cross-province mobility.
Panel D eliminates pre-2010 EPH survey years to ensure that our results are robust to a
balanced panel of age observations. Despite a dramatic loss of observations (recall that our
baseline analysis relies on the 2003-2015 EPH waves), the point estimates are not statistically
significantly different from our baseline results when imposing this restriction.
Panel E displays results from estimation of equation (3.1) when we have reassigned treat-
ment for birth cohort c to birth cohort c-7. These cohorts are very close in age and are likely
exposed to similar province-specific macroeconomic environments. However, the c-7 cohorts
have already completed primary school when the documented teacher strikes took place, and
if our baseline estimates successfully isolate the effect of teacher strikes on student outcomes,
we should not find any statistically effects among these cohorts. None of the point estimates
are statistically significant; the results are consistent with the assumption that the strikes
are uncorrelated with trends in outcomes across birth cohorts within each province.
Panel F shows results for our preferred specification when province-specific linear birth
46Chaco, Corrientes, Misiones, Rio Negro and Santa Cruz . See Appendix Table C..
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Table 3.6: Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
Years of Occupational Log wage Total Home
Schooling Sorting Earnings Unemployed Production
Panel A: Excluding city of Bs.As.
Male -0.0262*** -0.0015*** -0.0032** -1.7039 0.0008** 0.0009
(0.0064) (0.0004) (0.0012) (1.3505) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Female -0.0217*** -0.0003 -0.0019* -1.9064*** 0.0009* 0.0027***
(0.0062) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.6236) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Panel B: Excluding province and city of Bs.As.
Male -0.0235*** -0.0012*** -0.0034** -0.6997 0.0005* 0.0007
(0.0069) (0.0004) (0.0016) (1.1583) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Female -0.0227*** -0.0004 -0.0021* -2.1205*** 0.0008 0.0027***
(0.0070) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.6666) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Panel C: Excluding provinces with high migration
Male -0.0234*** -0.0013*** -0.0030** -1.5504 0.0009*** 0.0011*
(0.0055) (0.0004) (0.0014) (1.4377) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Female -0.0228*** -0.0003 -0.0026** -2.0903*** 0.0007* 0.0028***
(0.0060) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.6843) (0.0004) (0.0008)
Panel D: Balanced panel (survey year greater than 2010)
Male -0.0216*** -0.0015*** -0.0023** -1.8006 0.0008** 0.0012**
(0.0074) (0.0004) (0.0010) (1.1935) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Female -0.0203*** -0.0001 -0.0016 -1.3777 0.0009 0.0033***
(0.0068) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.8659) (0.0007) (0.0010)
Panel E: Reassigning treatment from cohort c to cohort c+7
Male -0.0061 0.0006 0.0022 -1.7665 -0.0003 0.0002
(0.0129) (0.0004) (0.0013) (1.2947) (0.0002) (0.0005)
Female -0.0132 -0.0011 0.0007 0.0649 -0.0002 0.0002
(0.0112) (0.0007) (0.0020) (1.3080) (0.0005) (0.0010)
Panel F: Including province-specific linear cohort trends
Male -0.0192* -0.0017*** -0.0045** -3.9414* 0.0007* 0.0008
(0.0094) (0.0005) (0.0020) (1.9962) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Female -0.0119 0.0002 -0.0020* -2.9745*** 0.0014** 0.0037***
(0.0090) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.7630) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Panel G: Eliminating cohorts expose to >200 days of strikes (top 1%)
Male -0.0262*** -0.0015*** -0.0032** -1.7039 0.0008** 0.0009
(0.0064) (0.0004) (0.0012) (1.3505) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Female -0.0217*** -0.0003 -0.0019* -1.9064*** 0.0009* 0.0027***
(0.0062) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.6236) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Notes: Authors’ estimation using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respondents. Each
column estimates the authors’ preferred version of equation (3.1) unless otherwise specified.
Panel A exclude the City of Buenos Aires (CABA). Panel B excludes both CABA and the
province of Buenos Aires. Panel C excludes the five provinces with the highest cross-province
mobility rates (Chaco, Corrientes, Misiones, Rio Negro and Santa Cruz). Panel D eliminates
pre-2010 EPH survey years to obtain a balance panel. Panel E shows results from the falsifi-
cation test where we have reassigned the treatment variable for cohort c to cohort c+7. Panel
F incorporates province-specific linear birth year trends to the estimation of equation (3.1).
Panel G drops the top 1 percent of the teacher strike exposure distribution. Standard errors
are clustered at the birth-province level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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year trends have been included. These results help us to further examine if our empirical
research design has successfully managed to isolate the effect of teacher strikes on student
outcomes, or if the coefficient estimates simply are driven by trends in outcomes across birth
cohorts within each province. The results from this exercise are not statistically significantly
different from our baseline estimates.
One of the main threats to valid inference in our paper, despite the inclusion of fixed
effects and demographic controls, is that our results are simply picking up differences in
outcomes caused by province-specific variation in macroeconomic performance across time.
To explore this question, we use post-2003 EPH data (data on local labor markets do not
exist before 2003) to examine the relationship between teacher strikes and local labor market
conditions. Provided that the relationship between teacher strikes and local labor markets
after 2003 is informative of that same relationship during the period 1977-1998, this analysis
reveal if the results simply are picking up differences in outcomes caused by province-specific
variation in macroeconomic performance over time.
The results from this exercise are shown in Appendix Table C.7. In Column (1) we show
the correlation between teacher strikes and the unemployment rate, the average hourly wages
and the average per capita family income. In Column (2) we add days of public administra-
tion strikes, calendar year and province fixed effects as well as province-specific time trends.47
Our main finding is that, once we control for public administration strikes, province-specific
time trends and province and year fixed effects, there is no significant relation between
the local labor market climate and teacher strikes. These results are consistent with the
idea that our results are not simply driven by province-specific variation in macroeconomic
performance across time.
47The results are robust to the inclusion of the 30th and the 70th percentiles of the per capita family
income (intended to capture any effect of a change in the distribution of per capita family income). Results
are available upon request.
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Even if our results are not driven by province-specific variation in macroeconomic perfor-
mance over time, it could still be the case that province-specific public school conditions are
driving the results (e.g. poor material conditions or low wages). If such school conditions
are correlated with teacher strikes but not subsumed by our fixed effects, time trends or
local labor market controls, they may contaminate our effects as these conditions could have
led to lower outcomes of exposed cohorts even if strikes did not happen. To explore this
possibility, we look at the relationship between teacher strikes and teacher wages.
The results from this exercise are shown in Appendix Table C.8. In Column (1) we show
the correlation between teacher wages and strikes. In Column (2) we add controls for public
administration strikes as well as calendar year and province fixed effects. Our main finding
is that there is no significant relationship between teacher wage and teacher strikes. These
results demonstrate that our identified results are not simply driven by province-specific
public school conditions across time.48
3.6.4 Short-run effects
In this section we analyze the effect of exposure to teacher strikes on outcomes of students
who have just finished primary school.49 The purpose of this exercise is to examine if the
strike effects occur immediately after the children have been exposed, or if they develop over
48To further explore this, Appendix Figure A-1 show the proportional change in real wages and teacher
strikes in each province for the entire period 1996-2009. We find no association between changes in wages
and the number of teacher strikes during this period.
49Due to educational reforms during the past two decades, grade 7 became a part of secondary education
in 2002, and mandatory education was extended from 7 to 12 years in 1998. In this section the treatment
variable is still defined as the days of strike while students were in primary school, which is now when the
children were between 6 and 11 years old.
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time. We focus on children between 12 and 17 years old when performing this analysis.50 We
concentrate on educational outcomes since most of these individuals have not yet entered
the labor market. These outcomes are: the likelihood of having attended primary school,
the probability of attending a public institution, years of education, the likelihood that the
main activity is home production, and the likelihood of being enrolled in school. We perform
this analysis on the individual level to control for household characteristics.51
Table 3.7 displays the results for each one of the outcome variables using two different
specifications. Column (1) incorporates the same controls as in our preferred specification.52
Column (2) incorporates additional local labor market controls (the unemployment rate and
the average wage in each province-year) and family characteristics.53
With respect to females, the results in Table 3.7 show that there is a decline in public
education enrollment of 0.93 percent relative to the sample mean. This represents 5.3 percent
relative to the mean when we scale the coefficient to account for the average level of strikes
among these individuals (57 days). We also find an increase in the likelihood of home
production by 3.45 percent, and a decrease the probability of being enrolled by 4.02 percent,
relative to the means. For males, exposure to 10 days of strikes reduces the years of education
by 0.29 percent relative to the mean. These results indicate that the negative education
effects of teacher strikes are visible immediately after the students finish primary school.
That the short-run effects are smaller than the long-run effects estimated in Table 3.2 is
consistent with the total effect of teacher strikes during primary school becoming more
50We exclude birth cohorts 1986-1990 as the educational reform was taking place at a different rate in
each province Alzúa et al. (2015).
51These results are robust to estimation at the aggregate level used in our main analysis. These results
are available upon request.
52Except for GDP at the province level for which there is not reliable data available in recent years.
534 dummies for province-specific quartiles of per capita family income and 5 dummies for the maximum
educational level of the head of the household: primary education or less, incomplete secondary, complete
secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary
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noticeable when all educational decisions (including college) have taken place.
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Table 3.7: Short-Term Effects of Strike Exposure (12-17 Year Olds)
Public Education Years of Education Home Production Not Enrolled
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A: Males
Strike Exposure -0.0025 -0.0014 -0.0235* -0.0243* 0.0018 0.0018 0.0031 0.0031
(0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0130) (0.0119) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0023)
% Effect -0.32% -0.18% -0.29% -0.31% 2.96% 2.96% 3.89% 3.89%
Panel B: Females
Strike Exposure -0.0074* *-0.0060 -0.0051 -0.0063 0.0021* 0.0022* 0.0032** 0.0032**
(0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015)
% Effect -0.93% -0.75% -0.05% -0.07% 3.45% 3.61% 4.02% 4.02%
Controlling for wage and unemployment X X X X
Controlling for household characteristics X X X X
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 12 to 17 year old respondents. Column (1) show results using
individual-level data and the same controls as in our preferred baseline specification. The model used to produce the results in Column (2)
incorporates local labor market variables that may influence the wealth of the family: the unemployment rate and the average wage in each
province. The model underlying the results in Column (2) further includes 4 dummies of province-specific quartiles of per capita family income
and 5 dummies for the maximum educational level of the head or spouse of the household (primary education or less, incomplete secondary,
complete secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary). Public education is a dummy variable equal to one if attending a public
school. Home production is a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent is neither working nor studying. Standard errors are clustered at the
birth province level. The coefficients are interpret as the effect of being exposed to teacher strikes for ten extra days during primary school.
*** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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In Section 2.3 we note that there may be heterogeneous treatment effects of teacher
strikes with respect to the socioeconomic characteristics of the student’s parents: wealthy
parents can afford to move their children to private institutions if they believe the strikes
hurt their children, and more educated parents are more likely to be capable to replace lost
instructional days with home schooling. Even though we do not have information on parental
wealth and educational attainment for the individuals included in our main analysis, we can
examine this for children that are between 12-17 years old. In Appendix Table C.9, we
estimate the effect of strikes by per capita family income and maximum years of education
of the head of the household. Consistent with our predictions, we find clear evidence that the
most affected students are those from the most socioeconomically disadvantaged households.
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Teacher industrial action is a prevalent feature of public education systems across the globe.
Despite a large theoretical literature on labor strikes and a reignited debate over the role of
teachers’ unions in education, there is a lack of empirical research that credibly evaluates
the effect of teacher strikes on student outcomes. This paper contributes to the literature
by providing a detailed analysis of the effect of teacher strikes during primary school on
long-run education and labor market outcomes. This is not a full analysis of the benefits
and costs associated with teacher strikes, but rather a partial equilibrium analysis that uses
teacher strikes to measure the effect of school disruptions on student long-term outcomes.
Nevertheless, the success of education policies ultimately depends on how they impact the
long-run outcomes of students, and identifying the net effect of teacher strikes on student
outcomes is therefore of great independent importance.
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Our results identify adverse long-run educational and labor market effects for both males
and females. For males, we find that exposure to teacher strikes during primary school leads
to a reduction in educational attainment, an increase in the likelihood of being unemployed,
occupational downgrading, and has adverse effects on both labor market earnings and hourly
wages. For females, teacher strikes reduce educational attainment in a way similar to that
of men. We find a reduction in the level of earnings among females as well, generated by
a reduction on labor force participation towards home production. By looking at 12-17
years old, we demonstrate that the negative educational effects are visible immediately after
children have finished primary school, and that these effects are concentrated among children
from the most vulnerable households.
Our analysis reveals that strikes affect individuals on other socioeconomic dimensions as
well. Specifically, individuals exposed to teacher strikes have less educated partners, lower
per capita family income, and are less likely to be the head of the household. While our
results suggest that males and females may be affected somewhat differently by teacher
strikes, the difference in our gender-specific estimates are often not statistically significant.
The prevalence of teacher strikes in Argentina means that the effect of teacher strikes
on the economy as a whole is substantial: A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests an
aggregate annual earnings loss of $3265 million. This is equivalent to the cost of raising the
average employment income of all primary school teachers in Argentina by 87.1 percent. In
terms of policy implications, this suggests that it may be worth raising teacher wages if this
will prevent them from going on strike.
Taken together, our results stress the importance of stable labor relations between gov-
ernment and industry and emphasize the necessity of a good bargaining environment that
reduces the number of strikes that students are exposed to. Given that the negative effects
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that we identify last for years and even generations, both unions and government should
make substantial attempts to limit the prevalence of strikes. One policy could be to intro-
duce labor contracts that extend over several years and only allow teachers to strike if a
bargaining impasse is reached when renewing these multi-year contracts. This would elimi-
nate sporadic strikes while still allowing teachers to use industrial action as a tool to ensure
fair contracts.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 1 OF APPENDIX
A.1 Appendix
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The profit of a competitive firm producing tasks i is:1
Π(i) = p(i) (LαL(i)L(i) + AMαM(i)M(i) + AHαH(i)H(i))− wLL(i)− wMM(i)− wHH(i),
where the price of the task p(i) and the wage of each type of worker are given for the firm.
The first order conditions with respect to L(i), M(i), and H(i) imply
J(i) > 0 if piJ(i) = p(i)AJαJ(i)− wJ ≥ 0 for J = {L,M,H}.
Competition assures that Π(i) ≤ 0. Moreover, the Cobb-Douglas production function for
the final good implies that production of all task is positive. So ∀i it must be that either
piL(i) = 0, or piM(i) = 0, or piH(i) = 0 or two of these conditions has to hold. Unemployment
of any type of worker is not possible in this economy because it would imply that wages fall
to zero and firms could make a profit in producing task i with that type. Then, a positive
amount has to be produce of each task using either low, medium, or high educated workers.
Therefore, given the assumption of increasing comparative advantage on i for more educated
workers, there must exist two thresholds levels IL and IH (where 0 < IL < IH < 1) such
that: a) piL(i) − piM(i) > 0 and piL(i) − piH(i) > 0 for all i<IL, piL(IL) − piM(IL) = 0; b)
1The proof presented here follows the analisys in Acemoglu and Zilbotti (1999).
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piM(i)− piL(i) > 0 and piM(i)− piH(i) > 0 for all i = (IL, IH); c) piM(IH)− piH(IH) = 0; and
d) piH(i)− piL(i) > 0 piH(i)− piM(i) > 0 for all i > IH .
A.1.2 Proof of propositions 1-3
The proof of propositions (1), (2) and (3) proceeds as follows. First, I compute the thresholds’
changes that determine the distributions of workers’ types to tasks. Then, the effects on
wages and the overall distribution of occupations follow directly from the new thresholds.
Changes in task composition within each educational level
The task composition within each educational level is determined by the thresholds levels
IL and IH . I use comparative statics to estimate the effects of an educational expansion on
the thresholds levels.
Proof of (i.1). I follow Acemoglu and Autor (2011) by expressing (1.14) and (1.15) in
logs:
ln (1− IH)− ln (IH − IL)− CHM(IH)− ln h+ ln m = 0 (A.1)
ln (IH − IL)− ln (IL)− CML(IL)− ln m+ ln (1−m− h) = 0. (A.2)
Now consider the effect of a change in h by totally differentiating these equations. We
thus obtain:
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− 1(1−IH) − 1(IH−IL) − C ′HM(IH) 1(IH−IL)
1
(IH−IL) − 1(IH−IL) − 1IL − C ′ML(IL)

dIH
dIL
 =
 1h
1
(1−m−h)
 dh (A.3)
The determinant of the first matrix, ∆ is positive (see Acemoglu and Autor (2011)),
therefore by Cramerś rule:
dIH
dh
=
1
h
(
− 1(IH−IL) − 1IL − C ′ML(IL)
)
− 1(1−m−h) 1(IH−IL)
∆ < 0 (A.4)
dIL
dh
=
1
(1−m−h)
(
− 1(1−IH) − 1(IH−IL) − C ′HM(IH)
)
− 1
h
1
(IH−IL)
∆ < 0 (A.5)
The inequality in the first equation is straightforward because all its terms are negative.
For the second equation to be positive it is necessary that
−C ′HM(IH) >
(1−m− h)
h
1
(IH − IL) +
1
1− IH +
1
(IH − IL)
Which leads to a contradiction since C ′HM(IH) > 0 and the RHS is positive. Therefore
dIL
dh
< 0. 
An increase in h leads to a reduction in both thresholds, given that higher educated
workers start performing medium-level tasks, and medium educated workers are pushed
towards lower-level tasks displacing low educated workers. With an increase in h, the average
task performed by each educational level diminishes leading to conditional occupational
downgrading.
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Proof of (ii.1). Following a similar procedure it is possible to write:
dIL
dm
=
(
1
m
+ 1(1−m−h)
) (
− 1(1−IH) − 1(IH−IL) − C ′HM(IH)
)
+ 1
m
1
(IH−IL)
∆ < 0 (A.6)
dIH
dm
=
− 1
m
(
− 1(IH−IL) − 1IL − C ′ML(IL)
)
−
(
1
m
+ 1(1−m−h)
)
1
(IH−IL)
∆ > 0 (A.7)
The inequality in the first equation is straightforward. For the second equation to be
positive it is necessary that:
C ′ML(IL) >
m
(1−m− h)
1
(IH − IL) −
1
IL
From (A.2) the RHS is < 0, because
m
(1−m− h)
1
(IH − IL) =
1
IL
ALαL(IL)
AMαM(IL)
<
1
IL
.
The result dIH
dm
> 0 follows by the comparative advantage schedule, given that C ′ML(IL) >
0. 
It is easy to see that with an increase in m the average task performed by low educated
workers (IL/2) and that of high educated workers ((1− IH)/2) will increase. The change in
the average task performed by medium educated workers depends on the parameters of the
model. Moreover, an increase in m leads to a larger share of tasks performed by medium
educated workers, by increasing its participation in low-level and high-level tasks. We are
153
also interested in d(IH+IL)
dm
since the average task performed by medium educated workers
can be defined as IL + (IH − IL)/2 = (IH + IL)/2. Depending on which effect is stronger,
dIH
dm
dIL
dm
Q 0. The average task performed by medium educated workers will increase or
decrease depending on whether this inequality is positive or negative. We can write it as
follows:
d(IH + IL)
dm
=
− 1
m
(
− 1
IL
− C ′ML(IL)
)
− 1(1−m−h) 1(IH−IL)
∆ +(
1
m
+ 1(1−m−h)
) (
− 1(1−IH) − 1(IH−IL) − C ′HM(IH)
)
+ 1
m
1
(IH−IL)
∆ Q 0
When m and h increase separately, IL always declines and IH increases in the first case
and decreases in the second case. When m and h increase simultaneously there is a mixture
of these effects. As a consequence, IL will diminish but IH can increase or decrease depending
on what effect is stronger.
Proof of (iii.3). Suppose that m′
h′ <
m
h
and I ′H > IH . By equations (A.5) and (A.6) IL <
I ′L. From (1.15), mh = cHM(IH)(IH − IL), with cHM = exp(CHM) and where c′HM(IH) > 0.
After the educational expansion m′
h′ = cHM(I
′
H)(I ′H − I ′L) > mh , which is a contradiction.
It means that IH cannot increase unless the relative supply of medium with respect to
high educated workers also increases. However, this condition does not work in the other
direction.
Changes task composition of the economy
In only a few cases the model provides a sharp prediction of the changes in the task
composition of the economy that does not depend on the parameters of the model.
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Proof of (i.2) and (ii.2). When there is an increase in IH , some medium educated workers
will be added to tasks originally performed only by high educated workers. Therefore, the
share of employment in high-level tasks in the economy will increase.
ET = h
E ′T = h′ +
∫ I′H
IH
m′
I ′H − I ′L
di
∆ET = ∆h+
∫ I′H
IH
m′
I ′H − I ′L
di > 0 
This inequality is written for the more general case in which m and h increases. Note
that the inequality stills holds for proposition 2 when ∆h = 0.
In the rest of the cases, when IH declines, it is only possible to define boundaries for the
changes in the occupational composition of employment. For example,
EB = l
E ′B = l′ +
∫ IL
I′L
m′
I ′H − I ′L
di
∆EB = (l′ − l) + (IL − I ′L)
m′
I ′H − I ′L
> ∆l.
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The inequality establishes that when the share of low educated workers is reduced by
∆l, the share in bottom-level tasks will decline less than ∆l since some medium educated
workers will start performing some of these tasks. The extent to which medium educated
workers will start performing those tasks depends on the extent of the decline in IL, which
at the same time depends on the comparative advantage schedules and whether the decline
in l was due to an increase in m, h or both.
A similar result arises when looking at changes in employment for top-level occupations
when IH declines. Formally,
∆ET = (h′ − h)− (IH − I ′H)
h′
1− I ′H
< ∆h.
A decline in IH is only possible if ∆h > 0. The inequality establishes that there is
less increase in employment in top-level occupations than the increase in the share of high
educated workers. Some high educated workers start performing middle-level tasks. To
study the determinants for an increase in employment in top-level tasks, it is possible to
state that:
∆ET > 0⇔ ∆h
h′
>
(IH − I ′H)
(1− I ′H)
that is, the increase in the supply of high educated workers has to be large with respect
to the change in the threshold IH .
Changes in the wages
We now turn to the case of changes in the wage levels. From the wage equations (1.22),
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(1.23) and (1.24) the threshold levels determine the wage levels. After an educational ex-
pansion IL always falls, while IH can increase or decrease depending on the case. I consider
these two cases separately.
Case 1: ∆IL < 0 and ∆IH < 0
Proof of proposition (i.3).. After an educational expansion, wages for high educated
workers can be expressed as:
ln W ′H = AV P ′ + I ′HCHM(I ′H) + I ′LCML(I ′L).
Therefore, the wage increase ∆ln WH = ln W ′H − ln WH can be expressed as:
∆ln WH =
∫ IL
I′L
CML(i) di+ I ′LCML(I ′L)− ILCML(IL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IL in WH effect< 0
+
∫ IH
I′H
CHM(i) di+ I ′HCHM(I ′H)− IHCHM(IH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IH in WH effect < 0
< 0,
where the inequalities for each term comes from the assumption about the comparative
advantage schedules. Given the comparative and absolute advantage schedule, CML(IL) >
CML(i) > CML(I ′L) for all i = (I ′L, IL) and CHM(IH) > CHM(i) > CHM(I ′H) for all i =
(I ′H , IH) . I can establish the following inequalities:
∫ IL
I′L
CML(i) di < ILCML(IL)− I ′LCML(IL) < ILCML(IL)− I ′HCML(I ′L)
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∫ IH
I′H
CHM(i) di < IHCHM(IH)− I ′HCHM(IH) < IHCHM(IH)− I ′HCHM(I ′H)
Therefore, ∆ln WH < 0.
Similarly, define ∆lnWL = lnWL− lnW ′L. The change in wages for low educated workers
can be expressed as
∆ln WL =
∫ IL
I′L
CML(i) di− (1− I ′L)CML(I ′L) + (1− IL)CML(IL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IL in WL effect > 0
+
∫ IH
I′H
CHM(i) di− (1− I ′H)CHM(I ′H) + (1− IH)CHM(IH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IH in WL effect > 0
> 0,
where the inequalities arise from considering
∫ IL
I′L
CML(i) > ILCML(I ′L)− I ′LCML(I ′L)
and, ∫ IH
I′H
CHM(i) > IHCHM(I ′H)− I ′HCHM(I ′H)
then,
∆ln WL > ILCML(I ′L)− ILCML(IL) + CML(IL)− CML(I ′L)
+ IHCHM(I ′H)− IHCHM(IH) + CHM(IH)− CHM(IHL′)
= (1− IL)(CML(IL)− CML(I ′L)) + (1− IH)(CHM(IH)− CHM(I ′H)) > 0.
Finally, wages of medium educated workers can be expressed as:
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∆ln WM =
∫ IL
I′L
CML(i) di+ I ′LCML(I ′L)− ILCML(IL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IL in WM effect< 0
+
∫ IH
I′H
CHM(i) di− (1− I ′H)CHM(I ′H) + (1− IH)CHM(IH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IH in WM effect > 0
Q 0,
where the results follow from the inequalities in opposite directions derived above for
∆ln WH and ∆ln WL.
When ∆IL < 0 and ∆IH < 0, WH increases, WL decreases, and WL can increase or
decrease depending on the parameters of the model.

Case 2: ∆IL < 0 and ∆IH > 0
Proof of proposition (ii.3).. Similarly, in the caseIH > 0 it is possible to express:
∆ln WH =
∫ IL
I′L
CML(i) di+ I ′LCML(I ′L)− ILCML(IL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IL in WH effect< 0
+
−
∫ I′H
IH
CHM(i) di+ I ′HCHM(I ′H)− IHCHM(IH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IH in WH effect > 0
Q 0,
∆ln WM =
∫ IL
I′L
CML(i) di+ +I ′LCML(I ′L)− ILCML(IL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IL in WM effect< 0
+
−
∫ I′H
IH
CHM(i) di− (1− I ′H)CHM(I ′H) + (1− IH)CHM(IH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IH in WM effect < 0
< 0,
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∆ln WL =
∫ IL
I′L
CML(i) di− (1− I ′L)CML(I ′L) + (1− IL)CML(IL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IL in WL effect > 0
+
−
∫ I′H
IH
CHM(i) di− (1− I ′H)CHM(I ′H) + (1− IH)CHM(IH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆IH in WL effect < 0
Q 0,

Changes in relative wages
Relative wages are easy to estimate in the model. Their level depends on the changes in
the thresholds and are equal to the difference of the equations stated above (alternatively,
they can be obtained directly from equations (1.25)-(1.27)) .
Proof of (i.4) and (ii.4). Relative wages can be expressed as follows.
ln W ′H − ln W ′M − (ln WH − ln WM) = CHM(I ′H)− CHM(IH)

> 0, if I ′H > IH .
< 0, if I ′H < IH .
ln W ′M − ln W ′L − (ln WM − ln WL) = CML(I ′L)− CML(I ′L) < 0
lnW ′H−lnW ′L−(lnWH−lnWL) = CHM(I ′H)−CHM(IH)+CML(I ′L)−CML(I ′L)

Q 0, if I ′H > IH .
< 0, if I ′H < IH .

I find that in any educational expansion the wage gap between medium and low educated
workers always fall according to the model. This is the case because medium educated work-
ers will always start performing bottom-level tasks when there is an educational expansion
(decline in IL), and the productivity differential of medium with respect to low educated
workers always decline, and this is what defines the wage gaps.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 2 OF APPENDIX
B.1 Oaxaca Decomposition of Average Wages
This section evaluates the relationship between changes between 1995 and 2014 in average
wages of each educational group and their occupational composition of employment. Wages
for a given educational group may change in part because workers switched to occupations
with a different wage, and in part because there was an increase or decrease in wages of
occupations they were already performing. The Oaxaca decomposition disentangles the
importance of these two effects on changes in average wages.
The changes in log wages between 1995 and 2014 can be decomposed by the method pro-
posed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973), and the role of occupations is obtained following
Ferreira et al. (2016). Let’s W sit be the wage of individual i from the educational group s in
time t and X be a vector of occupational dummies and other personal characteristics (gender
and age group dummies). Then we can express:
log(W sit) = βstXsit + sit
Consider t = 1995, 2015, it is possible to write a model with the two periods pooled together
as follows:
log(W si ) = βsXsi + si
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The difference in average log wages between 1995 and 2014 can be written as:
E(log(W si2014))− E(log(W si1995)) = E(Xsi2014)′(βs2014 − βs) + E(Xsi1995)′(βs − βs1995)
+ (E(Xsi2014)− E(Xsi1995))′β
Let j¯ denote sample average of variable j, βˆ denote ordinary last squares estimates of param-
eter β, 1 and 2 be 1995 and 2014 respectively, and w be log(W ). We can write the sample
estimate of the above expression as:
(w¯s2 − w¯s1) = X¯s2(βˆs2 − βˆs) + X¯s1(βˆs − βˆs1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ˆsp: pay structure effect
+ (X¯s2 − X¯s1)βˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ˆsc:composition effect
.
where ∆ˆsp and ∆ˆsc are, respectively, the estimate of the pay structure effect and the com-
position effect for group s. The first term, the composition effect, reflects the changes in
average wages of the group s due to changes in the return to covariates Xs. The second
term, the composition effect, estimates the change in average wages that is due to changes
in the distribution of covariates Xs.
We are interested in studying how changes in returns and composition of occupations are
related to changes in average wages. Let Xj be composed by 82 occupational dummies from
ISCO-88-3 digit level classification, and Xg be other covariates. Given the linearity of both
the pay structure and the composition effect, it is easy to get the part of the effect driven
by occupations. It is possible to write:
∆ˆsp =
j=82∑
j=1
X¯s2,j(βˆs2,j − βˆsj ) + X¯s1,j(βˆsj − βˆs1,j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Occupations
+
∑
g
X¯s2,g(βˆs2,g − βˆsg) + X¯s1,g(βˆg
s − βˆs1,g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Other covariates
∆ˆsc =
j=82∑
j=1
(X¯s2,j − X¯s1,j)βˆj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Occupations
+
∑
g
(X¯s2,g − X¯s1,g)βˆg︸ ︷︷ ︸
Other covariates
Table B.1 shows the results of the decomposition. The decomposition is performed for
the entire workforce and for each educational group separately. In column (1) the vector
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of personal characteristics X only incorporates occupational dummies. In Column (2) X
also contains dummies for combinations of gender, 4 age groups, and 6 levels of education,
to account for changes in these characteristics for the entire workforce and within each
educational group.
The results of the decomposition are stated as follows. For the entire workforce, the
average log wage increased 0.382 between 1995 and 2014, mainly due to a general raise in
wages within each occupation. The composition effect due to a change in occupations is small
(only explains 11 percent of the increase in wages), while most of the increase in wages comes
from the pay structure effect. This is consistent with Section 2.3 where we stated that the
occupational composition of the Brazilian economy did not change much during the period
1995-2014. The increase in average wages is mainly due to a generalized increase in wages
across all occupations and a decline in the occupational premiums, reflected in the negative
effects of occupational premiums in the pay-structure effect and the large positive change in
the constant of the regression. These results are robust to incorporate other covariates into
the decomposition (column (2)).
The decomposition exercise shows heterogeneous results for workers with different ed-
ucational level. For low educated workers, the average wages increased due to small but
negative composition effect and a large and positive pay structure effect. This indicates
that they occupational composition deteriorated (they are more concentrated in low wage
in 2014 when compared to 1995), but the wage level had a generalized increase (reflected
in the constant) that more than compensate for the occupational downgrading. Note that
the sign of the occupation term in the pay structure effect is negative, indicating that the
occupational premiums (with respect to the constant) declined. For medium educated work-
ers, the composition effect was large and negative, and it was not compensated by a small
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and positive pay structure effect. It reflects that the occupational composition of medium
educated workers deteriorated, and even when there was an increase in wages within each
occupation it was not enough to compensate for the occupational downgrading. In the case
of high educated workers, both the composition and the pay structure effect are negative,
indicating that not only there was an occupational downgrading during this period but also
that wages within each occupation decline as well. The fact that the occupation term in the
pay structure effect is positive shows that the occupational premiums increase (with respect
to the constant that largely diminished). This is because wages fall for high educated workers
in low wage occupations. The results for each educational level practically do not change
when other covariates are incorporated into the decomposition (column (2)).
A better intuition of these results can be obtained from Figure B.1. The figure displays
a locally weighted smoothing regression of the changes in log wages between 1995 and 2004
on the ranking of occupations for all workers in panel (a) and for workers with different
educational level in panel (b). From the first panel, it is clear that wages increased more in
low wage occupations and occupational premiums declined. While the smoothing regression
in the second panel shows that wages increased for all occupations in the case of low educated
workers, only increased in occupations with a low ranking for medium educated workers, and
wages declined for almost all occupations for high educated workers (except those at the top),
and this decline was more pronounced in low ranked occupations.
In summary, this section decomposes the changes in wages during the period 1995-2014
between an occupational composition effect (changes in the occupational structure of em-
ployment) and a pay structure effect (changes in wages within occupations). We find that for
all workers the composition effect is small, consistent with small changes in the occupational
composition of the economy; while the increase in wages is driven by higher wages at each oc-
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cupation, especially those that started with a lower wage. We also find that all educational
levels experienced a negative occupational composition effect, consistent with conditional
occupation downgrading. For low educated workers wages within each occupation largely
increase, compensating for the negative composition effect, and average wages increased. For
medium educated workers, wages increase only in a small number of occupations and it was
not enough to compensate for the composition effect, so average wages decreased. For high
educated workers, wages declined in each occupation, reinforcing the negative composition
effect, and average wages fell.
These results are in line with to those of the model presented on Section 1.2 for the case
that IH declines, as was the case in the calibrated estimation in Section 2.6.1.1 In the model,
an educational expansion generates a deterioration in occupations conditional on education,
which is larger for medium educated workers; this is exactly what the composition effect
indicates in the data. The model predicts a large increase in the price of occupations where
low educated workers are employed, an mild change in prices of occupations performed by
medium educated workers (can increase or decrease, but always between the changes in
prices of low and high educated workers), and a sharp decline in the prices of occupations
performed by high educated workers. These predictions are consistent with the heterogeneous
pay structure effect that is observed in the data.
1In this discussion, I assume the tasks in the model can be directly interpreted as occupations. See Section
2.2 for a detail discussion on occupations being interpreted as tasks
165
Table B.1: Oaxaca decomposition of changes in mean wages
All workers Low educated Medium Educated Highly Educated
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Total change in mean ln wages 0.382 0.382 0.333 0.333 -0.038 -0.038 -0.151 -0.151
Decomposition
Composition effect 0.041 0.200 -0.045 0.016 -0.123 -0.084 -0.055 -0.049
Occupations 0.041 0.023 -0.045 -0.031 -0.123 -0.117 -0.055 -0.052
Gender x edu x age 0.178 0.048 0.032 0.003
Pay structure effect 0.341 0.181 0.379 0.317 0.084 0.046 -0.096 -0.101
Occupations -0.568 -0.363 -0.487 -0.338 -0.585 -0.616 0.400 0.442
Gender x edu x age 0.302 -0.399 0.169 0.068
Constant 0.909 0.242 0.865 1.054 0.670 0.493 -0.496 -0.611
Relative importance
Composition/total 0.11 0.53 -0.14 0.05 3.21 2.21 0.36 0.33
Structure/total 0.89 0.47 1.14 0.95 -2.21 -1.21 0.64 0.67
Occupations composition/total 0.11 0.06 -0.14 -0.09 3.21 3.06 0.36 0.35
Occupations structure/total 0.89 -0.32 1.14 2.15 -2.21 3.21 0.64 1.12
Note: The table presents the Oaxaca decomposition of average log wages between a composition effect and a pay structure effect,
which are in turn decompose into the effect of occupations and those of other covariates. Column (1) only considers occupational
dummies according to ISCO-88-3 digit level. Column (2) incorporates group dummies for combinations of gender, 4 age groups
and 6 levels of education (GenderxEduxAge).
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Figure B.1: Changes in log wages by occupation. Period 1995-2014
(a) All Workers (b) By Educational Level
Note: The figure plots a locally weighted smoothing regression of the changes
in log wages between 1995 and 2004. Occupations are ranked as in Figure 2.2.
Source: Author’s calculation based on PNAD 1995 and 2004.
B.2 Additional tables
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Table B.2: Correlation between the ranking of occupations using different samples
1995-2015 1995-2015 1995-2015 1995 2004 2014
(reweigthed) (no union
nor public)
1995-2015 (re-weighted) 1.000
1995-2015 (no union nor public) 0.980 1.000
1995-2015 0.999 0.980 1.000
1995 0.944 0.944 0.941 1.000
2004 0.990 0.960 0.990 0.914 1.000
2014 0.978 0.952 0.980 0.896 0.976 1.000
Notes: The table shows the correlation between the ranking of occupations classified by ISCO-88 3
digit (a total of 82 occupations) based on their median wage for different samples. The sample 1995-
2015 (re-weighted) refers to the ranking based on their median wage using all household surveys
over the period 1995-2014 with re-weights to account for changes in demographic characteristics
of employed workers. The sample 1995-2015 (no union nor public) drop workers that belong to a
union or that work in the public sector. The sample 1995-2015 also considers the entire period but
it does not account for changes in demographic characteristics. Samples 1995, 2004, and 2014 only
take into account household survey in each of those years.
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Table B.3: Changes in the occupational structure of employment in Brazil between 1995 and 2014
Average Total workforce Low educated Medium educated High educated
wage 1995 1995-2014 1995 1995-2014 1995 1995-2014 1995 1995-2014
Occupations ISCO-88 1 digit
Professionals 6.3 5.1 5.3 0.6 0.2 3.9 -2.1 33.9 3.2
Legislators and managers 5.5 7.9 -2.8 4.4 -2.5 12.5 -8.8 20.4 -10.1
Military 4.5 2.1 -1.2 1.3 -1.2 4.5 -3.5 2.5 -0.7
Technicians 3.3 7.8 -0.2 3.4 -2.0 17.1 -8.9 17.3 -3.8
Clerks 2.4 8.2 3.6 2.9 0.1 21.9 -7.0 15.6 2.1
Plant and machine operators 2.2 8.1 -0.9 10.5 -1.0 4.3 4.4 0.7 1.3
Craft and related trades 2.0 20.5 -2.1 25.8 1.8 12.5 7.6 2.7 2.0
Service workers and salers 1.8 24.2 6.7 28.8 9.0 19.0 17.8 5.8 6.0
Agriculture and elementary 1.6 16.1 -8.2 22.2 -4.3 4.2 0.5 1.2 0.1
Total 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
Notes: I construct a ranking of occupations classified by ISCO-88 3 digit (a total of 82 occupations) based on their median wage over
the period 1995-2014.Three categories ISCO-88 3 digit: 82 occupations are divided into 3 groups of an equal number of occupations
according to their average wage. Bottom-third refers to the 27 occupations with lower average wage, medium-third are the next 27,
and the remaining 28 are classified as top-third occupations. Workers are classified into low (less than secondary), medium (some
secondary), and high educated (some university).
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Table B.4: Labor market effects of the Brazilian educational expansion under different
functional forms
Brazil Model: different functional forms
1995-2014 CHM(i) & CML(i) equal to:
i (i+ 1)2 i+ 1 i2
Panel A: Thresholds
Initial IL 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.424
Initial IH 0.664 0.664 0.664 0.664
Final IL 0.257 0.222 0.195 0.300
Final IH 0.58 0.559 0.534 0.610
Panel B: Changes in occup. composition of employment
Bottom-third -0.011 -0.072 -0.034 -0.004 -0.124
Middle-third -0.005 -0.004 -0.033 -0.054 0.033
Top-third 0.015 0.076 0.067 0.058 0.091
Panel C: Changes in mean occup. ranking
Low educated -0.037 -0.083 -0.101 -0.114 -0.062
Medium educated -0.129 -0.126 -0.154 -0.180 -0.089
High Educated -0.058 -0.042 -0.053 -0.065 -0.027
Panel D: % Changes in wages
Low educated 37.3 46.9 29.6 16.7 65.9
Medium educated -10.5 -10.9 -4.6 -2.1 -17.0
High Educated -21.6 -22.2 -16.3 -9.7 -30.0
Panel E: Changes in wage gaps
WH/WM -12.4 -12.7 -12.3 -7.8 -15.7
WM/WL -34.8 -39.3 -26.4 -16.1 -50.0
WH/WL -42.9 -47.1 -35.5 -22.6 -57.8
Notes: Column 1 shows the changes observed in the data from 1995 to 2014. Columns 2-5 show
the results of the educational expansion in the model using different fucntional forms for the
comparative advantage curves across tasks (i) following Section 2.5. For comparison, column 2
reproduces the preferred estimation from Table 2.6.1.
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Figure C.1: Correlation between teacher strikes and teacher wages
Notes: The figure is a binned scatter plot. The horizontal axis shows the days of teacher
strikes between 1996 and 2009, which varies at province level. The vertical axis depicts the
change in real teacher wage over the same period for each of the provinces in Argentina.
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Table C.1: Cross-province mobil-
ity of 13 year olds
Province Fraction Non-movers
Buenos Aires 0.979
Catamarca 0.963
Chaco 0.855
Chubut 0.930
Ciudad Bs.As. 0.999
Cordoba 0.947
Corrientes 0.850
Entre Rios 0.905
Formosa 0.942
Jujuy 0.932
La Pampa 0.952
La Rioja 0.968
Mendoza 0.947
Misiones 0.836
Neuquen 0.979
Rio Negro 0.715
Salta 0.943
San Juan 0.949
San Luis 0.945
Santa Cruz 0.835
Santa Fe 0.975
Sgo del Estero 0.942
T. del Fuego 0.943
Tucuman 0.952
Notes: Authors’ tabulations from 2003-2015
EPH data on 13 year old respondents. The ta-
ble shows the fraction of 13 year olds during
2003-2015 that live in the same province they
were born. Bold numbers represents provinces
with fraction of non-movers higher than 0.9.
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Table C.2: Dependant variable means
Male Female
Panel A: Educational Attainment
Secondary Education Completed 0.559 0.620
Years of Education 11.178 11.731
Tertiery Education Completed 0.166 0.248
Panel B: Employment
Unemployment 0.042 0.066
Not in Labor Force 0.041 0.312
Home Production 0.069 0.329
Informal Sector 0.309 0.354
Hours Worked 42.265 21.239
Occupational Sorting 0.177 0.284
Panel C: Wage and Earnings
Log Total Earnings 6.489 6.123
Total Earnings 731.8 372.3
Log Wage 1.255 1.257
Panel D: Other Socioeconomic Outcomes
Head of Household or Spouse 0.743 0.801
Married 0.716 0.688
Number of Children 1.353 1.671
Log Per Capita Family Income 6.791 6.650
Years of Schooling of Partner 11.732 10.357
Age of older kid 11.331 12.315
Panel D: Intergenerational Outcomes
Not Delayed at School 0.728 0.714
Gap in Years of Education -0.462 -0.503
Notes: Authors’ tabulations from 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-40
years old respondents from 1971-1985 cohorts. Home production
is defined as neither working nor studying. Informality is defined
as the share of employed workers that are salaried employee in
a small firm (less than 5 employees), or works as self-employed
without a university degree, or is a family worker with zero earn-
ings. Occupational sorting is evaluated by constructing an index
of occupation quality based on the proportion of workers in each
occupation with more than a high school degree. Not being de-
layed at school is defined as a dummy variable takes the value
of one if the age of the child minus years of education plus 6 is
greater than zero, and it takes the value of zero otherwise. The
educational gap defined by years of schooling plus 6 minus age.
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Table C.3: Effect of Strike Exposure on Individual Outcomes; two-dimensional fixed effects
Panel A. Educational Attainment
High School Diploma College Degree Years of Schooling
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.026*** -0.024***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
% Effect -0.52% -0.47% -1.39% -0.40% -0.23% -0.20%
Panel B. Employment
Unemployed Not in Labor Force Home Production
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure 0.001** 0.001* -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
% Effect 1.67% 1.22% -0.73% 0.29% 1.30% 0.85%
Panel C. Wages and Earnings
Log Earnings Log Wages Total Earnings
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure -0.002* -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002* -1.653 -1.772**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (1.264) (0.663)
% Effect - - - - -0.23% -0.48%
Panel D. Occupational Quality and Work Hours
Occupational Sorting Total Hours Informal
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Strike Exposure -0.001*** -0.000 -0.010 -0.019 -0.000 0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.058) (0.001) (0.001)
% Effect -0.79% -0.14% -0.02% -0.09% -0.03% 0.54%
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respondents. The unit of observation
is a birth priovince - birth year - EPH year, and the sample consists of 2460 observations. Regressions include birth province, birth
year and EPH survey year fixed effects as well as local GDP and exposure to public administration strikes. Regressions further
include birth provice by EPH survey year and birth year by EPH survey year fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by the number
of individual observations used to calculate the averages for each birth year-birth province- EPH year cell. The coefficient measures
the effect of being exposed to ten additional days of teacher strikes in primary school on the respective outcomes. Standard errors
are clustered at the birth province level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *
indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.4: P-values from Wild Cluster Bootstrap Standard Errors Method
Years of Occupational Log Total Home
Education Sorting Wage Earnings Unemployment Production
Panel A: Males
Strike Exposure -0.026** -0.002** -0.003** -1.704 0.001** 0.001
P-Value from Wild Cluster
Bootstrap Standard Error Method 0.029 0.016 0.032 0.275 0.045 0.134
Panel A: Females
Strike Exposure -0.022** -0.0000 -0.002 -1.906* 0.001 0.003**
P-Value from Wild Cluster
Bootstrap Standard Error Method 0.044 0.682 0.119 0.057 0.143 0.022
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30 to 40 year old respondents. The unit of observation
is a birth province - birth year - EPH year, and the sample consists of 2460 observations. Regressions include birth province, birth
year and EPH survey year fixed effects as well as local GDP and exposure to public administration strikes. Regressions further
include cohort-specific and a province-specific linear time trends. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations
used to calculate the averages for each birth year-birth province- EPH year cell. The coefficient measures the effect of being exposed
to ten additional days of teacher strikes in primary school on the respective outcomes. P-value is estimated following the wild
cluster method with Rademacher 2 point distribution following Cameron and Miller (2015). The bootstrap uses 999 replications.
The p-values show the probability of observing the given coefficient value under the null hypothesis of no effect. To facilitate
interpretation of the results, stars (*) have been used after the coefficient estimate to indicate which level the coefficient estimate
was significant at when the standard errors were clustered at the birth province level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, **
indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.5: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects of Strike Exposure by School Grade
Years of Occupational Log Total Home
Education Sorting Wage Earnings Unemploy. Production
Panel A: Males
Strike Exposure 1-4 grade -0.0295*** -0.0015** -0.0039** -1.5495 0.0011** 0.0010*
(0.0099) (0.0006) (0.0015) (1.4588) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Strike Exposure 5-7 grade -0.0240*** -0.0014*** -0.0027 -1.8088 0.0006 0.0008
(0.0073) (0.0004) (0.0021) (1.5825) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Panel B: Females
Strike Exposure 1-4 grade -0.0355*** -0.0011* -0.0035** -3.2691*** 0.0013* 0.0027**
(0.0074) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.9841) (0.0007) (0.0013)
Strike Exposure 5-7 grade -0.0126* 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.9976 0.0006 0.0026***
(0.0065) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.8975) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Notes: Authors’ estimation of their preferred version of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40
year old respondents (controlling for birth province, birth year and EPH survey year fixed effects as well as
local GDP and exposure to public administration strikes and including a cohort-specific and a province-specific
linear time trend). The treatment variable has been split into 2: teacher strikes that occur in grades 1-4 and
those that took place in grades 5-7. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations used
to calculate the averages for each birth year-birth province-year. The coefficient is interpret as the effect of
being exposed to teacher strikes for ten extra days during primary school. Standard errors are clustered at the
birth province level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and *
indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.6: Effect of controlling for non-teacher strikes and GDP
Years of Occupational Log Total Home
Education Sorting Wage Earnings Unemploy. Production
Panel A: Without controls for PA strikes and GDP
i. Male
Strike Exposure -0.0233*** -0.0015*** -0.0034*** -2.1796* 0.0008*** 0.0006
(0.0064) (0.0004) (0.0010) (1.1480) (0.0003) (0.0004)
ii. Female
Strike Exposure -0.0176*** -0.0003 -0.0020*** -2.5964*** 0.0010** 0.0029***
(0.0053) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.6296) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Panel B: With controls for PA strikes and GDP
i. Male
Strike Exposure -0.0262*** -0.0015*** -0.0032** -1.7039 0.0008** 0.0009
(0.0064) (0.0004) (0.0012) (1.3505) (0.0003) (0.0005)
PA Strike Exposure 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0014 -2.0821 -0.0001 -0.0010
(0.0123) (0.0009) (0.0035) (2.3253) (0.0004) (0.0008)
GDP -1.4222*** -0.0355 -0.0345 -6.9421 -0.0020 0.0132
(0.3645) (0.0271) (0.0871) (67.6629) (0.0184) (0.0323)
ii. Female
Strike Exposure -0.0217*** -0.0003 -0.0019* -1.9064*** 0.0009* 0.0027***
(0.0062) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.6236) (0.0004) (0.0007)
PA Strike Exposure 0.0121 -0.0005 -0.0012 -3.3382** 0.0002 0.0009
(0.0110) (0.0009) (0.0020) (1.4787) (0.0014) (0.0014)
GDP -0.7139 -0.0662* -0.0531 -74.3703 -0.0049 0.0406
(0.4904) (0.0365) (0.0468) (62.6525) (0.0328) (0.0546)
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respondents.
Panel A excludes controls for public administration strikes and province-specific GDP. Panel B includes
these controls, both defined at the time the cohorts were in primary school. Regressions are weighted by
the number of individual observations used to calculate the averages for each birth year-birth province-
year. The coefficient is interpret as the effect of being exposed to teacher strikes for ten extra days during
primary school. Standard errors are clustered at the birth province level. *** indicates significance at the
1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.7: Effect of local labor market conditions on teacher
strikes
Teacher Strikes
(1) (2)
Unemployment rate 0.6355** 1.1255
(0.2591) (0.9366)
Average wage 0.3605 -1.8366
(0.6432) (5.0689)
Average per capita income 0.0016* -0.0072
(0.0009) (0.0061)
Public administration strike exposure X
Province FE X
Year FE X
Province-specific time trends X
R-squared 0.047 0.407
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data
and strike data from CTI. The unemployment rate, average wages and
average per capita family income describe the labor market conditions
for each birth province-calender year cell. Column (1) regress the days of
teacher strikes during the period 2003-2015 only on labor market condi-
tions. Column (2) adds days of strikes in public administration, calendar
year and province fixed effects and province-specific time trends. Re-
gressions are weighted by the number of individual observations used
to calculate the averages for province-year. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. The coefficient is interpret as the effect of local labor mar-
ket conditions to days of teacher strikes. *** indicates significance at
the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates
significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.8: Effect of teacher wages on teacher strikes
Teacher Strikes
(1) (2)
Teacher wage year t 0.0102 -0.0119
(0.0126) (0.0130)
Teacher wage year t-1 0.0103 0.0229
(0.0133) (0.0212)
Teacher wage year t+1 -0.0177 0.0272
(0.0114) (0.0174)
Public administration strike exposure X
Province FE X
Year FE X
Province-specific time trends X
R-squared 0.018 0.569
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 1996-2009 data on
teacher wages from the Ministry of Education in Argentina and strike
data from CTI. The wages correspond to the wages of primary school
teachers with 10 years of experience in each province-calendar year. Both
columns include province and calendar year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the province level. The coefficient is interpreted as the
effect of strike exposure on teacher wages. *** indicates significance at
the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates
significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Short-Term Outcomes (12-17 Year Olds)
Male Female
Public Years of Home Not Public Years of Home Not
School Schooling Production Enrolled School Schooling Production Enrolled
Panel A: Stratification by Parental Education
At most primary education -0.0073** -0.0513*** 0.0030 0.0043 -0.0087** -0.0256 0.0011 0.0023
(0.0034) (0.0151) (0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0202) (0.0025) (0.0027)
Some secondary education -0.0039 -0.0307* 0.0019 0.0038 -0.0089** -0.0077 0.0029* 0.0041**
(0.0030) (0.0160) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0122) (0.0016) (0.0019)
Secondary education -0.0011 -0.0181 0.0020 0.0032 -0.0037 -0.0101 0.0017 0.0028*
(0.0029) (0.0114) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0136) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Some tertiary education 0.0019 -0.0176* 0.0013 0.0019 -0.0027 0.0032 0.0024* 0.0031**
(0.0034) (0.0097) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0034) (0.0101) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Tertiary education 0.0009 -0.0087 0.0012 0.0017 -0.0051 0.0067 0.0012 0.0022**
(0.0042) (0.0130) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0060) (0.0083) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Panel B: Stratification by Family Income
First quartile -0.0059 -0.0339** 0.0021 0.0041 -0.0110** -0.0220 0.0033* 0.0050**
(0.0044) (0.0144) (0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0052) (0.0165) (0.0017) (0.0020)
Second quartile -0.0022 -0.0353** 0.0029 0.0047* -0.0077* -0.0069 0.0025 0.0033*
(0.0022) (0.0136) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0097) (0.0015) (0.0017)
Third quartile 0.0024 -0.0179 0.0011 0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0003 0.0017 0.0024*
(0.0019) (0.0162) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0101) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Fourth quartile -0.0010 -0.0080 0.0009 0.0012 -0.0052 0.0027 0.0012 0.0023**
(0.0049) (0.0089) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0059) (0.0090) (0.0008) (0.0010)
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 12 to 17 year old respondents. The results are based on
individual-level regressions and the underlying model contains the same controls as that in column (2) of Table 17. Panel A interact the
treatment variable with 5 dummies for the maximum educational level of the head or spouse of the household (primary education or
less, incomplete secondary, complete secondary, incomplete tertiary, and complete tertiary). Panel B interacts the treatment variables
with 4 dummies of province-specific quartiles of per capita family income. Standard errors are clustered at the birth province level.***
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.10: Effect of Strikes During Secondary School
Years of Occupational Log Total Home
Education Sorting Wage Earnings Unemploy. Production
Panel A: Exposure to strikes during primary and secondary school
i. Male
Strike Exposure -0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.8551 0.0010** 0.0017**
(0.0138) (0.0007) (0.0029) (2.1016) (0.0004) (0.0006)
ii. Female
Strike Exposure -0.0083 0.0005 0.0017 -0.8612 0.0011** 0.0008
(0.0069) (0.0006) (0.0018) (1.1780) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Panel B: Exposure to strikes by educational level
i. Male
Primary Exposure -0.0157 -0.0012* -0.0023 -2.0373 0.0013*** 0.0019***
(0.0119) (0.0006) (0.0025) (1.4239) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Secondary Exposure 0.0131 0.0003 0.0021 0.2899 0.0007 0.0013*
(0.0130) (0.0007) (0.0029) (2.9300) (0.0005) (0.0008)
ii. Female
Primary Exposure -0.0188** 0.0003 0.0001 -1.9758* 0.0015*** 0.0024**
(0.0076) (0.0006) (0.0018) (1.1483) (0.0005) (0.0010)
Secondary Exposure 0.0020 0.0006 0.0033 -0.2375 0.0007 -0.0004
(0.0093) (0.0007) (0.0019) (1.0948) (0.0005) (0.0010)
Notes: Authors’ estimation of equation (3.1) using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respon-
dents. Panel A defines strike exposure as all the teacher strikes that took place during the years cohorts
were supposed to attend primary and secondary school (age 6 to 17). Panel B differentiates exposure
to teacher strikes between primary (age 6 to 12) and secondary (13 to 17). Regressions are weighted by
the number of individual observations used to calculate the averages for each birth year-birth province-
year. The coefficient is interpret as the effect of being exposed to teacher strikes for ten extra days.
Standard errors are clustered at the birth province level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, **
indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Table C.11: Differential Effect of Exposure to Long Lasting Strikes within an School Year
Years of Occupational Log Total Home
Education Sorting Wage Earnings Unemploy. Production
i. Male
Strike Exposure -0.0301*** -0.0016*** -0.0020* -1.6521 0.0008** 0.0010*
(0.0061) (0.0005) (0.0010) (1.0521) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Dummy of Exposure to 26-44 Strikes -0.1222* -0.0033 -0.0073 -12.7880 0.0032 0.0028
(0.0691) (0.0045) (0.0177) (12.4007) (0.0033) (0.0044)
Dummy of Exposure to More than 45 Strikes -0.0287 0.0004 -0.0344 -13.4280 0.0017 -0.0001
(0.1226) (0.0080) (0.0348) (18.9655) (0.0051) (0.0057)
ii. Female
Strike Exposure -0.0259*** 0.0001 -0.0005 -1.7583*** 0.0005 0.0029***
(0.0075) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.4546) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Dummy of Exposure to 26-44 Strikes 0.0371 0.0098 0.0032 24.1319* -0.0048 -0.0200*
(0.0814) (0.0061) (0.0163) (12.1390) (0.0047) (0.0097)
Dummy of Exposure to more than 45 Strikes 0.1308 0.0011 -0.0274 19.7115 0.0043 -0.0249
(0.1585) (0.0111) (0.0193) (22.1678) (0.0085) (0.0179)
Notes: Authors’ estimation using 2003-2015 EPH data on 30-to 40 year old respondents. Each column estimates equation (3.1)
adding two dummies to account for differential effect of strike exposure to long lasting strikes within one school year. These
variables are constructed by first identifying the maximum number of strikes in a school year for each birth province-birth year
cell. We create three mutually exclusive categories of strike maximum strike exposure if the maximum was lower than 25 days
within one year (42.9% of the sample), between 26 and 45 days (45.9 percent), or more than 45 days (11.1 percent). Regressions
are weighted by the number of individual observations used to calculate the averages for each birth year-birth province-year.
The coefficient on teacher strikes exposure is interpret as the effect of being exposed to teacher strikes for ten extra days during
primary school. Standard errors are clustered at the birth-province level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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